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INTRODUCTION
Canon 209 of the Codex Jurl3 Canonicl states that in 
common error and in positive and probable doubt, the Church 
supplies Jurisdiction. It reads - "In errore communi aut in 
dubio positive et probabili sive Juris sive facti, Jurisdiction- 
em supplet Ecclesia pro foro turn externo turn interno." In 
the present study we treat only of Jurisdiction supplied by 
reason of common error, because this is the point which pre­
sents most difficulty in practice.
As a rule, commentators on the Code treat the question 
of common error very briefly and very summarily: indeed, we
might even say that the point is generally unsatisfactorily 
dealt with - especially in view of the relatively important 
place it holds in ecclesiastical discipline, exercising, as it 
does, a fairly wide influence in the practical sphere of the 
valid performance of official functions. Due to the fact 
that most commentators confine themselves to a textual inter­
pretation of canon 209, there is at present much controversy 
as to the true notion of common error. Actually the doctrine
that the Church supplies Jurisdiction in common error - as 
codified in canon 209 ~ is very old. To arrive at the true 
notion of common error, therefore, it is necessary to examine 
the doctrine in its origin development and application down 
through the centuries. Thus a comprehensive examination of 
the historical background is demanded, and consequently the 
greater part of this essay is historical. The conclusions 
finally arrived at, make an interpretation of the present- 
Code discipline on common error a relatively easy task, and 
hence we devote to it only the two final chapters.
SECTION I.
THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON ERROR 
IN ROMAN LAW.
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g h a p t e r  I .
JUSTINIAN LAW.
It has been said of ancient Rome that her mission 
was war and her vocation law. That she fulfilled her mission 
is clear from a glance at the history of Roman military 
conquests. The fulfilment of her vodation is evidenced by 
the wftll-defined and highly-developed state of the legal system 
existing in the Roman state, long before the beginning of the 
Christian era - and by the influence this system has exercised 
on modern legal codes. Most European systems of the present 
day are based largely on that of ancient Rome. The Church 
too has, in no small measure, drawn from this same source: 
many canonical institutions owe their origin to Roman legal 
endeavour. Per instance, much of the terminology and many 
of the juridical notions contained in Book IV of the Codex 
Juris Canonici - treating of judicial processes - come di rectly 
from Roman law. But instances of this are not exclusively 
confined to Book IV of the Code: others might be mentioned.
It is interesting to note that the first and most typical case 
mentioned by Charles Boucaud when treating of this very 
question, in a paper read at the International Juridical 
Congress at Rome in 1934 - is that of Canon 209 (1).
Canon 209 - or at least that part of it which decrees 
that jurisdiction is supplied in common error - is undoubtedly 
a classical example of the influence of Roman law on Canon. 
Commentators on canon 209 unanimously agree in attributing its 
origin to Roman law. And it is most significant that pre-Code 
authors, in their treatment of the principles of common error, 
invariably appealed to Roman law in order to place the doctrine 
on a solid juridical basis. It Is obvious, therefore, that 
in order to have a proper understanding of the principles of 
canon 209 a brief study of their origin and original application 
will be essential.
(1) "Relatiorjg inter Jus Romanum et Codicem Renedir.tl XV”,
Acta Congressus Juridici Intemationnlis IV , p.48.
While there are many laws in the collections of 
Justinian which helped, to give rise to the doctrine under 
consideration, the outstanding case is that known as the Lex 
Barbarius(2) - the case to which canonical writers most 
frequently refer. By reason of its greater importance we 
shall first consider the Lex Barbarius: afterwards we shall 
examine the other minor, yet nonetheless important, cases 
which are, as it were, supplementary to the Lex Barbarius and 
help us to arrive at a more complete knowledge of the notion of 
the doctrine and its application, as obtaining in the Justinian 
legi slation.
Following is the text of the Lex Barbarius - Digest I,
14, 3.
Ulpianua libro trlgeslmo octavo ad Sabinum. Barbarius 
Phl£ippus, cum servus fugitivus esset, Romae praeturam petiit, 
et praetor designatus est. Sed nihil ei servitutem obstetisse 
ait pomponius, quasi praetor non fueritj atquin verum est, 
praetura eum functum. Et tamen videamus: si servus, quamdiu
latult dignitati praetoria functus sit, quid dicemus, quae 
edixit, quae decrevit, nullius fore momenti? an fore propter 
utilitatem eorum qui apud eum egerunt, vel lege, vel quo alio 
jure? Et verum puto, nihil eorum reprobari: hoc enim humanius
estj cum etiam potuit populus Romanus servo dicernere hanc 
pofcestatem: sed et si scisset servura esse, liberum efficisset.
Quod jus multo magis in Imperatore observandum e s t . " ^
In order to understand properly the full import of this 
law, and to demonstrate its relation too the subject matter under 
con si deration, it will be necessary to make a brief analysis of 
the text of the law itself, and to take a cursory glance at the 
historiaal background from which it emerges.
(2) D. I, 14, 3.
(3) This reading is taken from the critical edition of the 
Corpus Juris Civilis - Editio Stereotypa Quinta Decima, 
Berolini 1928-29, from which we also take other extracts 
from Justinian laws.
-3-
The chief judicial officer in the Roman state was the 
praetor. His duty was the administration of justice between 
the citizens. In the beginning there was but one praetor: 
however, with the expansion of the Snpire and the recognition 
of aliens by the law, it was found imperative to have extra 
praetors appointed - to cater for the administration of justice, 
firstly among aliens in the City, and secondly in the provinces. 
By the year 200 B.C., there were as many as six praetors. 
Appointed annually, following elections by the comitia centuriata 
- which embraced the whole body of the citizens, plebeian as 
well as patrician - the praetor ranked next to the Consul, At 
first the praetorship was confined to members of the Patrician 
group but under the Licinian laws in 337 B.C. it was opened to 
plebeians.^ This office however could never be held by a 
slave. In the Roman economy slayes had no rights of any kind.
As Moyle^5) puts it, ”In respect of capacity of right, slavery 
is a condition of absolute rightlessness. A slave could have 
no rights against either his master or anyone else .... a slave 
was not a •person1 at all; he had no caput (Inst.l, 16, 4).
The Roman lawyers looked upon him as a 'res1, and applied to him, 
as an object of property, the same rules which they laid down 
as to domestic animals.”
This being the Roman attitude towards slaves it was 
only to be expected that they should be excluded from holding 
public offices. Actually this exclusion is noted in Dig.V,
1, 12, 2 where it is stated that neither women nor slaves can 
hold civil offices - not because of any intrinsic incapacity 
but because custom would have it so.(6)
(4) cf. Hunter. Roman Law, p.34.
(5) Imperatorls Juatiniani Institutionum Libri Quattuor p.109.
(6) "quidam enlm lege impediuntur, ne judices Sint, quidam 
natura, quidam moribus. Natura ut surdus, mutus, et 
perpetuo furiosus, et lmpubes quia judicio carent. Lege 
(impeditur) qui senatu motus est. Moribus, feminae et 
servi, non quia non habent judicium, sed quia receptum 
est ut civilibus officiis non fungantur."
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The power of the praetor was twofold: he possessed
both .jurlsdlctlo and imperium. Juslsdlctlo (jus dicere)
expressed his power of administering the civil law. It could
he summed iqp in these words - "do, dico, addico - uttered by
the praetor In disposing of the several stages of a case.
That is to say, he gave permission to bring the cause into
court (dare actionem), and he appointed an arbitrator (dare
judlcem); he stated the law and shaped its application for
the investigation of the case before the arbitrator (dicere jus);
and he formally gave effect to the decision of the arbitrator
by vewting through his judgment a title to property or to
( 7)damages (addicere bona or damna)" According to Ulpian
it included the giving of possessio bonorum. the appointment 
of curators and the designation of arbitrators - a description
( Q )incorporated in the Digest of Justinian. The other element
of the praetor’s power, the imperium vested in him as part of 
the sovereign power that he possessed in virtue of his magis­
tracy. On the imperium were based the legislative as opposed 
to administrative and judicial functions of the praetor.
In the light of the foregoing we can readily understand 
the reason for Ulpian1s questions. Barbarius a fugitive slave 
came to Rome, apparently lived the life of an ordinary free 
citizen, and so successfully concealed his true identity that 
the people elected him to the office of praetor. as a slave 
he was incapable of holding his office - incapable of acquiring 
or exercising the power of jurisdictio and imperium. what of 
all the judicial actions he performed during the course of his 
office - actions performed by virtue of the office which he was
(7) Hunter. Roman Law, ps. 41-42.
(8) Dig. II, 1.1, "Jus dicenti officium latissimum est, nam 
et bonorum possessionem dare potest, et in possessjjiem 
mittere, pupillis non habentibus tutores constituere, 
judices litfcgantibus dare."
(9) Hunter. Roman Law, p.42.
thought to hold? ("Quae edlxit?") What of all the 
decrees issued by virtue of the imperium he was thought to 
possess? ("Quae decrevit?") Are all these official acts 
to be regarded as null and so devoid of juridical force? 
According to the strict letter of the law it would appear 
they should be. Ulpian however thought otherwise. In his 
opinion none of the acts should be reprobated. For the 
benefit of those who approached Barbarius in his official 
capacity, he considered that all official acts should be 
regarded as valid ("propter utilitatem eorum qui apud eum 
egerunt.")
It is to be noted of course that when Ulpian gave 
this reply at the beginning of the third century (Ulpian 
died 228 A.D.) it did not Immediately attain the force of 
law. We can reasonably assume however that from common usage, 
based on the authority of such an outstanding jurist-consult 
as Ulpian, the opinion was well established and widely accepted 
in pre-Justinian law. The opinion may actually have attained 
legal force by virtue of a constitution of Valentinian III in 
426 A.D.) This constitution - known as the "Law of Citations" 
- gave legal confirmation to all the writings of the five great 
jurists^^ and to all the passages quoted by them from other 
jurists, provided the correctness of such quotations should be 
verified. In case of disagreement, a majority of these 
authorities on any point determined the law. The opinion 
certainly acquired the force of a "lex scripta" by its 
incorporation in the Digest of Justinian which was promulgated 
A*D. 533.
So much for the Lex Barbarius. we now come to 
consider an extract from the Code of Justinian, (promulgated 
A.D. 529) which may help to throw more light on the state of
(10) I.e. Galus, Papinian, Ulpian, Paul and Madestinus.
the doctrine in Justinian’s time - it is taken from cod. VIIJ 
45, 2 and reads* "Si arbiter datus a magistratibus cum 
sententiam dixit, in libertate morabatur, quamvis postea in 
servitutem depulsus sit, sententia ab eo dicta habet rei 
judicatae auctoritatem."
An ’arbiter* in Roman law was a person appointed to 
find the facts with regard to a given case of litigation, and 
to pronounce sentence according to his findings - after the 
praetor had determined the law of the matter in the proceedings 
in .lure. He differed from the ordinary .judex in this that 
in pronouncing his opinion on the facts the arbiter could 
exercise a much wider discretion than was ordinarily open to 
the judex, and he could also decide from special knowledge. 
Besides, while there could never be mor4 than one judex, many 
arbiters could be appointed for the same case.^11  ^ Prom the 
very purpose of his function - especially from the fact that 
he was chosen by reason of expert knowledge in a particular 
case - we can conclude that an arbiter’s function was more 
in the nature of delegated power than of a permanent office.
In effect he was simply a judex delegatus - a fact which is 
verified by the glossator’s comment on the words "Si arbiter" 
of the law quoted above.
What this extract from the Code has in mind therefore 
is briefly this: A slave, who was commonly considered free,
acts as a delegated judge in a particular law-suit. After
sentence has been passed it comes to light that he is in
(13)reality not free. Being a slave he was of course
incapable of pronouncing a valid sentence. Nevertheless in
Sandars, Institutes of Justinian. P. LXIII.
(12) C.VII, 45, 2. gloss on words "si arbiter" - "Si arbiter, 
i.e. judex delegatus."
(13) cf. c. VII, 45, 2. gloss on word "Depulsus"- "Depulsus -
i.e. inventus servus et a domino vindicates."
-6-
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the circumstances, the legislator declares that this sentence 
has the force of a res .judicata, and so is valid and binding.
This case is in many respects merely a repetition of 
the Lex Barbarius: there is however one Interesting difference
between the two. while the Lex Barbarius considers the case 
of a slave exercising ordinary power by virtue of a permanent 
office, this latter case treats of a slave performing a function 
by virtue of delegated power. In both cases the acts of the 
slave are declared valid; the conclusion is that in Justin­
ian's legislation defects of both ordinary and delegated power 
were supplied by virtue of the principles of common error.
This point is interesting principally because of the contro­
versies and discussions which hinge around it in the course 
of the development of the doctrine later on in Canon Law.
Another very interesting question in connection with
the principles of common error is raised by Novella XLIV,
1, 4. We may summarize it briefly as follows. According
to this Constitution it was permissible and lawful for a
Tabellio (notary) to have a helper or substitute to whom he
(14)could delegate some of his duties. Apart from this one
helper however, the Tabellio could not validly^15) delegate 
xBaBxait another to perform any of his functions. ^ 16  ^ But if 
this law is not observed, and if despite its prohibition a
(14) Nov. XLIV, 1, 4. ”Propter tales enlm eorum forte 
dubitationes daraus eis (tabellionibus) licentiam singulis 
m u m  ad hoc constituere ... et licentiam ei dare ut dele- 
gentur ei ab iis qui veniunt ad ejua stationem et docu- 
menta; et diraissis eis interesse ...."
(15) NOTE. It Is clear that the tabellio in this case could 
not validly appoint a second helper or substitute. The 
power to delegate one substitute is In the nature of a 
privilege granted by the Snperor. ”... Propter tales 
enim eorum forte dubitationes, damns els licentiam m u m  ad 
hoc constituere.” Being a privilege therefore, and being 
restricted to the delegation of one substitute only, the 
delegation of a second must be regarded as absolutely 
ultra vires and consequently invalid. cf. B. Pontius.
De Sacramento Matrimonii, Lib. V. cap. XX, n.5. ’
(16) Nov. XLIV, 1.4. ”... et null! omnino alter! in stations 
existenti, licentiam esse, ut aut delegetur ei initium, 
aut cum dimittuntur intersit; nisi tabellioni qui auctor­
itatem habet, aut qui ab eo ad hoc statutus est,”
-8-
i second substitute is appointed by a Tabellio, that Tabellio
f
is to be punished: but the acts of this second substitute
are to be regarded as valid - "ipsls tamen docunentis propter
f17)utilitatem contrahentiura non infirmandis. '
A Tabellio may be described as a public notary or 
scrivener who drew up written instruments such as contracts 
wills etc.^18) In the circumstances visualized here a 
public notary has been invalidly appointed because of the 
absence of due authority or power in the person appointing. 
Presumably however he is commonly considered a proper and 
duly appointed notary, as people enter into contracts before 
him and have official documents drawn up by him. For the 
benefit of such people the legislator declares that all docu­
ments and instruments drawn up by such a notary are to be 
looked upon as valid. But it is certain that a notary, 
though he exercises a public office, does not possess the 
power of jurisdlctlo or imperium as does the praetor: his
power is merely that of authoritatively witnessing; it has 
no relation to judicial or legislative authority. Therefore 
in treating of common error in Justinian* s legislation we are 
not exclusively concerned with supplying the power of 
.lurisdlctlo. Other "powers" were also supplied. Indeed 
the intention or purpose of the legislation we have so far 
examined, seems to have been to guard against the invalidity 
of acts or contracts whenever the public good was endangered 
through common error - by supplying in all public persons or 
officials, any power or capacity that might be lacking in them, 
by reason of a hidden defect, and which was necessary for the 
valid performance of official functions. Thus to the slave
(17) Nov. XLIV, 1, 4.
(18) cf. C. I, 2, 14; cf. also Jac. Facciolatus Totius 
Latinitatis Lexicon (London 1828) v. Tabellio.
/■
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(19)
who acted as praetor was supplied jurisdictio and imperium; 
to the slave who acted as delegated judge was supplied the 
power to pronounce a valid sentence;(^0) invalidly
appointed notary was supplied the capacity to draw up public
4. (21)documents.
All this is very reasonable and equitable. It would 
indeed be very harsh and severe on the members of a community 
if, through an error on their part - an error entirely 
inculpable - they should be obliged to suffer the many incon­
veniences attached to the consequent invalidity of acts and 
contracts. But the same inconveniences follow frcm invalidity 
of acts whatever the cause of the invalidity may be - whether 
it be the lack of jurisdiction in an official or the absence 
of any other juridical power or authority. It would scarcely 
be reasonable for the legislator, therefore, to declare that 
on account of the public utility he would supply jurisdictio 
to an official who lacked it, while omitting to supply the 
defect of any other power to other public officials, when the 
same public utility equally demanded it. Not that Justinian's 
X  laws have drawn such a distinction; we have sufficiently proved 
that they h#ve not. But we emphasize the point here chiefly 
because we shall have occasion to refer to it later on, where 
it may have a very practical application, and so wish to bring 
it out here in its own proper setting.
We have spoken above of the legislator supplying 
certain defects: we have said that he supplied jurisdictio
and imperium to the slave-praetor, that he supplied capacity 
to the invalidly appointed notary to enable him to draw up 
valid documents. In this we have anticipated just a little.
(19) D.I. 14, 3.
(20) G.VII, 45, 2.
(21) Nov. XLIV, 1, 4.
10'
For on closer examination of those laws we have just been 
discussing, we find that though they certainly legislate for 
the validity of acts by reason of common error, they do not 
expressly state from whence that validating force comes.
(28)Equity demands, it is true, that these acts should be valid, 
but where precisely does the source of this validating power 
lie, and how is the validation effected? The answer to this 
question seems to be found in the Institutes of Justinian. (2 )^
It may be well to recall that though the primary purpose of 
the Institutes was to meet the need for a suitable text-book 
for law-students, still like the Codex and the Digest, this 
collection too had the force of law.
'lh.e case of interest here refers to the making of wills,
and again a slave plays an Important role in the matter. In
order to make a valid will at Roman law "it was established
that the testament should be made at one and the same time
in the presence of seven witnesses, and with the subscription
of the witnesses and with their seals appended, according to
the edict of the p r a e t o r . 24  ^ Certain classes of people
were debarred from the function of validly witnessing -
”... women, persons under the age of puberty, slaves, dumb
f 25 )persons, madmen .... cannot be witnesses.”' ' But what of a 
witness who is a slave but commonly considered free? The 
text continues:- ”Sed cum aliquls ex testibus testament! 
quidem faciendi tempore liber existimabatur; postea vero 
servus apparuit, tam D. Hadrianus Catonio Vero, quam postea 
Divi Severus et Antoninus rescripserunt subvenire se ex sua
(22) cf. D. I, 14, 3, ”... Quia humanius est ”
(23) Inst. II, 10, 7.
(24) Inst. II, 10, 3: For translation cf, Sandars. Institutes
of Justinian, P. 1671
(25) Inst. II, 10, 6. cf. also D. XXVIII, 1 20, 7. "Servus
quoque merito ad sollemnia adhlberi non potest; cum
juris civilis communionem non habeat in totum, ne
praetoris quidem edicti."
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liberalitate testamento, ut sic habeatur fir-mum ac si ut
oportebat factum asset: cum eo tempore, quo testamentum
signaretur omnium consensu his testis liber loco fuisset,
(26)neque quisquam esset qui status ei quaestionem moveret.”
Briefly, this text makes it clear that the Bnperors 
declared that they came to the aid of, or healed, a certain 
will which would have been invalid by reason of the fact that 
one of the seven witnesses to the will was a slave. And it 
is significant to note that the reason why the Bnperors thus 
aided the will is recorded, viz., since at the time when the 
testament was sealed, this witness was commonly considered a 
free man. By its inclusion in the Institutes of Justinian 
this extract obtiined the force of law, and applied ipso .jure 
to all cases similar to that visualized in it; thus constitut­
ing a stabilized general validating principle for all wills to 
which a person who was occultly inhabllis to testify, might 
happen to be a witness. After Its inclusion in the text of 
the Institutes there could be very little grounds for taking 
this extract as meaning that the Saperor would heal each will 
made in such circumstances by individual sanationea granted 
post factum - this would be contrary to the obvious significance 
and effect of the inclusion of a particular ruling in a work 
of codification such as that of Justinian. we may justifiably 
conclude that Inst. II, 10, 7 ia intended to be what the 
glossators later took it to be, viz., a statement that in 
common error certain defects will be supplied. We shall now 
examine the text more closely.
In determining the validity or otherwise of a will 
from the viewpoint of proper witnessing, regard was had only
(26) Inst. II, 10, 7.
12-
to the condition of witnesses at the time of signature.(27) 
Hence in the foregoing case the will should, by the strict 
letter of the law, be null - because one of the witnesses was 
actually a slave at the time of signature. However, the 
Bnperor by his supreme power, because of common error (this 
witness was commonly considered a free-man), aids or heals such 
a testament. He does not dispense from the lav; requiring 
seven witnesses - nor does he say that he supplies the testi­
mony of the seventh witness: if that were so he could just
as easily supply the testimony of a seventh witness when the 
seventh witness was absent entirely; but there is no law to 
that effect. what the Snperor does say is that he "would aid 
or heal such a testament." The defect in this testament is 
due to the lack or absence, in one of the witnesses, of the 
juridical capacity required for the ?alid performance of the 
function of witnessing. Hence the supreme ruler bestows on 
the slave, for this particular occasion, the juridical 
capacity required by the law in order to act validly as a 
witness. There can scarcely be any doubt that the same 
solution applies to the case of Barbarius. The supreme 
lawgiver - whether it be the people or the Snperor - 
supplied in him the juridical capacity required by law for 
the performance of the functions attaching to his office: 
it conferred on him the requisite .jurisdictio and imperium 
enabling him to perform official acts ab initio valid. And 
the same may be said of the slave who was commonly reputed 
to be arbiter, and of the notqry who was invalidly appointed 
yet still conmonly regarded as legitimate. To each the 
supreme law-giver supplied the requisite capacity to perform 
their respective functions validly.
(27) D. XXVIII, 1, 22, 1. "condiclonem testium tunc
inspicere debemus cum signarent, non mortis tempore.”
In comparing this last case of the slave testifying
or witnessing a will with the three cases we have earlier
examined we notice one point of difference. All cases agree
in this that th®re is common error present with regard to a
particular person: they a^ .1 have it In common too, that the
supreme lawgiver supplies a defect in the capacity of that
particular person with regard to whom the common error exists.
But while in the case of Barharius, of the arbiter, and of the
notary, all could be said to be public officials or at least
exercising a public function, the slave who merely witnessed
a will could scarcely be termed such. But despite the fact
that this slave-witness did not exercise a public function,
there Is no doubt that the same validating principle applied 
to his act as applied 
/to the acts of Barbarius: the text of the Inst. II, 10, 7
is unquestionable. We must conclude then that not only did
the principles apply to public officials, but they also
supplied the defect of capacity in others who, though not
public officials, could endanger the public good by performing
acts that were invalid by reason of some occult juridical
incapacity. The application of the doctrine in Justinian1s
legislation, therefore, was very wide and comprehensive. By
reason of common error the defect of delegated as well as
ordinary power was supplied. By virtue of It too, not only
was ,1urlsdictlo supplied but also the defect of any juridical
capacity the absence of which, in a person about whom the
error existed, would result in the invalidation of acts
performed by him. Aud finally, It was not even necessary
that this person be exercising a public office or function.
Such was the teaching of Roman law on common error.
In Justiniai's time, of course, the term »common error* was 
not in use - its origin probably does not go back further
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than the 12th century; but the doctrine corresponding to 
what we now understand by that term certainly was. There 
can be no doubting that the Roman law on the matter had a 
deep influence on Canon law afterwards. For that reason 
we have gene into some detail in our examination of the 
doctrine as contained in the Collections of Justinian, but 
feel that we have not drawn any conclusions that are not 
obviously implied, or even presupposed, in the text of the 
laws concerned.
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c h a p t e r  II. 
glossators oh roman l a w .
It is outside the scope of our work here to trace 
the history of Roman law in all its vicissitudes, during 
the centuries following the time of Justinian. A hrief 
sunmiary will be sufficient for our purpose.
In the beginning Justinian law had force only in 
the Eastern Qnpire. However by the victories of his generals 
Belisarius and Narses over the Ostrogoths, Italy became subject 
to Justinian, and he ordered that the civil law as sanctioned 
by him should prevail there also. Although during the next 
three centuries, the various states of Italy successively 
gained independence and were thus severed from Byzantine 
influence, still the Justinian law remained practically 
unaltered in Italy. This was largely due to the fact of 
its excellence and because it suited the needs of the age. 
Another reason however, which cannot be overlooked was "the 
influence and authority of the church in ' supporting and 
fostering the Justinian legislation. For the Popes and 
Pontifical courts ranked the Roman civil law only a little 
lower than the Canon law and consistently upheld Its authority; 
their influence penetrating far beyond the borders of the 
States of the Church, wherever an ecclesiastic found his w a y " ^  
The same ecclesiastical influence was a big factor in the 
preservation of Roman law in Gaul.
But though Roman law lived on in practice, as a 
science during those centuries of the dark ages it was 
practically dead. The study of it did continue to a certain 
e x t e n t  i n  t h e  schools of Rome, R aven na  and Pavia* but no
(1) Hunter. Roman Law, p.98.
outstanding names and no important works bear testimony to 
any degree of proficiency or progress. with the institution 
of the juridical school at Bologna, however, towards the end 
of the 11th century, the study of jurisprudence had a cele­
brated revival. Credit for this revival is chiefly due to 
the renowned jurist imerlus. Using the collections of 
Justinian as a text, he delivered public lectures and held 
disputations which attracted students from all over Europe - 
thus bringing into importance again the works of Justinian.
But our chief interest in Imerlus here is the fact that he 
was the first of the glossators - the name given to those 
jurists who inscribed on the manuscripts of the Justinian 
laws interlineal and marginal notes explaining difficult words 
and passages. The glossators flourished for about a century 
and a half after the time of Imerlus, and their commentaries 
covered the whole of the Justinian books, or as we refer to 
them, - the "Corpus Juris Civills." Last of these glossators 
was Accursius ( 1260). From extracts both from his own,
and from the glosses of his predecessors, Accursius compiled 
a gloss which came into common use as the "glossa ordinaria," 
and constitutes the accepted gloss on the Corpus Juris 
Civilis.
Although the glossators showed an understanding of 
the doctrine of common error and of its application in general, 
It can not be said that they made any advance towards a fuller 
and more complete treatment of the subject. Apart from the 
introduction of a few technical terras it may be said that they 
left the doctrine in much the same state as It had been under 
Justinian. However, a few of the points they make will be of 
interest. Naturally, of course, the glosses of chief interest 
will be those made on the laws we have already treated In the 
previous chapter.
According to the gloss on Dig.I, 14, 3 v. Barbarius 
three questions are asked in this law:-
1. whether Barbarius was a real praetor.
2. Whether his acts of administration were valid.
3. Whether he became free as a result of being appointed
praetor?
As far as the second question is concerned there can be no
doubt. But the answers to the first and third questions
proposed here deserve a little consideration. In a subsequent
(2)gloss the first question is answered. This gloss begins 
by quoting the opinion of some who contend that the question 
is not answered in the text, but nevertheless hold that 
Barbarius was not a real praetors Chief argument for their 
position is based on the rule - "Quod tails fuerit medio 
tempore, quails postea deprehenditur. "(3) but Barbarius 
was discovered to be a slave after he had been in office for 
some time; he must therefore have been a slave also during 
his term of office; and thus could not be a real praetor. 
Accursius however insists on the contrary opinion. Arguing 
from the text - "sed nihil ei servitutem obstetisse ait 
Pomponius"(4) he asserts that the question ij3 answered, and
answered in the affirmative, viz., that Barbarius was a true
(5)praetor. To the argument adduced by the opposing view
that because Barbarius was afterwards discovered to be a slave, 
he must therefore have been a slave during his term of office, 
Accursius makes a further appeal to the text of the Lex 
Barbarius to prove that Barbarius had attained freedom by 
his appointment to the praetorship. He recalls the words 
of the text, "sed et si scisset (populus Romanus) servum
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esse, liberum effecisset." and remarks that the Roman
(2) D.I. 14, 3 gloss on words "Functus sit."
(3) cf. C.IV. 55, 4:- "Sed quoadusque probaveris quae intendis
status tuus esse (is) videtur, qui in te post manumissionem 
deprehenditur."
(4) D.I. 14, 3.
(5) D.I. 14, 3, gloss cn words "Functus sit:" "Tu dicas huic
quaestioni responder! ibi supra "sed nih.il .. etc." et sic 
fuit praetor. (6) D.I. 14, 3.
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people would have made Barbarius free, rather than have the
office usurped. But in this case when the people did not
even know Barbarius was a slave - is he still made free? The
glossator asserts that he is - in order that men might not be 
(7)deceived.
To both questions then Accursius answers in the 
affirmative: Barbarius was a real praetor, and he was free.
We do not intend to criticize the arguments drawn from the 
text of the law by the glossator in support of his opinion, 
even though there are obvious objections. Our object here 
is, rather to ascertain as clbsely as possible the notions 
of the glossators with regard to the mode of supplying of 
jurisdiction or power, in so far as they can be deduced, 
from their attitude to these two questions. There can be 
no doubt that the glossator knew that a deficiency had to be 
supplied in the case of Barbarius. But how was this done? 
From the fact that Accursius held Barbarius to be a real 
praetor, it must follow as a logical consequence that he 
must have regarded the supplying of the deficiency as consist­
ing in one act on the part of the legislator - one act by 
which he rectified the position, as it were, once for all, 
and endowed the s lav e-praetor with habitual power for the 
duration of his office. It is most unlikely, of course, 
that the jurists of that period examined the problem from the 
point of view as to whether Barbarius possessed oft enjoyed 
jurisdictio per modum habitus or per modum actus. But in 
tracing the development of any given doctrine, we feel that 
one is justified in designating the various stages of progress 
by recognized modem technical terms, provided it can be 
established that they correspond with the a c t u a l  notions and 
ideas of the writers of the period under consideration.
(7) D.I, 14, 3, gloss on word "Effeelsset” - "Credimus quod 
fecisset potius quam dignitatem eriperet. Sed an hoc 
casu quando ignoravit fuerit liber? Die quod sic, 
ne homines decipiantur.H
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In the present instance there can be little room for doubt; 
the position adopted by Accursius implies that the acts of 
Barbarius were valid as a natural consequence of his official 
position, and therefore, according to our terminology, he 
possessed and exercised jurisdiction "per modum habitus."
As we have just noted, the glossators held that Barbar­
ius was a real praetor. Later on jurists and canonists 
referred to him as a praetor putatlvus, and this term came to 
be applied to all officials who were found to be in the same 
circumstances as Barbarius, i.e. commonly reputed to be an 
official though in reality incapable of holding office by 
reason of a hidden defect. The glossators however sqern to 
have been the first to use the term - and in a context very 
similar to that discussed above, so much so that it seems 
inconsistent with the opinion that Barbarius should be termed 
a real praetor.
The context in which they use the term has reference 
to the question discussed in the previous chapter - whether 
a will is valid, if among the seven witnesses required by 
law there is included one who is incapax by reason of being a 
slave but who is coimionly reputed free.(8V we have seen 
already that when determining the juridical position of wills 
from the viewpoint of proper witnessing, regard must be had
(9)only of the condition of witnesses at the time of signature.
But Cod. VI, 23,1, directs that the will be regarded as valid 
provided the witnesses were either free, or generally believed 
to be free, at the time of signature.^10  ^ This rule Is
(8) Inst. II, 10, 7: cf. also C. VI, 23, 1.
(9) D. XXVIII, 1, 22.
(10) "Testes, servi an liberi fuerint, non in hac causa 
tractari oportet: cum et tempore, quo testamentum 
signabatur, omnium consensu liberorum, loco habiti sint.."
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neatly summed up by the glossator - "Quo tempore consideratur
(11)conditio vera vel putatlva ut valeat testamentum". Here the
terms conditio vera and conditio putatlva are placed on the
same footing in so far as each of them produce the same legal
(12)effects, though in different ways, but a real distinction
is maintained between them. One wonders why the same dis­
tinction was not made and applied in the case of one who was 
a real praetor and one who was only commonly reputed to be 
such, as was Barbarius - especially seeing that the glossators 
realized that both laws (D.I, 14, 3 and 0. VI, 23, 1,) were 
based on the same principle, for in the very next gloss^13  ^
we read "Error ergo communis aliquid facit ut ff. de officio 
Praet.L. Barbarius"(14) Probably however, if they had 
discussed the question, the glossators would have held the 
slave in this case to be a real witness, even though they 
referred to his condition as putatlva. And so they could 
refer to the condition of Barbarius at time of appointment 
as putative, but nevertheless regard him as a real praetor.
However, the question is not one of great importance: 
our chief object ia mentioning the point is to introduce the 
new term putatlva which shall be frequently met with in later 
chapters. And if there is really inconsistency in the 
teachings of the glossators in holding Barbarius to be a real 
praetor, while distinguishing between the conditio vera and 
putatlva of a slave-witness in a very similar context, it can 
easily be accounted for by the inmature and undeveloped notion 
of the doctrine at this period.
(11) Cod. VI, 23, 1, gloss on word Slgnabatur.
(12) i.e. conditio vera produces the effect by reason of 
capacity possessed in accordance with law, conditio 
putatlva, by reason of capacity supplied by the legislator.
(33) C. VI; 23, 1, gloss on word "Omnium."
(14) NOTE, "ff. de officio Praetoris L. Barbarius, D. I, 14,
3; This was the old method of quoting the Corpus Juris 
Civil is.
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To the glossators too we are Indebted for the intro­
duction of the term "Error communis." It is beyond all 
question that the idea conveyed by this term, according to 
the mind of the glossators, corresponds exactly to the cases 
we 'nave been discussing so far, - the cases of the slave praetor 
and the slave witness who were commonly reputed to be free.
Not so clear, however, are the expressions in which the term 
error communis is usually found. Up and down throu$i the
notes of the glossators we find phrases such as "... et sic
(15)communis error facit jus." "Error communis aliquid
(16) (i7)facit" , "circa factum error communis facit jus;" while
in another context the term is enshrined in versed8 ) - "Et
error communis facit jus ut patet his versibus:-
"Error communis jus efficit, ut manifestat 
Testifleans servus, qui liber creditur esse."
It is difficult to determine the exact meaning of 
these phrases chiefly due to the vagueness of the Latin word 
"jus." This term can signify either a subjective right or 
an objective norm of law. The phrase "Error conmunis facit 
jus" might mean that because of common error there is confer­
red on an individual (about whae capacity the error exists) 
the light to have certain of his actions regarded as valid.
Or it may mean that common error constitutes an objective norm 
or law, by which are rendered valid certain acts of one 
about whose capacity the error exists.
But whatever the attitude of the glossators on this 
particular point may have been, it is at least clear that they 
used the phrases as a trite and concise summary of the prin­
ciple contained in the laws we have been examining - D.I, 14,
3, Inst. II, 10, 7. etc. This much can be deduced from the
(15) D. XXXIII, 10, 3 gloss on words Usum Imperatorum.
(16) C.VI, 23, 1 gloss on word "Omnium."
(17) D.I. 14, 3, gloss on word "Reprobarl."
(18) Inst. II, 10, 7 gloss on words "Omnium consensu."
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fact that the phrases are found principally among the glosses
on these laws, or if used elsewhere they refer back to these
(19)laws, especially to the Lex Barbarius.
In concluding our examination of the writings of the
glossators we would wish to draw attention to a further point -
not because there is anything new or more advanced in it, tut
rather to stress the unity and continuity of teaching between
Justinian*s legislation and the glossators. This point is
that the glossators did not confine the influence of the
validating effects of the principle of the Lex Barbarius to
the supplying of jurisdiction. They realized that by reason
of the principle there could be supplied deficiencies with
regard to capacity to witness wills, - "Communis error jus
efficit ut manifestat testificans servus qui liber creditur 
,,(20)esse." Likewise the principle applied to the supplying
of the authoritas to a notary Invalidly appointed or otherwise
invalidly holding office. - "Item nota hie aliud optimum
argumentm quod ubicumque tabellio perdit officium suum
(quod est propter fflultas causas: ut quia ministraverit
scripturam alienations rei sacra ) quod non ideo debent
(21)vitiare sua instrumenta." Just as in Justinian’s legis­
lation therefore, the purpose of the doctrine according to the 
glossators seems to have been that it should supply any 
defect of juridical power or capacity - independently of 
whether the person about whom the error prevailed was a public 
official or not, - whenever the public utility demanded.
(19) e.g. C. VI, 23, 1, gloss on word Omnium - "Error ergo 
communis aliquid facit ut ff. de officio Praetoris 
L. Barbarius."
(SO) Inst. II, 10, 7 gloss on words "Omnium consensu."
(21) Nov. XLIV, 1, 4, gloss on word "Document!s."
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SECTION II.
THE DOCTRINE OP COMMON ERROR IN CANON LAW FROM 
THE TIME OP GRATIAN TO THE 17th CENTURY•
Having examined the doctrine of common error in 
Homan Law, we now come to treat of it in ecclesiastical 
legislation. We shall find that for many centuries the 
Church had no express positive legislation on the point, 
and that the teaching was introduced into ecclesiastical 
discipline by custom and use. Adverting to the need for 
some such supplying principle, canonists borrowed the 
principle of Roman Law, which we have examined above, 
and applied it to canonical matters: by the constant
and consistent application of this principle to canonical 
matters the doctrine became firmly established in eccles­
iastical jurisprudence. In the present section we shall 
treat of the introduction into, and the early development 
of the principle in, Church Law. In the first chapter
we shall examine the doctrine from the time of GrAtian 
to the end of the ll+th century: in the second we shall
discuss the teaching of the 15th and 16th century 
canonists.
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C H A P T E R  I.
INTRODUCTION OP THE DOCTRINE TO CANON LAW.
ART I. THE INFLUENCE OF GRATIAN.
Born in Tuscany, John Gratian (Joannes Gratianus) 
was a Camaldolese monk of the monastery of Sts. Felix and 
Nabor at Bologna. The date of his birth is unknown as is 
also that of his death, but he certainly died before the 
Third Latern Council (1179), which refers to him as already 
dead - perhaps even before 1160.^^ Gratian was the author 
of the collection of laws generally referred to as the 
"Decretum Gratiani" or simply the "Decretum," which constitutes 
the first part of the "Corpus Juris Canonici." In his work, 
the author set out to remedy the deficiencies and shortcom­
ings of pre-existing collections, and especially to reconcile 
the discordances in them. The importance of his work may be 
measured by the fact that it marks the beginning of a new era 
in the science of Canon Law.
But while emphasizing the merit of the "Decretum" as 
a collection of laws, its legal authority must not be over­
estimated. It is the work of a private individual and 
consists of excerpts from Sacred Scripture, canons of many 
Councils and Synods, letters of Roman Pontiffs and extracts 
from civil law, as well as what are termed Dicta Gratiani - 
or private opinions inserted by the author himself. This 
collection was never approved by the Church as an authentic 
code of law. Even after its revision and correction carried
out by the Correctores Romani (1561+-1580) it did not become
(2)authentic, because the approval given by Gregory XIII
applied to the text of the revisers - not to the canons
(3)contained therein. The extracts and canons constituting
(1) cf. A. VAN HOVE. prolegomena, n.3U3.
(2) Brief "Cum pro Munere Pastorali." July 1st 1580.
(3) cf. GASPARRI, Praefatio to the Codex J.C. - "Gratiani 
Decreto publica nullo tempore accessit auctoritas."
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the Decretum, therefore, have exactly the same legal force 
and authority as they would have if they had never been 
inserted in the collection - they acquired no further authority 
by reason of their inclusion. These points are essential 
for a proper critical examination and true evaluation of the 
text of the Decretum, one of the canons of which we are now 
about to consider.
This Canon to which we refer - c.l, C.Ill, q.7, - is 
the first and apparently sole direct reference to the question 
of common error in the whole of the Corpus Juris Canonicl.
We quote the text: "Infamis persona, nec procurator esse
potest, nec cognitor. Tria sunt quibus aliqui impediuntur, 
ut judices non fiant (natura, ut surdus, et mutus et qui 
perpetuo furiosus est et impubes, quia judicio careant.
Lege, qui senatu amotus est. Moribus foeminae et servi, 
non quia non habeant judicium, sed quia receptum est ut 
civilibus officiis non fungantur). Verumtamen, si servus 
dum putaretur liber, ex delegatione sententiam dixit, quamvis 
postea in servitutem depulsus sit, sententia ab eo dicta rei 
judicatae firmitatem tenet."
Gratian has introduced this canon with the note,
"Dixit enim Sancta Romana Synodus, thus giving the impression, 
at first glance, that the whole canon was a decree passed by 
that Council. Such is not the case. The only section of 
this canon taken from the Roman Synod is the first sentence - 
"Infamis persona, nec procurator esse potest nec cognitor."
The remainder is inserted by Gratian himself and is taken 
from various sources in the Code and Digest of Justinian.
(U)For this we have the authority of the "Correctores Romani."
(U) cf. Notationes Correctoru®, Corpus Juris Canonici,
(Editio Lipsiensi) ad c.l, C.III, q.7. "Prior pars 
huius capituli usque ad versam "cognitor" habetur in 
Epistola 2 Felicis I, in qua refert Synodum a se 
habitam .... Reliqua vero huius capiti videntur esse 
Gratiani, surapta tamen fere ad verbum ex 1. quum praeter, 
Versic quidam enim ff. de judiciis, quemadmodum et in 
sequenti capite multa colliguntur ex variis legibus 
Digestorum et Codicis."
A glance at the Roman laws referred to will suffice to prove
this beyond all doubt. The section of the canon commencing
"Natura......" is taken word for word from D.V, 1, 12. And
the section commencing "Verumtamen ....." - which is our chief
interest here - is only a slight variation of C.VII, U5,2. For
the sake of comparison we recall the text of this law - "Si
arbiter datus a magistratibus cum sententiam dixit in libertate
morabatur, quamvis postea in servitutem depulsus sit, sententia
ab eo dicta habet rei judicatae auctoritatem." As can be
seen the variations in the wording between this law and the
text of Gratian are very slight: indeed the difference in
wording is due to the fact that Gratian incorporated in his
text the explanations and notes of the glossators with regard 
(^to this law.v ' The inclusion of these comments of the 
glossators is easily understood when it is remembered that 
Gratian compiled his collection about the year 111*0 at Bologna, 
just when the glossators on the Corpus Juris Divilis were at 
the peak of their fame. The text of c.l, C.Ill, q.7, vers.
"Verumtamen ....." therefore is essentially the same law as
that contained in C.VII, U5>2, and as such it retains and 
enjoys the legal force of that law. Hence when subsequent 
canonists refer to c.l, C.Ill, q.7 and quote it as a basis 
for their doctrine otf common error they are quite justified
in doing so; not because the text has any juridical force
/
by reason of its inclusion in the Decretum Gratiani - but 
because the text has legal force by reason of the fact that 
it is, in effect, an authentic law of Justinian. The precise 
force or authority this text enjoys in relation to Canon law 
will be determined later when we shall be treating the general 
question of the relation between civil law and canon. For the 
present it will be sufficient to note that this text of Gratian 
has the same legal standing as the Lex Berbarius which Gratian 
did not mention.
(5) cf. Supra Sec. I, ch.1. Footnotes (12) & (13)•
-27-
To assess the value of this text in so far as it 
indicates the extent to which the doctrine of common error 
obtained in canonical jurisprudence at the time of Gratian 
ia not easy. It can certainly be said, however, that Gratian 
realised the necessity for such a supplying principle in canon 
law, and that he was convinced that Roman law supplied the 
defect of that principle. ^  Obviously he intended that if 
a slave commonly reputed free was ever appointed an ecclesiasti­
cal judge his sentence should be regarded as valid. Furthermore 
from the fact that it was a law declaring that an infamis 
could not be procurator or judge^^ which was the occasion of 
his mentioning the Roman law teaching, we can presume that he 
intended that the sentences pronounced by a judge who was de 
facto infamis but generally not known to be so, should also 
be regarded as valid; but to what extent this represented 
the teaching of his time we cannot judge. It would be very 
rash indeed to conclude from this text that the doctrine of 
common error was an accepted thing at this time. On the 
contrary from the general drift of the text - and especially 
from the rigid adherence to the minute details of the Roman 
law - we can safely assume that it is a pioneer attempt to 
introduce the doctrine to Canon law. It is the private 
opinion of a great jurist which points out as it were a lacuna 
in ecclesiastical law and indicates a process by which this 
lacuna could be rectified.
To sum up, therefore, we may say of Gratian that he 
raised an important question in canonical jurisprudence and 
pointed the way to its solution. And the subsequent growth 
and evolution of the doctrine of common error in Canon law may,
(6) NOTE. Gratian attached the same legal force to Roman 
legislation as to the ecclesiastical canons so long as it 
did not contradict the latter. - cf. Dictum Gratiani post 
c.U, C.XV, q.3.
(7) c.l, CIII, q. 7 - ex Romana Synodo.
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in no small measure, be attributed to the initiative and 
ihfluence of this great canonist.
ARTICLE II. THE GLOSSATORS ON THE CORPUS JURIS
CANONICI.
Unlike the Decretum Gratiani, the Decretals of 
Gregory IX are an official and authentic collection of laws. 
Compiled by Raymond of Pennafort at the request of Gregory IX 
and consisting chiefly of decrees of Councils - both general 
and particular - of decretals of earlier pontiffs and of 
decretals from previous compilations, this collection was 
formally approved by that Pontiff as the official Code of 
Canon Law in 123k- Thus whatever its legal force might
previously have been, each chapter or canon in this collection 
henceforward enjoyed the force of universal law. From a 
legal viewpoint therefore this collection is notably more 
valuable and important than the Decretum.
A notable feature of the Decretals of Gregory IX is
the absence of any direct reference to the question of common
error. There are a few what we may call indirect references,
but so vague and unconvincing are they that we might well
pass them over, were it not for the fact that the glossators
introduced the subject of common error in their comments on
these particular canons. Some authors, however, have held
that the doctrine is officially recognized in the Decretals;
they claim that it is confirmed and canonised by virtue of
the fact that the decretal "Ad probandum (c.2U, X, 11, 27)
(2 )confers the force of law on the dictum Gratiani of which we
(1) cf. Constitution "Rex Pacificus." Sept. 5th 123U.
(2) c.l, CIII, q.7« Vers. Verumtamen.
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have spoken in the preceding article. To ascertain if
such a claim is justified an examination of the decretal in 
question will be necessary: A dispute had arisen in a
certain convent as to which of two candidates for the office 
of Abbess had been validly elected. The matter was referred 
to Pope Innocent III who commissioned three judges to inquire 
into the case and give a decision on their findings. The 
judges decided in favour of the claims of candidate A. But 
candidate B appealed from this sentence on the grounds that 
one of the judges in the case was publicly excommunicated.
Pope Innocent upheld the appeal and declared the sentence 
invalid, - %quod unus ex delegatis judicibus qui eandem 
sententiam protulerunt excommunicationis vinculo esset publice 
innodatus quando sententia lata fuit .... eandem sententiam 
constiterit infirmandam."
The inference from this decision, because of the 
emphasis on the word "publice innodatus," is that had the 
excommunication been merely occult the sentence would have 
been valid. This conclusion is actually drawn by Bernard 
Parmensis (+ 1263) author of the glossa Ordinaria on the 
Decretals of Gregory IX. This is a perfectly legitimate
conclusion with which we fully concur, but to assert that the 
text itself is a confirmation of the dictum Gratiani, c.l, 
C.III, q.7 is scarcely correct. To hold that this decretal 
legislates for the case of common error would be equivalent 
to attributing the same legal force to a law legitimately drawn 
up and promulgated, and to a conclusion drawn by commentators 
from that law. But there is obviously a vast difference
(3) e.g. cf. Wiestner, Inst. Can. II, 1, 82 apud Ojetti
Comment, in Codicem, De Personis. p.216. - "Hoc Gratiani 
dictum ad vim legis secundum eundem auctorem (Wiestner) 
ereetum est a Greg. IX inserente in auam collectlonem 
responsum Innoc. Ill, in C.2U, X, II, 27.
(i+) c. 2k, X, II, 27, gloss on word "Innodatus."
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between the two. A law is the wish of the legislator 
expressed in words. If commentatois should later draw 
conclusions from the formula of words used - however 
legitimate their conclusion may be - so long as they would 
entail a different or distinct wish or intention on the part 
of the legislator they cannot be regarded as laws, nor as 
enjoying the force of law; an essential element of a law 
i8 lacking, viz., the wish or intention of the legislator.
However this does not deprive the decretal in question
of all title to importance. Though it did not canonise the
doctrine of common error, at least it occasioned the first
real attempt to apply the principles, proposed by Gratian,
to strictly canonical matters. For, as we have noted above,
the glossator Bernard Parmensis concluded from the wording
of this decretal that a person who was occultly excommunicated
could validly pronounce judicial sentences - because, the
excommunication being occult, he would in the common opinion,
(5)be considered free and absolved.
As Bernard refers to both the dictum Gratiani (c.l, 
C.III, 2.7) and the Lex Barbarius (D.I, U*>3,) as a basis for 
his opinion we may take it that he regarded the incapacitating 
effect of excommunication in Canon law as the counterpart of 
Roman Law's state of slavery. It was indeed equivalent to the 
state of slavery in so far as it affected the capacity of a 
person to perform juridical acts. It is very important to 
remember that at this period in the history of Canon law all 
excommunication had the effect of depriving the person 
excommunicated of all Jurisdiction and juridical power.
(5) c.2U. X, II, 27, gloss on word Innodatus - "aliud ai 
occulte quia tunc nec ipse, nec" alii ip sum tenebatur 
vitare: quia divinare non poterant .... undejf cum
communi opinione liber et absolutuj habeatur et 
credatur, quidquid interim facit valet ut 3.q 7. c. 
infamis, vers, verunntamen (i.e. c.l, C.III, q.7.)
de offic. praet, 1. Barbarius.
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Eve ry excommunicated person was in effect an excommunicatu/^
(6)vitandus. This law continued in force till 1U18 when the
Constitution "Ad Svitanda" of Martin V effected a change in 
the discipline. This fact explains the reason for the 
necessity of the supplying of Jurisdiction in the case of an
f occultly excommunicated person who might he appointed Judge; 
without supplied Jurisdiction all the Judicial sentences of 
such a Judge would he invalid, with consequent detriment to 
the community.
An occultly excommunicated person might hest he 
described as an excommunicatus who was commonly considered 
free or absolved; or in other words, one whose excommunication 
was generally unknown. But there was another expression
which denotes this same idea and which seems to have had its 
origin about this time. Pope Lucius III had defined an 
occult crime as one "quod ah Ecclesia toleratur," as opposed
ito a notorious crime which signified that the delinquent had
(7)been canonically convicted of it. This same definition
came to he used with reference to fcccult excommunication and 
occult infamia, the implication probably being that the 
community as such could not be aware of the incurrence of a 
censure by a particular person until he had first been convicted 
according to canonical procedure. The result was that the 
glossators sometimes speak of the acts of an excommunicatus 
or an infamis  ^^  as being valid as long as he is tolerated by
(6) cf. c.lU, X, V, 39; also c.li*, X, V, 39 gloss on words 
"Denunciatus non sit;" also T. Sanchez, De Matriraonio,
Tom. I, lib. Ill disp. 22, n.33.
(6a) cf. Summa Sylvestrina, I, v. Excommunicatio. III. n.2.
(7) c.7. X, III, 2.
(8) "Infamia" was incurred as a penalty for the commission of 
certain crimes, a list of which is given in c.9» C.III, 
q»5» e.g. homicide, sacrilege, adultery, incest, perjury, 
etc.
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(9)the Church ("donee ah Sccleaia toleratur"). And from this
onwards we shall find the expressions "donee ah Ecclesia 
toleratur," "quamdiu ah Ecclesia toleratur," "dummodo ah 
Ecclesia sit toleratus," constantly recurring in connection 
with this subject of common error. The term toleratus 
excommunicatus from the time of the glossators till the 
issuance of the Constitution "Ad Evitanda" simply meant an 
occult excommunicatus*
The severe discipline with regard to the censure of 
excommunication brought home to the glossators the necessity 
of having jurisdiction supplied to judges who were occultly 
excommunicated, or who were otherwise incapax. And even 
though Joannes Teutonicus denied that the principles of the 
Lex Barbarius would supply jurisdiction defective by reason 
of excommunication/10  ^ there is sufficient evidence to 
indicate that there was at least a widely accepted opinion 
existing at the time of the glossators in favour of such an 
application. For in examining the annotations of the glossa­
tors we find a few contexts where the principles of the Lex 
Barbarius are expressly applied to the case of one who is 
occultly excommunicated/11  ^ Incidentally the glossators 
did not consider the question of applying these principles 
to the case of one who had been publicly excommunicated « 
for them, it was strictly confined to cases of occult 
excommunication. Other contexts reveal that they applied 
these principles also to the case of an infamis - again 
provided the infamia was occult/12  ^ Likewise they applied
(9) e.g. cf. c.l, C.III, q. 7, gloss on words Quod Judex - 
"Hie quaeritur an crimonosi vel infames possint esse 
judioes? St quidem si non tolerantur ab Ecclesia, non 
possunt; si tolerantur, bene possunt, et tenet eorum 
sententia, ipsi tamen peccant judicando.
(10) c.l, C.III. q.7* gloss on word "Dum putaretur."
(11) e.g. c.2U* X, II, 27 gloss on word "innodatus;" c.12,
C, II, 25, gloss on word "Publice" in fine.
(12) c.l, C.III, q.7» gloss on words Quod Judex; c.13, X, I,
3, filoss on word "Infamen."
   ;     1
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(13)them to the case of a judge who was occultly a slave, 
as was the case in Roman law.
But beyond stating the fact that the acts of an occult
excommunicatus or infamia or slave are valid, the glossators
(11+)are silent with regard to the doctrine of common error.
There is no doubt that they recognized the existence of the 
doctrine, but they gave no details with regard to conditions 
required for its application etc. All the indications are 
that the notion of the doctrine and its application as con­
ceived by the glossators was very rudimentary and undeveloped. 
To illustrate this we may take as example their attitude 
towards the question of the application of the principles of 
common error to the internal forum. From a gloss on the 
decretal "Dudum"^1^  we can justifiably conclude that the 
glossators did not regard these principles as applying to 
the internal forum. The historical background to the decretal 
was briefly this: A certain Dean (decanus) had presumed to
accept and retain simultaneously, two benefices, with the care 
of souls attached to each - contrary to the ruling of a Decree 
of the Uth Latermn Council, which declared that on acceptance 
of a second benefice the first was ipso jure vacant. The 
Archdeacon and Chapter of Canons brought the case to the 
attention of the Roman Pontiff. In the decision against the 
Dean we read the words - "In suae quoque salutis et multarum 
animarum dispendium praedictas parochiales ecclesias retinebat, 
cum earum cura, qua jam privatus fuerat ipso jure, ad eum 
nullatenus pertineret: et sic per ipsum eaedem animae
damnabiliter sunt deceptae.l6^
(13) c.13, X, I, 3, gloss on word "Servum" -"quia talis judex 
esse non potest, nisi communi opinions pro libero se 
gerat et habeatur quo casu tenet ejus sententia ...."
(1U) NOTE. The glossators did not use the term "common error;" 
communis opinio was their phrase cf. c.2U, X, II, 27 glos? 
on word InnodaTus; c.l, C.III, q.7> gloss on words Dum 
Putareturl c7T37 X, 1,3, gloss on word Servum.
(15) c. 5U, X, 1, 6.
(16) c. 5U, X, 1, 6.
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We are chiefly interested here in the interpretation
given by the glossator to this last phrase, "et sic per ipsum
eaedem animae damnabiliter sunt deceptae." The glossator
notes that it would appear that all the absolutions imparted
by that prelate were invalid because, since he had ceased to
hold the benefice, he no longer had any power of binding or
loosing by virtue of it. Yet, he proceeds to assert that
those souls shall not thereby be lost; they shall be saved
"propter fidem quam habebant de Sacramento," that is by reason
(17)of desire or ex voto - but not by reason of valid absolu­
tion. SAtxxxxsxif In view of the fact that the glossator 
seems to advert to the presence of common error ("cum crederent 
ilium adhuc esse suum praelatum"), it seems strange that he
did not declare the absolutions valid on the basis of supplied
(18)jurisdiction according to the principles of the Lex Barbarius . 
The obvious conclusion is that the glossator did not consider 
the internal forum as being within the scope of the validating 
force of these principles. However we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the glossator may not have considered the 
case from this viewpoint: it is quite possible that being
accustomed to associate the notion of common error with judges 
who were occultly excommunicated or occult slaves, he may not 
have adverted to the possibility of having the conditions 
realized in an unusual case such as that contemplated in this 
decretal. But whichever alternative be correct the truth of 
our original assertion is not d^credited, viz., that the 
glossator’s notion of the doctrine and its application was 
very rudimentary.
(17) cf. c.l+, X, III, U3> - "... quamvis talia (i.e. baptizatus
a se ipso) continuo decessisset ad coelestem patriam 
protinus evolasset, propter Sacramenti fidem, etsi non 
propter fidei Sacramentum." Alexander III.
(18) c.5U, X, I, 6 gloss on word "Deceptae" --  Sed numquid
valebit illis absolutio illius talis Parelati, sive 
poenitertia per ilium imposita? Non videtur; quia 
nullam potestatem habet ligandi, vel solvendi .... In 
isto casu non credo, quod perirent, non quia ille hoc 
posset, sed propter fidem quam habebant de Sacramento, cum 
crederent illu. adhuc .... SUUB Praelatum, et
sola fide salvantur ...."
Due credit however must be given them for what they 
did accomplish. They advanced the doctrine a stage further 
from the state in which Gratian had placed it. And though 
their writings on the subject were admittedly meagre, they 
at least set a headline for subsequent commentators, and 
helped to make possible the development that was soon to be 
effected.
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ARTICLE III. EARLY DECRETALISTS.
The Decretalista may be described as the successors 
of the glossators. They differed from the glossators only 
in this that, while the latter inserted their comments and 
explanations of the Decretals in the margin of the official 
text itself, the Decretatists' commentaries took the form 
of formal treatises. These commentaries while being 
completely distinct from the text of the Corpus Juris Canonici 
itself, had that text as basis, and usually followed the 
order obtaining in the text. The commentaries of chief 
interest here are those of Innocent IV and Hostiensis.
A. Innocent IV.
First in order of time and of importance is the
commentary of Pope Innocent IV (Sinibaldus Fliseus 125h) - the
first instance of a canonical writer in the Chair of St. Peter.
This commentary, or "Apparatus" as it is called, was compiled
(2)about the year 1251, and as the great glossator Bernard 
Parmensis died in 1263, this work can be regarded as contem­
poraneous with the "glossa Ordinaria" on the Decretals of
(1) cf. Cicognani, Canon Law, p.332.
(2) of. A. Van Hove, Prolegomena, n.L56, 2.
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Gregory IX. Yet there is no comparison between the notes 
of the glossators and the commentary of Innocent as far as 
their respective treatment of the question of common error is 
concerned. Innocent displays a much keener awareness of the 
existence of the doctrine and the conditions required for its 
application. It may justly be claimed that he is the first 
canonical writer to make a scientific approach to the whole 
question. There are four chief points to be treated in 
connection with Innocent's teaching on the doctrine of common 
error:- (a) Necessity of a title,
(b) Its application to delegated power.
(c) Its application to non-jurisdictional power.
(d) Its application to the forum internum.
We shall treat briefly of each of these in that order.
(a) Necessity of a title.
Our opening extract from Pope Innocent's writings 
marks the beginning of a long controversy which continued 
right up to the publication of the Codex Juris Canonici - 
whether an office holder requires a "titulus coloratus" to his 
office in order that his official actions may be rendered valid 
by reason of common error. The occasion is his treatment of
(3)the decretal "Nihil" de Electione. Legislating on the 
confirmation of elections - the election of all ecclesiastical 
officials required confirmation with the sole exception of 
the Pope^^ - this decretal lays down that those office­
holders who have no Superior under the Holy See shall, 
immediately on their election, approach the Supreme Pontiff 
either personally or by properly authorized representatives, 
to obtain confirmation of their election.
(3) c. LU» X ,1, 6.
(U) cf. D. XXIII, c., 1; c,17, X, 1, 6
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But those who live far away from Rome i.e. outside the 
boundaries of Italy, shall, in the meantime while awaiting 
confirmation, administer their charge, enjoying all the rights 
and privileges of their office - with this one exception, that 
they cannot alienate ecclesiastical property. From this 
arises the question asked by Innocent: what of the case
where the person elected exercised his office according to 
the instructions of this decretal, but being afterwards found 
unsuitable was removed from office without ever having obtained 
confirmation of his election - what of the official acts 
performed by him in the meantime?^) jn reply, Innocent 
quotes laws supporting the opinions both affirming and denying 
the validity of the acts in such a case: then in his custom­
ary manner, he proceeds to give his own solution. In doing 
so, however, he wanders beyond the obvious limits of the 
question and seems rather to make it an occasion for the 
expression of his views on the subject of common error. In 
this light then, we must accept the extracts which follow.
He commences: "Dicimus quod omnes qui habuerunt
canonicum ingressum licet postea fiant haeretici vel symoniaci,
(6)ratum est quod fit ab eis quousque tollerentur. Here he
visualizes an ecclesiastical official legitimately instituted 
according to canonical requirements, but who afterwards becomes 
a heretic, and thereby ipso facto incapable of holding office 
or of validly exercising - and he declares that the
official acta of such a person are to be regarded as valid as 
long as he is tolerated ("quousque tollerentur.”) And as we 
have already seen, this is equivalent to saying that his 
official acts are to be regarded as valid as long as the defect 
under which he labours remains occult, or correspondingly as
(5) cf. Apparatus ad c.kht X, 1, 6.
(6) Apparatus ad c.kkt X, 1, 6.
(7) cf. c. US, X, V, 39 i c.8, C.XXV, q. 1 - "Et quod ab 
infidelibus vel haereticis factum fuerit omnino 
cassabitur."
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long as he is commonly reputed to he a real official. On 
the other hand he continues, "cassantur acta si in principio 
non haheret canonicum ingressum, ut quia symoniace vel per
/ o\intrusionem .... asaumptus est.” It is not quite clear
whether Innocent is here speaking generally of the invalidity 
of acts performed by an official who has acquired an office 
without proper canonical institution, or whether he intends 
to declare invalid the acts of such an official even when 
through common error he is generally considered genuine. Prom 
the general context however, and especially from the contrast 
so noticeable and striking between the two phrases, "qui 
habuerunt canonicum ingressum" and "si a principio non haberet 
canonictum ingressum," it would seem that he has the question 
of common error in mind in the second case just as he had in 
the first. PTom this we may conclude that Innocent demanded 
that an official should have a canonical title to the office 
he held, in order that the principles of common error might 
have effect; in other words, that he should have acquired 
the office through the normal canonical procedure - canonicus 
ingressus—  though de facto he was not a real official because 
of a hidden incapacitating defect.
That this was the attitude of Innocent is verified by
his remarks in a different contest. Vindicating a decision
(9)given by Pope Innocent III, he says that this decision is not 
contrary to the prescription of the Lex Barbarius which states 
that sentences pronounced by one who is in possession of an 
office are valid even though that person was not really 
praetor: "sed ibi respondent, illud ideo esse non quia in
pos8essione erat: quia vere judicandi potestatem acceperat
ab imperatore, et omina alia faciendi quae ad praetorem
(8) Apparatus ad c.l^, X, 1, 6.
(9) cf. 8, X, III, 36.
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pertinebat: licet non esset legitimus praetor sed per
obreptionem." Innocent is really quoting the opinion
(11)of othere here, but from the sentence immediately follow­
ing it is certain that this is his own opinion also - "fit idem 
dicendum est in quolibet praelato confirmato: et de hoc nota
supra e nihil de electione," which is the chapter we have been 
quoting from above.
Interpreting Dig. I, 1U, 3, as signifying that the 
acts of the slave - praetor Barbarius were valid not solely 
because he was in possession of the office and was commonly 
considered a real praetor, but also because he had been 
appointed to the office by the proper authority, Innocent 
applies the same ruling to Canon law. Common error alone is 
not sufficient - the ecclesiastical official about whose 
capacity the error exists must have been commissioned by the 
proper authorities; he must have received proper canonical(12)institution before the validating principles become effective.
(b) Common Error and Delegated Power.
An interesting feature of the teaching of Innocent IV 
on this question of common error is that he did not recognize 
the application of the doctrine in the case of the exercise of 
delegated jurisdiction - or at least of delegated jurisdiction 
for one case only. Appreciating the fact that the whole 
purpose of the doctrine was to provide for the public or 
common utility, he failed to see how this common utility could 
be verified when jurisdiction was delegated for one individual
(10) Apparatus ad c.8, X, III, 36.
(11) NOTE. The subject of "respondent" is found a few 
sentences earlier viz. "Certi quidam ....."
(12) This opinion is also stated in another context in the 
commentary of Innocent on e.UUf X, 1, 0. "Sed de istis non 
confirmatis dicunt aliqui quod si aliqua fecerit in judicic 
vel etiam extra judicium ex officio, ut emancipationes, et 
Bimilia quod propter errorem communem et utilitatem 
publicum valet, ff. de.officio Praetoris Lex Barbarius. 
Quominus posset reBponderi quod ibi ideo tenet quia erat 
praetor confirmatus a praefecto praetoris, vel ipsa elect­
ione, sed non confirmatus nec electus non est praelatus." 
Note the first use of the term error communis in canonical
______jurisprudence.
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case. The context in which this opinion is expressed im 
k x$m x s k £ is the commentary of Innocent on c.22, X, 1, 3* 
According to this decretal certain judges had been commissioned 
to examine and give judgment on a particular case in connection 
with a convent of nuns; the rescript by virtue of which these 
judges had been delegated was invalid by reason of obgeption; 
their sentence therefore was declared invalid. To the 
objection that this sentence should be regarded as valid by 
virtue of the Lex Barbarius - because the nuns, being ignorant 
of the defect in the rescript, considered the judges to be 
properly appointed - Innocent replies that the acts of Barbarius 
were valid "propter utilitatem multorum qui habuerunt necesse 
agere apud eum .... hie autem cum causa una tantum commissa 
ait, non est multa utilitas subditorum. Unde propter hoc non 
est tolerandus iste processus."(^S)
It must be emphasized, however that Innocent is speak­
ing only of delegation for one case; it does not necessarily 
follow from this that he would hold the same view if the 
delegation were general or ad universitatem causarum, such 
as that of a general legate of the Holy See.^li+^ He does not 
advert to this latter possibility. He does mention, in 
another context, this distinction between ordinary and dele­
gated judges in connection with the application of the doctrine
of common error, but there also he has in mind delegation for
(15)one case only. In the absence of explicit reference to
it we can only surmise what innocent's view on the point might 
have been. But from the reason given for his not applying
this doctrine to cases of delegated power, viz. , "non est multa
utilitas subditorum" we can deduce that he had in mind only 
delegation for individual cases; for the power of jurisdiction 
obtained by virtue of general delegation ao cloeely approximates 
in effect to that acquired by virtue of an office, the same
(13) Apparatus ad c.22, X, 1, 3.
(lh) i.e. a general legate as contemplated in c.2, X, 1, 30.
(15) cf. Apparatus ad c.23, X, 1, 29. "Secus autem in delegato 
qui vult illam causam tantum quae in delegatione continetui
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distinction could scarcely be said to apply in its regard.
So that when we quote Innocent as holding that the principle 
of the lex Barbarius do not apply to delegated jurisdiction, 
we should qualify the statement to this extent that general 
delegation is not explicitly included by him, and that, from 
the context, he appears to refer exclusively to delegation 
for individual cases.
(c) Application of Common Error to Non-Jurlsdlctional Power.
It is worthy of note that Innocent IV did not confine
the efficacy of common error to the validating of acts
performed by virtue of jurisdiction. If he did not explicitly
state it, he at least strongly implied that common error could
have the effect of validating the official acts of a notary.
He defines a public document as that which carries authority
"sine adminiculo vivae vocis alicuius notarii, qui forte
mortuus est.'^1^  If it is objected that the person who
drew up a particular document was not a legitimately designated
notary, the burden of proving that he was a real notary rests
with the party introducing the document. This could be
proved either by witnesses or by a public document attesting
to the fact that such a notary was legitimately appointed.
Furthermore he declares that it would be sufficient if it
could be established by means of witnesses that the person in
question publicly exercised the office of notary, "Crederem
autem quod sufficeret si per testes probaretur quod publice
officio notarii fungebatur .... ff. de officio. Praet. 1.
(17)Barbarius, C. De Testibua 1, I" - thereby implying that the 
document was equally authoritative whether the notary was 
really legitimately designated or only commonly reputed to be
(16) Apparatus ad c.l, X, II, 22.
(17) Apparatus ad c.l, X, II, 22.
notary due to the fact that he publicly exercised the office. 
That this is the implication intended by Innocent himself is 
clear from the laws he quotes as the basis of his teaching, 
viz., ff. de officio pract 1, Barbarius (D,I, lb, 3) and 
C. De Test. 1, I, (C. Ill, 23, 1.) both of which we have 
discussed in an earlier c h a p t e r . I n  that chapter we have 
seen too, that in Roman law, it was certainly recognized that 
common error supplied the necessary capacity to a putative 
notary in order that he might validly draw up public documents, 
but this statement of Innocent is the first indication we have 
of its obtaining in Canon law also.
(d) Application of Common Error to the Internal Forum.
When treating of the glossators above we mentioned that 
they appeared to confine the application of the principles of 
common error to the external forum, as shown by their inter­
pretation of that passage in the decretal "Dudum" (c. 5b> X,
1, 6,) - "Kt sic per ipsum eaedem animae damnabiliter sunt 
deceptae.” The same can scarcely be said of Innocent, for 
when he declares valid all the acts performed by those pre­
lates who, after canonical institution, had become heretics^ ^  j 
he makes no distinction between acts pertaining to the external 
and acts pertaining to the internal forum. Hence we should 
seem justified in maintaining that he regarded as valid all 
sacramental absolutions imparted by them, just the same as all 
the judicial sentences pronounced by them, and all the other 
acts of administration pertaining to the external forum.
Yet when he is confronted with an explicit and concrete 
question as to whether the principles of common error cover the
(18) cf. Supra Sec. I, ch. 1.
(19) cf. Apparatus ad c. UU, X, 1, 6, "Dicimus quod omnes 
qui habuerunt canonicum ingressum licet postea fiant 
haeretici, vel symoniaci, ratum est quod fit ab eis 
quousque tollerentur."
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case of sacramental confession, Innocent seems to be hesitant
and doubtful. Evidence of this is had in his explanation
of the passage quoted above from the decretal "Dudum." He
offers two alternative solutions^20  ^ - (l) "Potest dici
animas non deceptas cum ab omnibus habeatur praelatua et valet
poenitentia ab eo recepta. Veniam enim meruit quia ignorans
deliquit. P. VIII, c.8." As he states it here, it is clearly
a case of common error, but Innocent suggests holding for the
validity of the confessions on a cpmpletely different basis -
by appealing to the words of St. Paul, - "I obtained the mercy
( 21)of God because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." But
evidently he is not so sure of this, for he immediately adds 
that if anyone who confessed to this putative prelate should 
afterwards discover that he was not a real prelate, that 
person should confess and obtain absolution anew. (2) The 
second solution is more to the point - "Vel potest dici quod 
vere absolvit quamdiu toleratur a Superiore." Here he 
undoubtedly suggests the efficacy of common error with regard 
to the internal forum. But he suggests it in none too con­
fident a manner. He seems to put it forward as a possible 
alternative solution to the question, rather than as his own 
considered and definite opinion, which is usually introduced 
by more forceful terms such as "Die," "dicimus;" "dicendum 
est," etc. The hesitancy with which he forwards the opinion 
obviously indicates that it is something new; we may safely 
assume that he was the first to have given expression to it. 
Much credit is due to Innocent for this, for it marks the 
beginning of a new stage in the development of the doctrine 
under consideration.
(20) Apparatus ad c.5U, X, 1, 6.
(21) I. Tim. 1, 13. cf» also D.VIII c.3 - quod simpliciter 
erranti potest ignosci.
f LIBWK? I
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B. Hostiensie.
Despite the apparent doubt and hesitancy of Innocent 
on this point just discussed, it is interesting to note that 
another great canonist of this period, frho was practically a 
contemporary of Innocent, put it forward as certain that the 
principles of common error apply even to the internal forum. 
This canonist was Henry of Segusio - better known as Hostiensis 
(■f 1271)* Commenting on this same phrase in the decretal 
Dudum he follows the same lines as Innocent and holds for the
validity of the absolutions conferred on the penitents in
(22)question for the same reasons. Continuing, he states
that certain authors were of the opinion that the penitents 
in the circumstances should receive absolution anew from a 
real priest, when they had discovered the true state of things; 
the laws quoted by them in support of this opinion being 
de Ppen c. Omnis utriusque sexus and de presbyteris non 
baptizatis c. Veniena. This is, in effect, a repetition of 
the opinion of the glossators seen above, which held for the 
invalidity of the Sacrament of Penance in this case, but for 
the salvation of the souls concerned per fidem Sacrament!.
The laws referred to as a basis for the opinion are c.12, X,
V. 38 which decrees that each person must confess at least 
once yearly to his own pastor, or to another priest with the 
permission of his own pastor previously obtained; and c.3» X, 
III U3» which decrees that a non-baptized person cannot be 
ordained, and if de facto he is ordained he does not receive 
the character of Orders - even though he is generally believed 
to be baptized. These laws, according to the sponsors of the 
opinion, imply that the application of the principles of common 
error is excluded in matters pertaining to the internal forum -
(22) Lectura in Quinque Lib. Peer, ad c.54, X, 1, 6.
"Excuaantur autem animae subditorum propter justam 
ignorantiam arg. D. VIII, c.8, Consuetudo, et quia 
praelatus ab ttcclesia toleratur C.VIII, q.U, c. nonne.
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and hence that the penitents concerned in the present case, 
on realizing the true state of things, must confess and be 
absolved again.
Hostiensis very ably denies their contention and 
refutes the basis on which they place it. We quote verbatim - 
"Tu dicas hoc esse consilium cautum; non tamen est de 
necessitate juris. Nam qualiscumque sit presbyter vere 
absolvit ex quo curam tenet dummodo servet formam iScclesiae, 
quamdiu probabilis est ignorantia et ab Ecclesia toleratur 
ut in praemissis juribus et ff. de officio praetoris, L. 
Barbarius. Nec obstat de Poen.c. Omnis utriusque sexus quia 
loquitur quando qui8 scienter vadit ad extraneum Sacredotem: 
nec obstat de Presbyteris non baptizatis, c. Veniens. quod 
loquitur quando fundamentum sacramentorum desst ubi quidem 
superaedificari non p o t e s t . T h e r e  is no difficulty in 
discerning the mind of Hostiensis on the point; from this 
passage it is apparent that he is convinced of the application 
of the principles to the internal forum - provided all the 
requisifcte conditions for common error are fulfilled.
But though there is no difficulty about the meaning of 
this passage, there is however one phrase in it which appears 
somewhat strange and unfamiliar, viz., "quamdiu probabilis est 
ignorantia." There is, of course, a very close relation 
between the notions ignorance and error. Ignorance may be
defined as the absence of due knowledge; error is simply a 
false judgment. Ignorance is a negative thing; error is 
positive in so far as a positive judgment is made about some­
thing. Obviously, however, the error or false judgment is 
merely a consequence of ignorance. In law both ignorance and 
error are regarded aa the same and are governed by the same
(23) Lectura ad c. 5U» X, I, 6.
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norms, at least in so far as they are the cause of acts.
It is quite intelligible then that Hostiensis should refer to
ignorance - it being more fundamental than error. And wh
shall see that canonists of a later date often refer to
ignorance and error quite indiscriminately in connection
vrith this subject of common error. Less familiar however
is the expression "probabilis ignorantia." In no modern
text-book do we find a division of ignorance into "probabilis"
and "improbabilis:" no theologian or canonist of the present
day speaks of ignorance as being probable. However, during
the 13th century when Hostiensis wrote, the term "ignorantia
probabilis" had a definite meaning: it was used in opposition
to "ignorantia crassa et supina." This can be deduced from
c.2, 1, 2 of the Decretals of Boniface VIII^2^  first part of
which decrees - "ut animarum periculis obvietur, sententiis
per statuta quorumcumque Ordinariorum prolatis, ligari
nolumus ignorantes dum tamen eorum ignorantia crassa non fuit
aut supiha." The meaning is obvious: those who are ignorant
of the statutes of their Superiors, provided their ignorance
is neither crass or supine, are not bound by those statutes.
The gloss on this decretal puts the same thing in different
jjerms^2^  - "Nota ex principio capitis quod statuta Episcorporui
vel quorumcumque habentium potestatem statuendi, non ligant
probabiliter ignorantes qui possunt praetendere justam causam
ignorantiae." The same expression is used by Joannes
Andreae.^2®) And, if we may ancitipate a little, the same
distinction is found in the writings of Pajormitanus.^2^ ______
(2h) e.g. cf. VERMEERSCH-CRSUSEN, Epitome I, nf*"In jure tamen 
aequiparantur.H
(25) cf. e.g. Baldus, Comm, in Dig. I, lh, 3. Lect. I, n.25: 
Panormitanus, Comm, ad c. 13, X, 1, 3, n.12.
(26) i.e. "Liber Sextus Decretalium" - promulgated by the 
Bull Sacrosanctae 3 Mar. 1298.
(27) 0. 2. 1, 2, in VI gloss - "Casus."
(28) c.2, I, 2, in VI gloss on words "Ut Animarum" - Et ejua 
duo sunt dicta: primum quod statuta Ordinariorum non
ligant probabiliter ignorantes .....
(29) Comm, ad c. 13, X, I, 3. "Et in casu aut erat ignorantia
probabilis, et sustinetur propter probabilem ignorantiam ... 
Aut ignorantia non erat probabilis sed crassa et supina, 
et tunc actus est nullus, si impedimentum ex se inducebat 
nullitatem."
Hence we may safely assume that ’’ignorantia probahilis” 
corresponds to what is known at the present day as ’’ignorantia 
invincilkilisor equivalently inculpable ignorance. There­
fore when Hostiensis wrote ’’quamaiu probabilis est ignorantia 
et ab Ecclesia toleratur” he simply demanded that the error 
should be based on ignorance which was inculpable: if it
were based on crass or supine ignorance (and therefore 
culpable) the principles of the lex Barbarius would not apply. 
In saying, therefore, that common error produced certain 
effects, Hostiensis did not include all categories of error: 
he inserted a very definite qualification as''to the quality of 
the error - thus limiting to a certain extent the scope of 
the application of the principle, and marking also a further 
step in the development and clarification of the doctrine.
C. Other early Decretalists.
There is little else worthy of note on this subject 
of common error in the writings of Hostiensis. Nor do any 
of his contemporaries at the close of the 13th century make 
any further contribution to the development of the doctrine. 
They reiterate much of what we have already seen - the 
repetition of which would be superfluous. There is one point 
in their writings however which we would wish to emphasize 
again, viz., that they invariably visualized common error as 
a safeguard, ensuring the validity of the official acts of a 
public official, whatever the nature of his power might be; 
they did not confine or restrict its influence to acts 
performed by virtue of jurisdiction alone - they made no 
distinction whatever with regard to the nature of the power 
or authority in question. It was sufficient that the 
official in question be a public official, and that he be 
acting by reason of his office. Thus Innocent IV often refers
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to acts performed "rationc officii” or ”rationc publici
officii1* when treating of the application of the doctrine.
That this is the attitude of other waiters also is shown by
their continual application of the doctrine to the official
acts of a notary - the most common example of a public
official who does not enjoy the power of jurisdiction. In
terms which are practically an exact repetition of the words
of Innocent, which we have discussed earlier in this chapter,
(31)Hostiensis makes the application to the acts of a notary. 
Giulelmus Durantis (■*• 1296) puts the same thing in very clear 
terms. Replying to the question as to the position of acts 
performed by one who exercised the office of notary, but who 
was later discovered to have held the office invalidly, this 
canonist writes - ’’Die quod si habuit privilegium ab eo qui 
potestatem habuit creandi notarios, licet postea appareat 
eum non posse notarium esse puta quia servus esse .... tunc 
instruments ejus valebunt, ut patet in Barbario quia fuit 
a populo electus, et ideo ejus sententiae valuerunt.'*(32)
It is interesting to note that Durantis follows 
Innocent IV in demanding canonical institution by the proper 
authority in order that an official might benefit by the 
supplying principle of common error. Thus he qualifies the 
above statement by inserting "Si habuit privilegium ab eo qui 
potestatem habuit creandi notarios,** and in the next sentence 
he continues ’’Si vero nullum privilegium habuit, tunc communis 
error non potuit eum facere notarium.” In passing we might
(30) E.g. cf. Apparatus ad c.hh, X, 1, 6 ; ad c.8 , X, I, hiad c.l, X, II, 22, etc.
(31) Lectura in v. Lib. Dec. ad c.l, X, II, 22 - ”... Sed et
sufficeret si probaretur per testes quod tempore illo
quo fuit factum instrumentum quod nunc in dubio revocatur, 
officio notarii sive tabellionis publice fu/gebatur .... 
ff. de offic. Ppaet. L. Barbarius, c. de Test. L. 1 ....”
(32) Speculum juris, Tom. I, De Instr. Editione § Restat 
videre n. 32. NOTE. Quilelmus Durantis is better known 
as ’'Speculator.7’”"
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mention another sponsor of this opinion - Guido de Baissio
(i.e. Archideaconus + 1313)> who makes this confirmation by
the proper authority just as essential for validity as any
other factor: HNam quaradiu toleratur, omnia quae gerit,
(33)sustinetur propter confirmationis tuitiorem.
Reviewing very briefly the writings of 13th century
•anonists we can say that they did much to further the develop-
<7ment of the doctrihe of common error. But though they defined 
the limits of the application of the principles and to some 
extent at least, determined the conditions required for their 
application, still their treatment of the whole question is 
rather incidental: we arrive at a knowledge of their teaching
on the question solely from applications made by them in 
particular cases; they do not give a comprehensive or detailed 
discussion of the doctrine itself. This position is easily 
understood however, when we recall that it was only in the 12th 
century that the revival of civil jurisprudence as a science 
had taken place. The Church itself had no positive legis­
lation on the subject of common error: the Canonists therefore
were dependent on civil law in the matter - and to a certain
'Vr*extent tea the teaching of civil jurists. So, until such 
time as the civil jurists had themselves evolved a studied 
treatment of the question as contained in their own laws,
(such as in Dig. I, 1U> 3> etc.) it could scarcely be expected 
that the doctrine would be found in a highly-developed form in 
the writings of the Canonists.
It was only in the lhth century - over two centuries 
after the revival, - that we find the first really efficient 
and speculative treatment of the subject by civil juBists.
(33) Erraarationes super Decreto ad c. 37> C.XIII, q.2
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For this we are indebted to two eminent jurists - Bartolua 
de Saxoferrato (+ 1357) - with whom originated a new method 
of commenting on Roman law, and whose followers came to be 
known as Bartolists - and especially Baldus de Ubaldus 
( + 11*00), an expert in both civil and ecclesiastical law, who 
wrote commentaries on both the Justinian collections and on 
the Decretals of Gregory IX. We shall discuss the writings 
of these jurists in the following article.
ARTICLE u. CIVIL JURISTS OF THE lUth CENTURY.
The teaching of these two jurists - Bartolus and 
Ubaldus - may be summarized by saying that it provides an 
answer to three main questions :-
1. How does common error produce its validating effect?
2. What is the purpose of the doctrine?
3. What conditions are required that it may produce its effects
We shall treat of each in order.
1. How does common error produce its validating
effect?
When examining the writings of the glossators on 
Roman law we saw that, according to them, Barbarius by virtue 
of his appointment as praetor became a free man and was a real 
praetor.^ Such were the effects of common error according 
to them; and as such, these effects were very radical - 
radical in so far as they implied the healing of the deficiency 
at the very root by deleting all personal incapacitating 
defects, as it were, by one act, thereby rendering the person
in question a real official, and capable from the very begin­
ning of office of performing valid acts. From this we con­
cluded that the notion of the glossators with regard to the
(1) cf. D. I, lh, 3 gloss on words "Functus sit."
-51-
question as to how common error produced its effects, seems 
to have been that, with the general sanation of personal 
defects in the beginning, all subsequent official acts were 
automatically valid in the normal way; hence common error 
really conferred habitual capacity on the official for the 
duration of the term of office; and this in the case of a 
judge or prelate would mean habitual jurisdiction.
Accursius who compiled the glossa Ordjnaria died in the
year 1260. It is interesting to note that Bartolus who
wrote practically a century later subscribed to this opinion
of the glossator, viz. that Barbarius by virtue of his appoint-
(2 )ment became free and was a real praetor. He admits, how­
ever, that the point was disputed and quotes from authorities 
holding the contrary opinion, viz., that Barbarius was not a 
real praetor.(3) This latter opinion seems to ha*e gained 
support rapidly, for not long afterwards Bpldus de Ubaldus 
could refer to it as being the "coramunior opinio.” Some of 
the arguments put forward by Baldus in support of this more 
dommon opinion are worthy of note:-
1. ".... qui secundum legem creatus non est, verus
praetor non est .......  adeo ut etiamsi perceperit commodum
officii, tamen officium non dicatur habere .....
2. Cum rationes huius legis sint aequitas et publica 
utilitas et illae rationes foveant actibus Barbarii, sed non 
Barbario; ergo acta valent, sed Barbarius non est praetor,
et sic invenitur administratio dignitatis ubi non eat dignitas."
(2) Comment. In Dig. ad I, 1U, 3, Lect. I. n.3 - "Quaero 
numquid iste (i.e. Barbarius) fuerit liber? Et tenet 
glossa quod sic, maxime ne homines decipiantur legis
authoritate .... Dico quod glossa bene dicat .
n.i|. Quaero numquid iste fuerit vere praetor? Et 
determinat glossa quod sic. Ultrajnontani centrarium ...
Dico tamen quod glossa be&e loquiter.”
(3) Comment, in Dig. ad I, 1L, 3 Lect. I. n. 3 "... Et tenet
glossa quod sic .... Ultramontani ut Petrus, Jacobus de
Ravenna, Cyims et Guilelmus tenett contrarium ....."
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3. Si autem veleris tenere communem opinionem quod 
Barbarius non habebat verara praeturam nec libertatem, die 
quod una quaestio tantum solvitur in litera, scilicet quod
(U)gesta valeant "
Prom these and other arguments Baldus concludes - 
"Ex illaa est communior opinio quod Barbarius non fuit praetor, 
scil. vere, sed jurisdictions, scil. quoad ordinata per 
ipsum.
The arguments are obviously reasonable and convincing; 
they are supported by the statement that the opinion is the 
more common. There is a definite change over from the 
teaching of the glossators - there must consequently be a 
corresponding change in the notion as to how common error 
produces its effect, or the manner in which official actions 
are rendered valid. Under this opinion there can be no 
question of a general sanation of incapacitating defects thus 
conferring habitual capacity on the official concerned - such 
as we visualized above. Here there is no such sanation - 
Barbarius according to this view remains incapax: he is not
a real praetor - "Barbarius non fuit praetor, scil. vere,
sed jurisdictions, scil. quoad ordinata per ipsum.
Baldus here seems to imply that barbarius became praetor for 
each individual official act performed by him; that the 
necessary capacity was supplied to him for the valid perfor­
mance of each succeeding act; that jurisdiction was supplied 
to him per modum actus. He leaves no doubt that this is 
his meaning when farther on in the same context he writes - 
"et sic Barbarius habuit jurisdictionem actu et non habitu." 
This is admittedly a notable advance in the theory of common 
error; indeed we may well say that it is the first really 
theoretical discussion on the subject.
(U) Comm, in Dig. ad I, II4., 3* Lect. I. n. li+,15. 35.
(5) Comm, in Oi^< ad I. lh, 3, Lect. I. n. 1 7.
(6) BALDUS, Comm, in Dig. ad I, 11+, 3. Lect. I. n.17.
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2. What is the purpose of this doctrine?
The purpose or reason of this law, which states that
as a result of common error certain acts are rendered valid,
is the public utility. This is made clear by Bartolus who,
in answer to the question why the judicial acts of a judge
who is inhabilis should be regarded as valid, replies -
"Publics utilitas, ne tot acta coram eo pereant."^^ Baldus
(8)states the same thing. It may be well to emphasize that
Baldus insists that, in order that this law may have effect, 
it must be the public utility that is at stake; private 
utility is not considered. Replying to an objection arising 
from the application of D. XII, 2, 17, the objection alleging 
that this law should have the same effect as D. I, 14, 3>
Baldus distinguishes between the exercise of a public office 
for private utility and its exercise for the public utility. - 
"Ibi (i.e. D. XII, 2. 17) erat officium authoritate publicum
sed utilitate privatum; hie (i.e. D.I. 14, 3) omnino publicum.
Unde hie versatur utilitas publica, ibi non, et sic non
( Q )obstat."' ' He does not give any rules as to how to deter­
mine when the exercise of an office may be said to be for
public and when for private utility. But one thing he does 
stress: public utility is not necessarily or exclusively
connected with acts pertaining to or deriving from universal 
jurisdiction. Quoting Cynua^^ as saying that the public 
utility does not enter into the question when one is dealing 
with a particular case, Baldus by way of refutation, points 
out that the public character of jurisdiction is verified not 
only when its application is universal, but equally when it
( (7) Comm, in Dig. ad I, 14, 3 Lect. I. n.5.
(8) Comm, in Dig. ad I, 14, 3 Lect, I, n. 25.
(9) Comm, in Dig. ad X, 14, 3.Lect. I, n. 27*
(lO) NOTE. The writings of Cynus and other contemporaries
are not available.
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ia particularized. Thia seems to run counter to the
opinion of Innocent IV holding that the Lex Barhariua does 
not apply in the case of delegated jurisdiction because the 
utilitas multorum is not v e r i f i e d . B a l d u s  does not
explicitly advert to this question, but we feel justified in
holding that in view of his attitude, as revealed in the 
above context, he would draw no distinction between ordinary 
and delegated jurisdiction bo far as the application of the 
principles of common error is concerned: he would regard the 
public utility as being at stake in the exercise of delegated
jurisdiction just aa in that of ordinary.
3. What conditions are required in order that common 
error may have effect?
This question concerns the conditions required besides 
common error in order that this law may apply. In the wide 
sense the "publica utilitas" could come under thia heading 
also, in so far as there can be no question of the application 
of the doctrine unless the public utility is involved: in
this sense it is a conditio sine qua non. But the conditions 
which chiefly interest is here concern the official, and 
the qualifications required in him, in order that his actions 
may benefit by the law.
We have already seen that Innocent IV required that
an official should have a canonical title to the office he 
holds - otherwise common error would avail him nothing.
Innocent himself, however, noted that this view was not
(11+)universally accepted in his time. The question now
(11) cf. Comm, in Dig. ad I, 1Z+, 3. Lect. I. n. 36 -
".... male loquitur (i.e. Cynus), quia jurisdictio est 
juris publici in universali et in singulari."
(12) cf. INNOCENT IV, Apparatus ad c. 22, X, 1, 3.
(13) cf. Apparatus ad c. hh, X, I, 6.
(ll+) cf. Apparatus ad c. U1+, X, I, 6. "Alii dicunt, sed non
placet, quod quamdiu est in possessione Episcopatus
etjam non confirmatus, valent non solum praedicta, sed 
alia omnia quae facit, ne illudatur contrahentibus."
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makes a reappearance couched in slightly different terms:
instead of inquiring whether ingressus canonicus is essential,
it is asked whether the authoritas Superioris is required.
The discussion of the question by Bartolus obviously indicates
a continuance of divided opinion on the matter. He quotes
two authorities - Jacobus de Ravenna and Ouilelmus de Cuneo -
as holding the view that the official must have authority
from the proper Superior, and mentions three authors - Patrus,
Cynus Pistoriensis and Dinus Mugellanus - as holding the
contrary, viz., that such authority is not necessary.
(15)Bartolus himself subscribes to this latter view. In
support of this view he draws an argument*from Nov. XLIV, I,
We had occasion to refer to this extract when discussing 
the teaching of Roman law on the subject of common error. 
Briefly the case contemplated is that of a person who has 
acted for some time as notary and who is commonly regarded
v
as a legitimate notary, though, in fact he has never been 
appointed by the Superior having the authority to do so - 
his official acta are regarded as valid "propter utilitatem 
contrahentiu#." The inference obviously is, that since 
the acts of this putative official were regarded as valid 
when no proper Superior had appointed him, then the authoritas 
Superioris cannot be regarded as an essential factor for the 
valid operation of the principles of the Lex Barbarius. It 
is clearly a strong argument in Savour of this view.
It must be noted, however, that Bartolus is not 
consistent in his teaching on this point, for in another 
context he veers completely around to the contrary opinion. 
Thus, commenting on God. XII, 50, 7 he writes - "Ex fine 
legis nota quod licet aliquis habeatur et reputatur pro 
publico official!, et revere, non sit ex eo quod non fuerit
(15) cf. Comm. In Dig. ad I, 14, 3, Lect. I. nn. 5, 6
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legitime ordlnatus, vel quia reputatur tabellio cum non 
ait, vel judex cum non sit, quod acta facta per eum nullius 
sint momenti, et ipsi faciens punitur. Here he denies
the validity of the facts of such officials because they have 
not been legitime ordlnatus viz., appointed and constituted 
according to the requirements of law by the Superiors having 
power to do so. He implies then that common error avails 
nothing when the official invalidly holds office by reason 
of defect of form in his appointment; the only occasion 
when it does apply is when the invalidity is due to a personal 
incapacitating defect. He states it thus - w... hie obstat 
Lex Barbarius, ff, de officio Praetoris, quia quandoque quis 
est electus solemniter, tamen propter defectum personae non 
potest esse, et tunc facta per eum valent cum sint publica 
ut ibi {i.e# Lex Barbarius); quandoque quis potest esse, 
sed non electus secundum formam debitam et time facta per 
eum non valent, The theory seems to have been that
without proper canonical appointment a person could not be 
regarded as a public official - and consequently could not 
validly perform public acts - however much he might be con­
sidered so by public repute.
It would be difficult to say which of these opinions 
Bartolus ultimately favoured. The latter view certainly 
seems to have been the more widely accepted one at this time.
It is the view adopted by Baldus^18  ^ - and indeed it is the
view which stood practically unopposed for more than two 
centuries after this time.
{16} Commen in Cod, ad XII, 50, 7, n.2.
(17) Commen.in Cod. ad XII, 50, 7, n.3.
(18) Coma, in Dig, ad I, 14, 3, Lect, I. n.29. "Bcce quidam 
tamquam tabellio confecit longo tempore instrumentaj 
postea apparet quod non est tabellio quia creatus fuit 
a non habente potestatem a Principe vel a rege. Certe 
ille nullus est et instrumenta sua sunt nulla, quia non 
sunt facta a publica persona." cf. Also Lect, II, nl7 
and Lect, II, n.5.
- 5 7
Baldus next raises the question whether the official 
under consideration is required to be in good faith with 
regard to his own status. In other words is it necessary
that the official be ignorant of the fact of his incapacity,
or does the law supply even if, realizing his incapacity, 
he deliberately and in bad faith performs the functions of 
the office which he invalidly holds? Baldus notes that a 
person may be in bad faith in a twofold manner: (a) when
de facto he is incapable of holding office and realizes this;
(b) when de facto he is capable of holding office but is 
convinced of the contrary. But bad faith is no obstacle;
he writes - "Nota quod quis quaerere potest quasi possessionem
jurisdiction!s etiam cum dolo et mala fide."^1^  Nor does 
the film conviction that one is acting invalidly impede the 
validating influence of this law - f'Ista tamen opinio non 
est curanda in judice, quia quod facit, valet ex virtute 
jurisdiction!a. Bhde etsi Barbarius credidisset sua gesta 
non valere, tamen valent per hanc legem.
examination of the writings of the great Baldus 
would not be conplete without a reference to what probably 
is his most distinguished comment on the whole subject. One 
would not expect to find it at this comparatively early period 
in the history of the doctrine - perhaps it is because one 
has been accustomed to associating it with modern discussion 
and controversies on the point. The extract reads:- 
"Et per hoc puto quod si Barbarius non exercuisset nisi uni cum 
actum ille unicus actus valeret, et de aequitate ita valuit 
primus quern fecit, sicut ultlmus. In this Baldus
(19) Comment, in Dig. ad I, 14, 3 Lect. I. n. 29.
(20) Comment, in Dig. ad I, 14, 3 Lect. I. n. 29.
(21) Comment, in Dig. ad I, 14, 3 Lect. n ,  n. 18.
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reveals a very clear knowledge of the exact nature of common 
error. He puts us on our guard against the idea that common 
error is to be estimated according to the number of people 
who actually approach the official in question In his official 
capacity: common error is determined rather by the estima­
tion of the community independently of how many or how few 
members of the community actually approach the official in 
this way. The passing of almost six centuries has taken 
nothing from the value or truth of this statement of Baldus: 
we shall meet the point again in later chapters.
In the present chapter we have made many references 
to Reman law; and in the present article especially, most 
of our quotations have been taken from the jurists' coranen- 
taries on Roman law. It may be asked by what right they 
find a place in a work purporting to be canonical. By way 
of conclusion to this chapter we may very profitably give a 
brief summary of the relation between, and the influence 
exercised by, Ro^an law on Canon law.
Roman law was a well-developed system and an ancient 
institution at the time of the foundation of the Church.
When Justinian had it systematically codified in the 6th 
century, the Church was still comparatively immature, and 
only gradually developing as it were a legal system suitable 
to Its own purpose and end. It was inevitable that this 
system should have much in common with the already existing 
civil system; for, as Cicognani puts it, "why should the 
Church disregard the large body of civil laws relating to 
judicial proceedings, contracts^ certain matrimonial impedi­
ments, the law of domicile and prescription, and the like, 
which had already been wisely established and were in common
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use? Roman Pontiffs gave their approval to this attitude
towards civil law.^23  ^ Pope Nicholas I, { 867) referred to
(24)Roman laws as "venerandae leges Romanae."' ' Gratian seems 
to have attached the same value and importance to Roman 
legislation as to the ecclesiastical canons, the only quali­
fication being that the civil laws shoraild not in any way be 
contradictory to the ecclesiastical. This is exemplified 
by the numerous quotations from Roman law found in his
(25)
"Decretum; w and it is expressly stated in one of his dicta.
Towards the end of the 12th century Pope Lucius III,
( 1185) gave official recognition to Roman law as being
supplementary to Canon law - by admitting its authority in
/ pg \
cases where Canon law was silent. Some time later Pope
Honorius III ( 1227), while not abrogating this principle
of Lucius III, nevertheless declared that there were only 
very few cases in which it could a p p l y . T h e s e  were the 
official pronouncements on the matter, but in practice it 
seems that the Decretists and Decretalists followed the 
principle of Crttian, and were unanimous in holding that 
ecclesiastical causes could be decided indiscriminately by 
either civil or canon law, provided the civil law did not 
contradict the latter.(28) These commentators may not have 
expressly stated so, but that this was their attitude is 
clearly illustrated by their writings.
(22) Canon Law. p.125.
(23) cf. c. 16, C.XI, q.lj c. 16, C.XXV, q.2j c.44, C.XXIII,
q. 5.
(24) cf. c.l. C. XXX, q.3.
(85) Dictum Gratiani post c.4, C.XV, q.3. "Sed sicut circa
huius ‘operis initium praemissum est, toties leglbus Imper-
atorum in eccleslasticis negotiis utendum est, quoties
sacris canonibus obviare non inveniuntur.
(26) o.l, X, V, 32. (27) cf. c. 28, X, V. 33.
(28) cf. A.VAN HOVE, Prolegomena, n. 445, Note 3.
(29) a . VAN HOVE. Prolegomena, n.233 writes on this point -
Vfprincipium nulla dispositione canonica est expresse 
statutura, praxi sanctae Sedis et Synodorum est introductum 
per scriptores et collectores collectionum canonicorum 
est aff irmatum. w
( 2 2 )
Prom all this we can understand the Importance of 
the position filled by jurists such as Bartolus and Baldus 
in their role as authorative commentators on the Justinian 
laws. njhen later canonists had of necessity to appeal to 
Roman law in order to supplement deficiencies in the eccles­
iastical code it was only natural that they should accept 
the civil law as expounded by these jurists. Hence the 
great influence exercised by these jurists on the development 
of canonical doctrine in general - and on the doctrine of 
common error in particular. In t»he following chapters we 
shall examine the results of this influence as portrayed 
in the writings of subsequent canonists.
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TEACHING- OF 15th AND 16th CENTURY CANONISTS.
While emphasizing the importance of the civil jurists 
and their influence on canonical teaching, the immediate 
effects of this influence must not he exaggerated. It must 
not he imagined that canonists as a result, proceeded to 
include in their commentaries an ex professo treatment of 
the theory of common error. Rather, they continued to treat 
of it incidentally, making application of it whenever the 
occasion presented; and making what explanations or quali­
fications they migjit deem necessary on such occasions. But 
in these explanations and qualifications they display a more 
confident note and reveal a more well-defined notion of the 
doctrine than did earlier canonical writers.
During this period of the 15th and 16th centuries a
couple of names stand out in pre-eminence - Nicolaus de
Tudeschis ( 1445) - better knorai as Panormitanus^ - and
( 2)Pelinus Sandeus ( 1503). Prom the writings of these and
others such as Joannes Baptists de S a l i s ^  Sylvester 
Prierias/4) S. Antoninus, Covarruvias Leyva, and Martinus 
de Azpilcueta^5  ^ we shall be able to obtain a fairly accurate 
and complete knowledge of the state of the doctrine at this 
time. It will be more simple and convenient to treat these 
two centuries as one units there is no outstanding change to 
be found in the teaching of the canonists between the beginning 
and the end of this period. There are some points it is true,
(1) NICOLAUS DE TUDESCHIS was Archbishop of Panormitanus from
whence he acquired his name: we shall refer to him in
these pages as PANORMITANUS.
(2) NOTE. There were other eminent canonists at this period - 
Joannes ab Imola, Joannes de Sancto Georgio, Augustinus 
Berouis, Joannes a Ripa etc. but their works are not 
available.
(3) Otherwise known as TROVAMALA: wrote "Summa Roscella.”
(4) i.e. Mazolinus Sabaudus O.P.: wrote "Summa Sylvestrina.”
(5) Generally referred to as NAVARRUS.
c h a p t e r  I I .
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on which there is slight divergence of opinion - these shall 
be noted; but generally speaking they may be said to be in 
agreement. a brief survey of the salient points in their 
teaching will suffice.
A. Nature of defect of capacity in which 
common error supplies.
Panormitanua limited the extension or scope of the
principle when he declared that common error is of no avail
whenever the defect of capacity is due to an impediment of
the natural law. Replying to the question whether a sentence
should be retracted which was passed by a judge who laboured
under an occult impediment, he makes a distinctions if the
impediment arises from the natural law e.g. if the judge is
insane, then the sentence must be regarded as null and void,
(6)
"quia tolerantia nihil operatur circa impediraentum naturale."
This point is very reasonable and intelligible, for 
if the natural law demands the fulfilment of a certain con­
dition for the validity of any act or contract and this 
condition is not fulfilled then it is beyond the power of any 
human legislator to supply the defect. An inferior legis­
lator cannot by his own authority, abrogate, change or 
dispense from the laws of a superior legislator; hence when 
an inferior legislator declares that by reason of common error 
the required capacity to validly perform certain acts is 
supplied, the capacity in question must be required by virtue 
of his ovm law, or rather the defect in question must be an 
absence of some condition required by that inferior’s own law. 
The Church, then, can only supply defects which arise as a 
result of the absence of conditions or qualifications required
(6) Comment aria ad c. 13, X, I, 3.
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by Her own positive laws: She cannot encroach on the domain
of either the natural or divine positive law. ®ds latter
is brought out clearly by Panormitanus in another context.
By reason of divine constitution the power of Orders is
necessary that one may validly absolve, and ordain. Bae
Church cannot change this constitution, nor can She dispense
from it. She could never give to one who had not received
the power of Orders, the power to validly absolve or ordain -
not even in common error. Panormitanus points out therefore
that the principles of common error apply only in relation
to defect of jurisdiction, but do not apply in the case of
defect of the power of Orders: hence a person who is
ordained by one who is commonly reputed to be bishop, but
(7)who de facto is not a bishop, is not validly ordained.
It is of interest to note that at least one author 
has put forward the view that common error applies even in 
the case of an impediment of the divine law; Mascardus 
asserted that if a person confesses to one vino is commonly 
reputed to be a priest but in reality is not, then both
I 0\
confession and absolution are valid. However, we need not
pay much attention to this, because some lines further down
in the same context he contradicts this statement and falls
/g\into line with the teaching of Panormitanus quoted above.
(7) Commentaria ad c. 2, X, III, 43 ad finem - "Notatur
quod communis error seu opinio facit valere gesta.
Ista enim procedunt in depen^pibus a jurisdictions, non 
autem in dependentibus ab ordine •••• Ex quo infertur 
quod qui ordinatur ab eo qui putabatur episcopus cum 
non esset, nullam ordinem recepit.'*
(8) cf. De.Probationibus, Vol. II Conclusio 649, n. 14.
(9) cf. De Probationibus, Vol. II Conclusio 649, n. 98.
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B. Quantity or extent of error.
We have seen that Hostiensis Insisted that common
error would not supply the defect of jurisdiction or of any
other capacity, if the error were based on ignorance that was
(10)
crass or supine. This teaching is reiterated by Panormitanus, 
and by Pelinus Sandeusi11^
Panormi tanus now makes a further attempt to circum­
scribe the notion of common error. He asserts that a defect 
or impediment in an official may be publicly known in one 
place, and occult in another: yet the acts of this affficial
performed in the place where the fact of his incapacity is 
still occult, are rendered valid by virtue of common error.
He ascribes the opinion to Joannes Audreae and describes it 
as "most true.” (Veri ssimum). By way of proof he notes 
that in the case of Barbarius it would seem certain that in 
his place of brigln he must have been known for what he really 
was - a slave - yet when he came to Home and was appointed
praetor, his official acts were valid by reason of common 
(12)
error. Panormitanus does not define what would con­
stitute a "Locum" or place in this connection, though the
(13)
fact that he refers to "locum judicii" would seen to
suggest that it need not necessarily be very large. Pelinus
Sandeus taught that the error need not be one which Involves
all the people: he would regard error as being common if the
official concerned were considered habilis by all those who
(14)knew him - "omnibus scientibus et cognoscenti bus. "
(10) cf. Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3 nn. 12, 13.
(11) cf. Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3, n.5. - "Dispositio
L. Barbarius ff. de Offic Praet. habet locum etiam in 
delegato ... Pallit istud primo quando ignorantia 
inhabilitatis esset supina."
(12) Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3, n. 13.
(13) Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3 n. 13 - "Nam verisimle est
quod in partibus suis erat notarium illos esse servos, et 
tamen actus sustinetur si in loco judlcii putabantur 
liberi."
(14) cf. Commentaria ad c. 24, X, II, 27, n.3.
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Pro bably the extent to which an official would be known would 
depend on the size or extension of the area for which he was 
acting as official; thus, generally speaking, the number of 
people who would know a pastor would be limited according to 
the extent of the parish; a bishop would be known, ar at least 
known of, by all those living within the confines of his 
diocese. It would seem correct to conclude then, that 
according to the notions of Felinus, error could be designated 
common if it was the common opinion of those who lived within 
the territory to which the official in question was appointed. 
We put this forward as a suggestion however rather than as a 
definite conclusion.
C. Necessity of good Faith on the Part of those
who benefit.
Despite the use of the expression "ab omnibus scienti-
(15)
bus et cognoscentibus" by Felinus it is clear that he did 
not require that each and every individual member of the 
community should err, in order that common error be realized: 
nor did he require that each and every one who knew, or knew 
of, the official should be in error with regard to that 
individual1 a capacity. He intended the term "omnibus" £o 
be interpreted morally rather than mathematically. That this 
is true is clear from a particular case discussed by him, and 
by most commentators of this period and later. The case was 
that of the few who might happen to know of the existence of an 
impediment in a public official, while the community at large 
were in ignorance of it - whether these few could benefit by 
the error of the others, or whether the fact of their knowledge 
would impede the validating effect in their case. Ihe very
(15) cf. Commentaria ad c. 24, X, II, 27, n. 3.
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fact of their asking the question straightaway proves that 
these commentators did not require mathematical unanimity of 
error in order that common error might he realized. The 
answers given to this question are in general agreement, but 
not in every detail.
The question seems to have originated with Joannes
Calderinus: both Panormitanus and Felinus Sandeus attribute
(16)
it to him. Speaking of the case where the parties alone
are igiorant of the impediment under which the judge labours, 
while all others in the community know of the existence of 
this impediment, Panormitanus declares that the ignorance on 
the part of the parties concerned cannot be regarded as pro­
bable - and therefore there can be no claim for the validity 
of the sentence through the influence of common error. He 
then goes on to treat the converse case, viz., if the parties 
to the case know of the impediment while all others are 
ignorant of it. By way of reply he quotes the opinion of 
Galderinus .... "dicit Calderinus quod gesta ab excommunicato 
quatenus procedit in favorem sclentls sunt nulla aut retract-
anda, quia cessat favor in sciente .... quod est verbum valde
(IV)
notabile this latter remark would Indicate that
Panormitanus is in agreement with the opinion which he quotes. 
It can scarcely be said, however, that Panormitanus gives a 
complete answer to the question here: the question proposed
hy him referred to an impediment in the judge I.e. impediment 
in general: the answer refers only to a particular individual
impediment, viz., excommunication. It may be asked what was 
his opinion on this point in relation to other occult impedi­
ments of the positive law, such as occult dismissal from or
(16) cf. Panormitanus, commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3. n.13. 
F5LINUS SaNDBUS. Commentaria ad c. 24, X, II, 27, n.8 .
(17) Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3, n.13.
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loss of office etc. In other contexts in which he refers
to this noint, Panormitanus always seems to treat of
(18)
excommunication. Nevertheless we feel justified in
attributing to him the same teaching with regard to the
other impediments on the grounds: (a) that he uses the
example of excommunication as being that of most frequent
occurrence: (b) that the reason he alleges in the case of
excommunication applies also in the case of the other
(19)
impediments, viz. ’’quia cessat favor in sciente.” It
may be well to note here that Sandeus in his treatment of
( 20)
the point expressly refers to all impediments. We shall
now examine briefly the opinions on this question.
In the writings of both Panormitanus and Felinus
Sandeus there is evidence of indecision or uncertainty as
to the exact consequences. Thus Panormitanus, following
the opinion of Calderinus, asserts - "gesta ab excommunicato
quatenus prccedunt in favorem scientis sunt nulla aut
(21)
retraotanda: 11 and Sandeus - "... licet caeteri ignorent,
(22)
tamen gesta in favorem scientis sunt nulla aut irritanda.”
In these contexts both authors seem doubtful as to the position;
they imply that it is possible that such acts are ipso facto
null and void - and at least if they are not ipso facto null
then they should be rescinded. Yet both these authorities
state elsewhere without any doubt or qualification that such
acts are valid, but that they should be rescinded in order to
(23)penalize those who knowingly,approached an incompetent official
(18) e.g. cf. Commantaria ad c. 24, X, II, 27, n.16.
(19) Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3, n#13: cf. also Commentaria
ad c. 24, X, II, 27, n.16.
(20) cf. Commentaria ad c.24, X, II, 27, n.8 : and ad c. 35,
X, I, 3, n.30.
(21) Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3, n.13.
(22) Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3, n.5.
(23) cf. PANORMITANUS. commentaria ad c.24, X, II, 27, n.16.
”Collatio beneficii per exeommunicatum cccultum el qui sciebat 
ilium exeommunicatum tenet mero jure ratione public! officii 
conferentis, tamen iste cui facta est collatio poterit prlvari 
illo beneficio ut puniatur in eo in quo deli quit: participavit
nempe cum persona prohlbita cf. Felinus Sandeus,
Commentaria ad c. 24, X, II, 27, n.8 .
According to this view then, the acts performed by a public
official in favour of the few in the community who are aware
of his incapacity, are valid, but those persons act unlawfully 
in thus approaching him and by way of penalty for their unlaw­
ful action the act of the official placed in their favour 
should be rescinded. This opinion seems to have met with
general favour for it was adopted by other writers such as
(24) (25) f26)Socinus, Bertachinus, and Sylvester.
This question had a very practical bearing on the
Sacrament of Penance. Following the view just referred to,
it logically follows that If a person knowingly confessed to
an occultly incapacitated confessor (who was commonly reputed
to be habllla)that person sinned gravely In doing so.
Sylvester adverts to this and asserts that such a person is
bound to repeat such a confession - hence Implying the absol-
{27)ution conferred to be Invalid. The invalidity however
is not due to the defect of power of jurisdiction in the con­
fessor, but, as Medina^  ^points out, to the absence of the 
required dispositions in the penitent. For, by committing 
grave sin in the act of receiving absolution he has placed an 
obstacle to the valid reception of absolution. This teaching 
is merely a logical application of the generally accepted 
opinion of the time that it was unlawful to approach a merely 
putative official knowingly (i.e. in bad faith). Generally 
speaking the act placed by that official in favour of those who 
were in bad faith would be valid, but in the case of the
(24) cf. Regulae Juris et Fallentiae, Lit. G. Reg.CCX.
(25) cf. Repertorium, Pars I, Lit. G. verb "Collatio" n.70.
(26) cf. Sumrna Sylvestrina, Pars I, v. Excommunicatio, III, 5.
(27) cf. Summa Sylvestrina Pars I, v. Confessor, I, n.16. Nota
secundo, quod qui excommunicato occulte scienter confite- 
tur extra casum necessitatis, mortaliter peccat, et con­
fession an iteraro tenetur ..."
f* MEDINA. Do Poenitentia, da Restitution© et de Contracti­
ons, Tom. I, Trac. II, De Poen. Q.XXII - Absolutlo autem 
Sacramentalis ab excommunicato occulto impensa non ita 
tenet, quia ejus defectus, per publicas leges humanas supp­
ler! non potest eo quod absolutio impensa actu peccanti, 
seu obicem ponenti, de jure divino eat nulla.
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Sacrament of Penance the unlawfulness of the action of such 
as were in had faith would render the reception of the Sacra­
ment not only unlawful hut also Invalid.
D. Application of Common Error to the Internal Forum.
Much of this discussion presupposes that the principles 
of common error apply to the internal or Sacramental forum. 
Express references to this point during the 15th century seem 
to have h e m  few. But, as we remarked in an earlier chapter, 
when the commentators say that all the acts of a putative 
prelate are valid it is practically certain that they intend 
to include those which pertain to the internal forum: besides,
it is significant that none of these commentators expressly 
exclude the latter. panormitanus does make a passing refer­
ence to the point when treating of e. Dudum (i.e. c. 54, X, I, 
6), and follows the opinion put forward by Hostiensis, which 
we have already seen.^2i>^
During the 16th century references are more frequent 
and leave no doubt about the prevailing attitude. Baptista 
de Salis has it explicitly - ”Et per praedicta habes quod si 
confessor excommunicatus tamen occultus et toleratus audiat 
confessiones, quod confessiones factae cum eo valent nec sunt 
iterandae postea superveniente scientia. 50  ^ The same is 
repeated practically verbatim by Sylvester. ^ 31 ^ And towards 
the end of the century Navarrus writes - "si quis ipso jure 
suo titulo et possessione juris privaretur ... et a Superiors
toleraretur, eo casu gesta per ipsum in conscientiae foro
(32)valerent." Other authorities could likewise be quoted,
(29) cf. Commentaria ad c.54, X, I, 6 , n.20.
(30) Summa Roscella v. Confessio Sacrament. Ill, n.4l.
(31) cf. Sunma Sylvestrina v. Confessor, I, n.15.
(32) Opera Omnia, tom. I, De.Poen. D, VI, c. Placuit, n.179.
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but sufficient has been said to sho?/ that this was the 
accepted opinion of the time - that it had become established 
as the only reasonable and tenable opinion on the matter.
E. Necessity of a Title.
Vtfaether treating of its application to the internal 
or to the external forum, commentators of this period were 
practically miversally agreed that the authoritas Superioris 
or canonical institution was required in order that common 
error might have effect. a brief summary of the evidence 
will suffice here.
Panormitanus bases his opinion on the Lex Barbarius.
This law according to him has a twofold fundament - common
error and the Authoritas Superioris; for the slave who was
considered free had received office from the legitimate
authority. Both common error and this intervention of proper
authority were equally essentials one without the other was 
(33)of no avail. All acts of an intrusus therefore were to
be regarded as invalid - intrusus being the term used to
designate a person who had acquired an office by means other
than those recognized ty law.^34  ^ Though the validity of
this argument might well be challenged, it nevertheless went
for long unquestioned. The opinion was taken for granted by
most commentators, the result being that no effort was made
to bring further arguments in support of it. Sandeus is
content with saying - ”... publica authoritas c m  quasi-
(35)possession© capacitatis sufficit. w Baptista de Sails,
speaking of confession, says that if a person unknowingly
(33) cf. Commentaria ad c.44, X, I, 6, n.ll.
(34) Cf. BALPUS. Commentaria ad c.44, X, I, 6, n.3. Intruaua 
i.e. "qui non intrat per ostim, id eat qui non habet 
canonicum Ingres sum. "
(35) Commentaria ad c.22, X, I, 3, n.3 .
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confesses to an intrusus the confession is invalid and he is
bound to repeat the confession whenever he learns the truth:
should he never learn the truth then he will be saved per
f idem Sacramentl. Sylvester holds this same view.^3^
And this teaching is found unchanged in the writings of
(38)Navarrus at the end of the 166h century. ' Thus far then 
we find practical unanimity among authorities on a question 
that was soon to be the subject of lively controversy - result­
ing ultimately in the establishment of the contrary view.
Of this we shall see more later.
F. Common Error and Delegated Jurisdiction.
Another question which was discussed at this time,
.and which seems to have received a satisfactory solution, was, 
whether the doctrine applied in the case of delegated juris­
diction. We have met the question in a preceding chapter 
when discussing the writings of Innocent IV. His name figures 
here again, in so far as his teaching on this point is recalled 
by commentators of the 15th and 16th centuries, and rejected 
by them. It will be remembered that Innocent denied the 
application of the principles of the Lex Barbarius in the 
case of delegated jurisdiction: Panormi tanus expressly states
that in his time authors commonly denied this teaching. (40)
while later on Sandeus asserts that all authorities opposed It. 
When treating of the writings of Innocent on this point it will 
be remembered, too, that we pointed out that probably at least,
(36) Summa Rosella, v. Confesslo Sacramentalis, III, n.41.
(37) cf. Summa Sylvestrina, Pars I, v. Confessor, I, n.15.
(38) cf. Opera Omnia, Tom. I, de Poen. D.VI, c, Placuit, n.180.
(39) cf. Commentaria ad c. 22, X, I, 3, n.10.
(40) cf. Commentaria ad c. 22, X, I, 3, n.3.
this canonist denied the a p p l i c a t i o n  of the principles only 
to delegation ad unam vel alteram cau3am. However, this 
does not make any material difference in the present case, 
because the arguments advanced by panormitanus purport to 
prove that cannon error applies to all categories of dele­
gation - whether it be ad universitatem oauaarum or ad unam 
causam tantum.
Hie three chief arguments put forward by Panoraitanus 
in support of his rejection of Innocent«s contention are based 
on three laws we have already seen, viz., c.l, C.III, q.7:
Cod. VII, 45, 2i c.24, X, II, 27. The argument from the 
first two is, that in both these cases there is question of 
a slave, who is conrnonly considered free, being delegated as 
judge, and his sentence in each case is declared valid. we 
have already examined the juridical force or value of the 
dictum Cratiani referred to here (i.e. c.l, C. Ill, q.7) and 
found that it is merely a repetition of Cod. VII, 45, 2.
In effect then the two arguments advanced by Panormitanus 
here may be combined in one. But from the words of Cod VII, 
4 5 ,  2 -  " S i  arbiter datus a magiatratibus, cum sententiam 
dixit, in libertate morabatur, quamvis postea in servitutem 
depulsus sit, semtentia ab eo dicta habet rei judicata® 
auc tori tat em" - and from the annotation of the glossator 
stating that an arbiter is a judex delegatus. ^ ^  there can 
be no doubting the validity and force of this argument of 
Psnorraitanus:  it satisfactorily proves that common error
a p p l i e s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  delegated jurisdiction.
Ah equally forcible argument is that drawn from c.24, 
X, II, 27. we nave already seen that from the emphasis on the
(41) cf. c. VII, 45, 2, gloss on words "Si arbiter."
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word publico in this decretal the glossators concluded
that If the excommunication were occult, the sentence would 
have been valid by reason of common error. But the decretal 
expressly states that the judges in question were delegated, 
for cne particular case only. Ohough the glossators did not 
make explicit mention of this point it is obviously implicitly 
contained in their teaching that they considered the principles 
of common error as applicable to delegated jurisdiction - even 
to delegation for one case. Hence Panormitanus is quite 
justified in the conclusion he draws viz., "Kota ibl publics 
Innodatus - quod gesta judlce etlarn delegato public© excom­
municato sunt ipso jure nulla, secus si non esset publice 
excommunicatus sed toleratus, ut hie probatur a contrario 
sensu. Et ex hoc infertur quod tolerantia operatur etign 
in delegato, et valeant gesta, si communi opinion© reput&batur 
habili."*45)
By way of answer to the objection put forward by
Innocent - that when sun official is delegated for an individual
case there can be no question of the public utility being at
issue - Panormitanus assorts that, whan a Superior delegates
for a particular case, the act of delegation itself Implies
an exercise of authority which is at once juridically public
and fully verifies the notion of public utility, because the
Superior delegates in his capacity as a juridical person.
(42) NOTE. Bhe relevant passage in this decretal reads:
•r. • quod imus ex delegatis judicibus, qui eandem 
sententiaxa pratulerunt excoumunlcationis vinculo esset 
publice innodatus, quando aententie lata fuit ... eandem 
sentential constiterlt inf 1 man.dam. n
($5) Gommentaria ad c. 24, X, II, 27 s n.2.
(44) Gasmentaria ad c.22. X, I, 3, n.lo. "Potest did quod cum superior comitt it cans am, in ipsa commission® 
veraatur jus publicum, et utilitas publiea, quia committit 
jure puhLico, L. 3. ff. de juris, omn. Jud. Tilde commissio 
facta a Jure pub&ico non deoei: vitiari propter vitium 
personae judicls olandestinam.
(42)
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Sandeus refers to the explanations given by various authors 
as to how the public utility is involved in the exercise of 
delegated jurisdiction. Among them he quotes Joannes ab 
Imola as holding that the public utility is involved in the 
case of delegation even for ^particular occasion, because 
it is in the interests of the community at large, that 
justice be properly ministered to each individual member of 
the community: and Baldus as holding that It is sufficient
if the public utility be verified or realized in the quality 
of the office in question, even though it is not Involved in 
each individual act of exercise of this office. Sandeus
does not make any suggestions cn the matter himself: he is
satisfied that these arguments suitably refute the objection 
proposed by Innocent IV and reiterates that it is the opinion 
of all that the principles of common error apply to delegated 
jurisdiction. philippus Decius too, testifies that this is 
the coronon opinion, and we shall see later that this view 
has seldom been questioned by subsequent canonists.
G. Conclusion.
By way of summary, we shall now make a brief examin­
ation of the principal examples or cases of the application 
of the doctrine given by authors at this period. This will 
help considerably towards a fuller understanding of the notion 
of common error prevailing at this time. The cases in which 
common error could be regarded as being verified may be 
reduced to two main headings:-
(1 ) that of a person appointed to an office while 
labouring under an occult incapacitating impediment, thus 
rendering his possession of the office de jure invalid from 
the beginning:
(45) Commentaria ad c. 22, X, I, 3, n.3.
(46) cf. Commentaria ad c. 13, X, I, 3, n.38.
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(2) that of a person validly Instituted in an office,
but who afterwards for one reason or another loses office or
is deprived of it, thus rendering his possession of the 
office de jure Invalid from the moment of loss or privation.
(1) The first example envisages the case of a person 
who a priori is incapable of validly receiving or holding
office ion account of an occult incapacitating impediment: 
as long as the impediment remains occult the official in 
question will be commonly reputed legitimate and his official 
acts will be valid. Such was the case of Barbarius - he 
was a slave and therefore inhabllis, at the time of his appoint­
ment to the office of praetor. In canon law incapacity aris­
ing as a result of the censure of exconmunication was the 
example most frequently cited at this period. A few words 
with regard to excommunication may not be out of place here.
We have already seen that according to the earlier 
ecclesiastical discipline every excommunicated person was in 
effect an excoranunlcatus vitandus: whether he was publicly
or occultly excommunicated, whether the excommunication was 
latae or ferendae sententiae. the person excommunicated was 
deprived of all jurisdiction and juridical power. From
this arose the teaching that, in the case of an occultly 
excommunicated person who held an office, all his acts should 
be regarded as valid by virtue of common error - that is, as 
long as the fact of his excommunication remained occult.
Such a person was referred to as an excommunicatus toleratus. 
With the issuance of the Constitution "Ad Evitanda" by 
Martin V in 1418 the term excommunicatus toleratus acquired 
a new meaning in canonical jurisprudence: in this Constitution
(47) cf. c.14, X, V, 39j also c.14, X, V, 39 gloss on 
words "Denunciatus non sit."
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It was given a determined juridical signification in opposition 
to the term excommunicatus vitandus. By an excommunicatus 
vitandus was meant one who had to be shunned by the faithful: 
and a person became a vitandus in either of two waysj- 
($) if the sentence of excommunication which was passed on 
him were formally published, or made known by the judge in 
special and express form: (b) if he incurred the penalty of
excomnunication by reason of sacrilegious violence against a 
cleric so notoriously that the fact could in no way be dissimul­
ated or excused. All other persons who were excommunicated, 
but who did not fall under either of the above categories, 
were'called Tolerati  ^ The law no longer obliged the
faithful to abstain from intercourse with such excommunicated 
persons: neither did the law deprive these excommunicati
tolerati of jurisdiction or juridical power. Hence if an 
excommunicatus toleratus (in the sense described here) 
exercised an office his official acts would be valid by law; 
so that henceforward there was no necessity for the invocation 
of the saving principles of common error where the acts of 
such a one were concerned. ^
specific meaning in canon law with relation to excommunication, 
* it is noteworthy that canonists continued to use it in its 
original sense with relation to the doctrine of common errorj 
we find them referring to a judex toleratus and a praelatua 
toleratus which simply signifies that the judge or the prelate
labours under an occult defect. Thus we find Henriquez 
expressly defining it - "Nunc ille dicitur toleratus qui
(49) cf. FSLINUS SANDEUS. Commentaria ad c.35, X, I, 3, n.30j 
CO VAR FTJ VI AS Y LEYVA. Opera Omnia, Comm, ad c. Alma matei*, 
de Sent. Excom. in VI, Pars I, 6, n.7; - DOMINICUS / 
DE SOTO, Comm, in Quart. Sent, Tom. I, Dist. I, q.5,
Art. 6.
But though the term toleratus was thus given a
(48) For text of this Constitution nAd Evitanda, w cf 
Codicis Juris Canonici Fontes, Vol.I, n*45.
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cammuni errore populi habetur pro legitimo pastore judice 
aut e l e c t o r e . w e  shall meet it often in similar contexts 
when discussing the writings of later canonists.
(2) The second example mentioned above is the case 
of an official who is secretly deprived of, or secretly loses 
the office to which he had been validly designated. Panormit­
anus states the principle clearly - "Cum is qui se gerebat pro 
praelato fuit electus et confirmatus seu eidem pro visum per 
Superiorem tamen postea aliquid gerlt, propter quod fuit
prlvatus Ipso facto praelatura .... et tunc si ista privatio
(51)fuit occulta tenant omnia gesta." One exception however
was made to the rule of the application of common error in the 
case of occult cessation of office, or occult revocation of 
jurisdiction: this exception was the cessation of delegated
jurisdiction by reason of the death of the person delegating, 
re jam integra. Guilelmus Durantis ( 1296) in his day had
held that on no account could the acts performed by a delegate 
in such circumstances be held as v a l i d . F e w  authors 
make reference to the point, but Panormitanus strongly favours 
the opinion just quoted. His reasons are that by the death 
of the person delegating, jurisdiction in the delegate is 
extinguished; ignorance of the death of the former cannot 
confer jurisdiction: nor can coma on error confer jurisdiction
in this case.^53) He denies the existence of an analogy 
between this case and that envisaged in the Lex Barbarius.
In the case of the Lex Barbarius, the validity of acts was 
due to both common error and the fact that Barbarius had 
received office from the proper Superior, the authority of
(50) Summa Theol. Mor. Lib. XIII, c.7, n.6.
(51) Commentaria ad c.44, X, I, 6, n,12.
(52) Speculum Juris, Tom. I, Tit. de Judice delegato,
Restat, n.5.
(53) cf. Commentaria ad c. 20, X, I, 29, n.10.
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this Superior having continued. In this case however the 
jurisdiction of the Superior has ceased - only common error 
remains, which of itself is not sufficient to render official 
acts v a l i d . H i s  opinion goes back to the more fundamental 
question as to the necessity of the authoritas superioris 
as well as common errors and we have seen that at this period 
this authority of the Superior was universally regarded as 
essential.
The question did not arise however in the ordinary 
cases of occult privation of office, occult revocation of 
jurisdiction etc; in these cases the authority or juris­
diction of the Superior who conferred the office still 
continued in force, and hence there is unanimous agreement 
that in such circumstances, the doctrine of common error 
applied. For this we have already quoted Panormitanus.
Among many others holding the same opinion we may mention 
Baptista de Salis^°5  ^ Sylvester^56) and Navarrus.^*^
We should lime to emphasize, finally, that whether 
the authors of this period were treating of the case of an 
occult impediment which existed previous to appointment, or 
of an impediment which arose in the official subsequent to his 
appointment, they were unanimous in holding that the doctrine 
only applied in the case of a public official exercising a 
public office. Time out of number we meet the phrase "gesta 
valent rations publicl officii." or similar phrases, when
(54) cf. Gommentaria ad c.20, X, I, 29, n.ll.
(55) cf. Summa Roscella, v. Confessio Sacr. Ill, n.41.
(56) cf. Summa Sylvestrina, Pars, I, v. Confessor, I, n.15.
(57) cf. Opera Omnia, Tom.I, De Poen, Dist. VI, e. placult,
n. 179.
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they treat of common error and its f o r c e . B e s i d e s ,  just 
as we noted with regard to earlier canonists, the officials 
most frequently referred to are p r e l a t e , j u d g e ,  
and notary, (63-) all of whom are public officials, fulfilling 
as they do all the conditions required according to the 
definition of the term, as laid down by Sylvester in this 
connection, viz., appointment by virtue of public authority 
for the public utility.
Thus, though the c o m m  lawyers took the doctrine of 
common error directly from Roman law and established it in 
canonical jurisprudence by use and custom, it is noteworthy 
that they modified the fcoman practice on this one point.
For we have already seen when discussing Roman law doctrine 
that it was not necessary that a person be a public official 
in order that his acts should benefit by the validating 
influence of common error; in Roman law, common error would 
supply juridical capacity to a private person exercising a 
private function, as for instance to a slave witnessing a 
will.(63) gut from its very Introduction to Canon Law, com­
mon error has always been associated with public officials 
only.
(58) e.g. cf. PANORMITANUS, Commentaria ad c. 34, X, V, 39, 
n.9. ad c.8, X, II, 14, nn. 27, 45; ad c. 24, X, II, 27, 
n. 16. FELINUS SANDEUS Commentaria ad c. 24, X, II, 27, 
n.3. SYLVESTER, Summa S yl ve s t r in a Pars, I, v. Excommun- 
icatio, III, 5. COVARRUVIAS Y LEYVA. Opera Omnia,
Tam. I, Comm, ad c. Alma Mater, de Sent, Exc. in VI,
Pars, I, 7, n.9. NAVARRUS, Opera Omnia. Tom. II. cap.
IX, n.9.
(59) e.g. cf. PANORMITANUS. Commentaria ad c.44, X, I, 6, n.ll.
(60) e.g. cf. PANORMITANUS, Commentaria ad c.24, X, II, 27,n.2.
(61) e.g. cf. PANORMITANUS. Commentaria ad c.8, X, III, 50,n.21
(62) cf. Summa Sylvestrina, Pars I, v. Excommunicatio III, 2.
"Tertia est quod officium publicum est duplex, scil. 
publicum authoritate et utilitate, id quod communl 
authorltate fuloitur, et ad communem utilitatem ordinatur, 
uti tabellionatus .....
(63) cf. Above, Sec. I, Ch. I, p.12; cf. also Inst. 11,10,7.
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THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON ERROR FROM THE BEGINNING OF 
THE 17th CENTURY TO THE PROMULQATION OF THE 
CODEX JURIS CANONICI.
Though the Council of Trent made no express legislation 
with regard to the doctrine of common error, still certain pro­
nouncements of the Tridentlne Fathers exercised a certain
influence on the evolution of the doctrine in subsequent years.
(1)Most important of these was the Decree Tametsl, by virtue 
of which parties could be married validly only before the pastor 
of the parish where at least one of the parties had a domicile or 
quasi-domicile - or before another priest with this pastor*s or 
the Ordinary's permission. We may also mention the decree 
’’Quamvis Presbyteri," which legislated on the necessity of 
jurisdiction and approbation by the Ordinary in order that a 
confessor might validly hear confessions. This did not intro­
duce any radical change into the discipline with regard to the 
necessity of jurisdiction, but it did introduce a change to 
this extent that, as a result, only the Ordinary could approve 
of confessors. Pastors continued to enjoy jurisdiction 
ex officio and could still delegate this power, but they could 
not give approbation.^ These decrees - especially the former • 
were the occasion of the awakening of interest of the theologians
(1) Seas. XXIV. Dec. de Ref. Mat. cap. 1. "Qui aliter quam 
praesente parocho, vel alio sacerdote de ipsius parochi 
seu Ordinarii licentia ... matrimonium contrahere attenta- 
bunt, eos Sancta Synodus ad sic contrahendum omnino inhabilis 
reddlt et hiuiusmodi contractus irritos et nullos esse 
decemit.n
(2£ Sessio XXIII, Decret. de Ref. Ord. Gap. XV, "Quamvis pres- 
byteri in sua ordinatione a peccatis absolvendi potestatem 
accipiant, decemit taman Sacrosanta Synodus, nullum etiam 
regularem, posse confessiones saecularium, etiam sacerdotum, 
audire, nec ad id idomeum reputarl nisi aut parochiale 
beneficium, aut ab Episcopis per examen, si illis videbitur 
necessarium, aut alias idoneus judicetur, et approbationem, 
quae gratis detur obtineat."
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in the question of common error. It was inevitable that 
merely putative pastors would assist at marriages and that 
putative confessors would hear confessions. They had to 
determine, therefore, whether, when and under what circum­
stances such marriages and confessions would be valid. The 
answer to these questions, as found in their writings, will 
form a continuation of the history of the doctrine of common 
error.
In view of the influence exercised by these decrees of 
the Council of Trent, in giving rise as it were, to a new phase 
in the history of the doctrine, it may be suggested that a more 
apt point of division in its treatment would have been the 
Council of Trent itself, rather than the end of the 16th century. 
However, we consider the division here adopted to be justified, 
on the grounds that the reformations and revised descipllne, 
introduced by the Council of Trent, are first fully reflected 
in the writings of the early 17th century theologians, rather 
than in the works of thesjl canonists who flourished during, 
and immediately following, the Council.
In the present section we shall devote a chapter to 
each of two main questions which arise, viz., (1 ) the application 
of the principles of common error to the act of assistance at 
marriage and to other non-jurisdictional actss (2) the notion 
of common error Itself. Before treating these two main 
questions, however, we shall speak in the opening chapter of 
various minor questions which arise in connection with the 
subject: some of these questions we have already touched upon,
others are new; and while they may not, perhaps, play &i 
essential part in the ultimate development of this essay, still 
a work on this subject of common error would not be complete 
without seme reference to them.
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C H A P T E R  I .
VARIOUS questions arising in connection 
WITH THE DOCTRINE.
Tie questions to be discussed in this chapter may be 
conveniently summarized under five headings as follows: -
(1) The necessity of a title.
(2) The licit use of common error.
(3) The application of the principles to delegated
jurisdiction.
(4) The principles of common error as the source of
Canons 207, 2; 430, 2.
(5) The principles of common error with relation to
probable jurisdiction.
yy>We shall not treat of these in order.
ARTICLE I . NECESSITY OF A TITLE.
In the preceding chapter we referred briefly to the
opinion which, for all practical purposes, was unanimous in
holding for the necessity of the nauthoritas Superioris" in order
that common error be effective. Thus Petrus de Arragon ( -t 1595)
writing at the end of the 16th century avers that it is the
common opinion of all authorities - and the true opinion -
that the acts of a putative prelate are valid provided two
conditions ^re fulfilled, viz., that the prelate has been
appointed auctorltate superiorls and that he be commonly
regarded as prelate (i.e. common error). The same opinion
is expressed by the Spanish Jesuit theologian Henriquez ( + 1608)
in the following terms, "Ille dicitur toleratus qui communi
errore populi habetur pro legitimo pastore, judice aut electors:
dummodo duo habeat, primo titulum saltern coloratura a praelato,
aut auctoritate legis: secundo ut rations public! officii
(2)exerceat jurisdictionem.” This seems to be the first occasion
on which the expression tltulus coloratus occurs. The author
(1) cf. De Justitia et Jure, Quaest. LX, Art VI.
(2) Summa Theol. Mor., Lib. XII, Cap. 7, n.6.
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does not offer a definition of the terms, hut from the context 
in which it is found, it is obviously synonymous with the 
expression auctoritas superioris, which is described by Petrus 
de Arragcn thus: "auctoritas Superioris, hoc est, quod
fuerit talis prg.elatus seu judex auctoritate Superioris con­
st i t u t u s . H e n r i q u e z  has this in common with preceding 
authors, also, that he neglects to put forward arguments in 
support of the view he adopts - probably because of the lack 
of opposition to this view.
Thomas Sanchez ( 1610) - whose exposition of the
whole question of common error must be regarded as the most
outstanding and most complete in the whole history of the 
(4)doctrine - makes little attempt to adduce arguments in 
favour of this opinion. Denying even the probability of 
the contrary opinion, he is content to reiterate the argument 
of Panormitanus alleging that the Lex Barbarius has a twofold 
fundament - error communis and auctoritas Superioris - both 
of which are equally essential.^
A title may be defined as the cause by reason of which 
a right is acquired. This title may be real and true, it 
may be invalid, it may be merely apparent or non existent.
To describe these various categories or classes of titles 
authors are accustomed to use concise and descriptive expres­
sions, such as titulus legitimus, titulus verus, titulus 
invalidus, titulus coloratus, titulus existimatus. titulus 
praesumptus etc. It is to be noted however that all authors 
are not consistent in applying the same definition to each of
(3) De Just, et Jure, Quaest. LX, Art. VI.
(4) cf. De S. Matrimonii Sacramento, Lib.Ill, Disp. XXII.
(5) cf. De Mat. L,b. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.49; cf. also 
PANORMITANUS. Comment, ad c.44, X, I, 6, n.H.
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the above terns. Hence an important factor to be con­
sidered in the study of each Individual author, will be the 
exact signification cf the terms as used by him. This of 
course will be easily found either in his preliminary defini­
tion of terms or from the context. However, at least two 
of the above terns have consistently received the same signi­
fication from all, viz., tltulus exlstimatus and titulus 
coloratus. A titulus existimatus Is had when a person is
commonly regarded as an office-holder (e.g. judge, prelate, 
etc.) when de facto the office has never been conferred on him. 
A titulus coloratus (coloured title) Is had when a person has 
been appointed to an office by a legitimate superior, the 
appointment being invalid, however, by reason of an occult 
defect. in his definition of coloured title T. Sanchez 
emphasizes that it is not sufficient if the office be con­
ferred by any Superior whatsoever - it must be the legitimate 
Superior having the power to do s o . ^  Hence, he concludes, 
if the Superior delegating or appointing is himself an 
intrusus,though a real prelate in the estimation cf the 
community, the person delegated or appointed cannot be said 
to have a coloured title, - and is therefore incapable of 
performing valid acts, The same is true of a real Superior 
who delegates in a case over which he actually enjoys no 
real power.
Among other sponsors of the theory requiring a coloured
(9)title we may mention Flaminius Parisius (-1-1603) Nicolaus
( 6)
(6) e.g. Compare T. SANCHEZ. De. M a t.  Lib. Ill Disp. XXII, 
n.61 - "... a t  concurrit titulus praesumptus scilicet 
licentia et a auperlore potentl concedere, d a t a  . . . "  
with DE ANCELIS Prael. Juris Can. T. IV. Pars. I, Lib.II, 
Tit. I, n.25 - "Titulus praesumptus, seu exlstimatus, 
dicitur quando vulgo credituft datus, qui reipsa datus 
non fuit a Superlore."
(7) De Mat. Lib.Ill, Disp. XXII, nn. 2, 48, 51, 61,
(8) cf. De Mat. Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.51.
(9) cf. De.Resignations Beneficiorum, Tom. II, Lib.XI, q.l, n.S20
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darcla ( + 1613), and the Jesuit Theologians Joannes de
(1 1 ) (12) (13)
Salas (+1612, Reginald (+1623), Suarez (+1617,
(14) (15)Lessius (+ 1623), and Laymann (-+1635): The first real
exponent of the contrary view was Basilius Pontius (+1629)
in his treatise: "De Sacramento Matrimonii Tractatus." It
is true, this opinion had been put forward before his time,
but it was proposed in a tentative manner. Bartolus a
Saxoferrato held it at one stage and quotes others for the
(16)same view, but later he seems to favour the other. To
Pontius must go the credit of being the pioneer of the opinion, 
not so much because he was the actual originator of it, but 
rather its vindicator, in so far as he put forward solid and 
convincing arguments in support of it. In the light of this 
it can be easily understood why Antoninus Diana ( + 1663) 
could refer to this opinion some years later as being a new
Pontius lists three main argunents to prove his 
contention that no coloured title is required.
(a) Quoting the decretals c.9, X, I, 31^19  ^ and c.13, 
X, I, 2,^20  ^ as proving that jurisdiction can be acquired by
(10) cf. De Beneficiis, Tom.I, pars. V, c. IV, n.281.
(11) cf. De Leglbus, Q. XCVI, Trac. XIV, Disp. X, 3 n.14.
(12) Theol. Mor. Lib, I, n.98.
(13) De Censuris, Tit. XX, Disp. II, Sect. IV.
(14) De Justitia et Jure, Lib. II, c.29, Dub. 8 , n,65.
(15) Theologia Moralls, Tom.I, Lib. I, Trac. IV, c.22, n.9.
(16) cf. Above, Sect. II, Ch.I, Art.4.
(17) cf. Resolutiones Morales, Tom.I, Trac.III, Resol. 19, n.3.
(18) De S.Matr. Lib. V, cap.XX, nn. 3, 4, 6.
(19) This decretal reads; "Respondemus quod cum sit in canoni- 
bus diffinitum, Primates, vel Patriarchas, nihil juris 
prae caeteris habere, nisi quantum sacri canones concedunt 
vel prisca illis consuetudo contulit ab antiquo."
(20) This decretal reads; Nisi forte his quibus delinquentes 
ipsi deserviunt ex indulgentia, vel consuetudine speciali, 
jurisdictionem huiusmodi valeant sibi vindicare.
(10)
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means of prescription and of custom, Pontius maintains that 
it is not true to say that jurisdiction is always obtained 
directly from the legitimate Superior. therefore, it can 
be acquired also through common error without any intervention
on the part of the legitimate Superior.
(b) By virtue of Nov. XLIV, 1,4 the acts of a putative 
notary, who has not been appointed by the legitimate Superior 
having power to do so, are declared valid. Therefore, 
appointment by the proper Superior cannot be an essential 
factor: in other words a coloured title is not required, 
common error alone suffices. We have seen this argument 
already and its force can scarcely be doubted.
(c) The third is not listed formally as an argument 
try Pontius, but rather as a confirmation of a conclusion which 
he draws as a result of his not requiring a coloured title.
He emphasizes the grave perturbation that would follow from 
the invalidty of all the Sacraments conferred by a parochus 
exlstimatus who has not a coloured title.(21) The obvious 
implication is, that since the purpose of the doctrine of 
common error is precisely to prevent such grave inconveniences 
and perturbations, there seems no reason for restricting its 
influence to the case where a coloured title is had.
That these arguments carried weight and force is 
demonstrated by the influence they exercised on subsequent 
writers. Very soon afterwards P. de Castro Paleo (+ 1633)
( 2 2 )could refer to the opinion as both reasonable and probable. 
Likewise Joannes Sanchez (+ 1624) who asserts that this opinion
(21) De Mat. Llb.V, cap. XX, n.6 . ’’Hie quaeso lector animad- 
vertat, quanta animorum perturbatio sequeretur, si omnia 
sacramenta matrimonii et confessiones fuissent invalida."
(22) cf. Opus Morale, Pars, V, Trac. XXVIII, Disp. II, Punct. 
13, 10, n.9.
-87-
prop os ed by Pontius is much more conducive to the promotion
of the common good than the opinion req u irin g  a coloured
t i t l e .  (23) A^ong many oth ers who regarded th e  opinion as
( 24)probable were Vericelli ( -+-1656), Diana who recommended 
it to confessors as such, Hurtado (->-1659) who declares
it safe in practice,(26) Leander (+ 1663)\ a n d  
Tamburini (-h 1675). (
Despite the views of these, authors, however it must
be admitted that the weight of theological and canonical
opinion during the 17th century still favoured the view
requiring a coloured title. Many names could be mentioned 
(29)here,''- but as they to a large extent merely repeat what
*
had been said by their predecessors, we shall consider only 
the objections raised by de Lugo (-h 1660) to the contention 
of Pontius. De Lugo*s main argument is that greater evils 
and greater inconveniences would follow as a result of the 
application of the theory e^ounded by Pontius and his adher­
ents, than those which this theory is intended to prevent.
For, he says any person could set himself up as a legate of 
the Pope and, by means of forged letters, deceive the people 
into believing that he was a real legate* and immediately 
such a legate was commonly regarded as_a real legate, then 
by virtue of; common error all his acts- would be valid.
(23) cf. Selectae Disputationes, Disp. 44, n.3.
(24) cf. Quaestiones Morales et Legalea, Trac. II, Q.XXV, n.15.
(25) cf. Resol. Moral., Tom.I, Trac.Ill, Res. 19, n.3.
(26) cf. Resol. Moral. Pars, II, Trac. XII, cap.I, Dub.VII,
n. 2019.
(27) cf. De Sacramentis, Tom. I, Trac.V, Disp. XI, q.102.
(28) cf. Theol. Mor. Tom. II, Lib, V, c. IV, VII, n.17.
(29) e.g. TRULLENCH, Opus Morale, Tom. II, Lib. VIII, c.l,
Dub, io, n,4; canPIDUS. Disquisitlones Morales, Diaq.
Ill, A rt. x, n.2; BaRBQSa De Officlis et potestate 
Parochi, Pars, II, c.XVII, n.33 j THESAURUS - CEERALDUS.
De Poenis Eecles. Pars I, cap.VI.
    „  ,  . —    —   -]
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Likewise, heretics could pretend to be bishops, clmld easily 
lead the people to believe that they were real bishops, and 
on the strength of this deception, and consequent common 
error, would be capable of validly performing the functions 
and duties of a real bishop. Such a state of things would 
tend to the promotion and encouragement of fraud and deceit 
by evil-minded pretenders, rather than to the promotion of 
the coranon good. In order to prevent such grave dangers
\ it is absolutely necessary that a coloured title be required,
as well as common error, in order that the acts of a putative
official be v a l i d . T h i s  argument is repeated almost
(31)verbatim by the Jesuit theologian Haunoldus ( + 1688) who 
describes it as the only real argument of weight in favour of 
the view requiring a coloured title. There seems much truth 
in this statement of Naunoldus, for the majority of subsequent 
authors whether maintaining the one opinion or the other 
almost invariably refer to it, either to uphold or reject 
it, according to the side of the controversy they sponsor.
Thus Reiffertuel (+17C3), for instance, relies on this argu­
ment as a basis for his view on the question.^
It would be monotonous and useless to follow the 
controversy in all its detail through the 18th and 19th 
centuries. To do so would entail the continuous repetition
(30) De Juatitia et Jure, Disp. XXXVII, § III, n.23. "Sequitur 
enim, quod si aliquis malitiose se legatum Papae fingat, 
et ostendat bullas falsas in testimonium suae potestatis, 
eo ipso istius acta futura sint valida in utroque foro, 
sicut si esset verus legatus Papae. Item haeretici qui 
si episcopos fingunt, et potestate ilia facta decepiunt 
rudes et rusticos non mlnorem habebunt potestatem juris- 
dictionis circa illos quam si veri Rpisoopi, dum adesset 
error communis; haec quidean durissima sunt, et conducer— 
ent ad fovondos nequissimos simulatores in suit fraudibus. 
Merito ergo requirimus ad valorem gestorum per judicem 
false existlmatum, quod habeat titulum coloratura ....”
(31) cf. De Justitia et Jure, Tcm, V, Trac.II, cap. 1, n.24.
(32) cf. j)us. Can. Univ. Lib. II, Tit. I, n.200.
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of arguments for and against, objections and counter- 
objections - and all to no purpose. For, as we shall 
see in due time, this controversy ended with the publication 
of the Code of Canon Law: hence a detailed study of it
here will have no practical bearing on the conclusions we 
may reach as a result of this study. It will be sufficient 
to say that the controversy continued. The opinion favour­
ing the necessity of a coloured title remained, as it were,
(33)
"in possession" and claimed the larger number of supporters.
Yet there were many who favoured the less strict view.^®^
There can scarcely be any doubt as to the probability of
this latter view, nor as to the safety of following it in
practice. In the period immediately preceding the pro-
f 35)mulgation of the Code we find Bucceroni' referring to 
this opinion as most probable: Noldin describes it as
/ »2C\
probable: and Qasparrl is satisfied that jurisdiction
is supplied in common error even without a coloured title -
at least from the reflex principle that the Church supplies
( 37)jurisdiction in dubio juris.
(33) Following are some who held this view:-
LACROIX, Theol Mor. Tom II, Lib. VI, Pars.I, n.115.
ROSSIGNOLI, De. Mat. I, Praenot. XXX, n.9.
SALMANTICENSES. Cursus Theol.Mor. Tom II, Trac.IX, 
c. VIII, Punct. IV, n.54. a
F. SCHMISR, Jus Can. Univ. Lib, II, Trac,I, c.VII, S 4 
n . 30 •
JANSEN, Theol. Mor. Unive. Casus XCIX, n.6, R.3.
CONCINA, Theol. Christiana, Tom IX, Lib.H, Diss. II, 
c IV, n.31.
SASSERATH. Cursus Theol. Mor.Pars, IV, Trac. I, Diss.
V .  Q . I ,  n . 1 1 9 .
(34) e.g. WIESTNER. Inst. Can. II, I, n.8 8.
SCHMALZGRUEBER. Jus Eccles. Univ. II, I, n.2l.
RON C A GLIA. Univ. Mor. Theol.II, Trac.XIX, Q. V. o.l,R.III.
AN GEL US A SaNCTa MARIA. Brev.Mor. Carmel., Pars II,
Tract.XI, c.IX, Sectio II, Sublectio I, n.26, etc.
(35) cf. Inst. Theol. Mor. Ill, n.769.
(35) cf. Summa Theol. Mor. (1911), III, n.355.
(37) Trac. Can. de Mat. Vol.I, n.913. "Proinde stante hoc
controversia jurisdictio videtur suppler!, ex princlpio 
saltern reflexo, quod nempe Ecclesia in dubio juris juris- 
dlctlonem supplet."
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ARUCLE II. - LICIT USE OF COMMON ERROR.
At the outset It may he remarked that this question 
of the licit use of common error falls almost entirely 
#lthln the domain Of Moral Iheology, and as such does not 
merit detailed consideration in an essay that Is primarily 
canonical. We shall he satisfied, therefore, with giving 
a very hrlef outline of the teaching of theologians on the 
point, which will consist mainly in noting the modification 
ttie teaching underwent during the course of the 17th century. 
The question must he examined from two viewpoints:- (a) from 
that of the faithful - or at least those few - who are aware 
of the existence of an impediment in the official, and con­
sequently know that he possesses no habitual jurisdiction 
or power: (h) from that of the official himself who is
aware of his own defect of power.
A. Licit Use of Common Error by the 
faithful.
As this question may arise in relation tb both the 
external and Internal forum, it will he more convenient to 
treat the two cases as separate questions: hence we shall
discuss the lawfulness of using common error in matters 
pertaining to - (1) the External fonaa; (2) the Internal 
forum.
(1) - External forum:
It will be recalled that when examining the writings
of earlier canonists, we found them generally agreed in their
(38)opinion on this question.' According to the majority, if
a few members of a community knew, for instance, that a
(58) cf. Above Section II, Chap. II, Par.c.
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particular judge was inhabllis (while the conamunity at 
large regarded him as hahllis and therefore as a real 
official), and if these few approached this putative judge
as parties to a litigation, the official acts of the judge
*
in favour of such would be valid, but should be rescinded 
as a penalty for their having approached an official, whom 
they knew to possess no jurisdiction. According to these 
authors then, the procedure was valid but gravely illicit.
TSals view was accepted by Thomas Sanchez in its main out­
line - with one slight but important modification... He too
declared the procedure to be valid and as a general rule to
(39)be annulled, but pointed out that in certain circum­
stances the procedure could be even lawful and therefore not 
subject to annulment. Bie reason why the acts should be 
annulled according to the earlier canonists, was in order 
that the parties might be suitably and properly punished for 
invoking the ministrations of one, whom they knew to be a 
merely putative official. Sanchez argues that if, by reason 
of circumstances, the parties in question did not act unlaw­
fully by approaching such an official, then there could be 
no question of the imposition of a penalty - hence no 
question of the annulment of acts by way of penalty. As m  
example of circumstances thqt would thus change the aspect 
of the case, Sanchez quotes that of a person who, despite the 
fact^he knows of the incapacity of a particular judge, is 
nevertheless compelled to seek his ministrations because he 
is not in a position to approach another is properly con- / M -  
s t i t u t O d . i n  other words, as Garcia^*^ puts it, if
(39) cf. de Mat. Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, nl45.
(40) De Mat. Lib. Ill, Disp.XXII, n.45. "Intelligo tamen 
retractanda esse in odio illlus scientis quando sciens 
ipae deliquit adeundo eum judicem, quern noverat alibi 
denunciatum ... secus si minime deliquit ... nullam ad- 
mitteret culpam, si non habens alium judicem, apud quem 
causa agat, hunc adeat, ac proinde non venit in poenam 
retractanda sententia. *
(41) cf. De Beneficiis, Tom.I, Pars, V, c.IV, n.312.
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the person concerned cannot approach another judge or 
official without grave inconvenience, he is quite justified 
in approaching one whom he knows to he merely putative.
Basillus Pontius goes a step further* Treating of 
this point he asserts that the same principles apply to the 
few who are aware of the defect in the judge, as apply to 
the majority of the community #10 are in genuine error. As 
far as the external forum is concerned, there is for him no 
exception to the general rule - given common error, the con­
sequential benefits apply equally to the majority who are 
ignorant of, and to the minority who knew of, the existence 
of the incapacitating defect in the public official. He 
puts forward the following argunents as proof of his conten­
tion? Laws are made in consideration of general or common 
contingencies. w/hen a law states that acts are valid when 
performed by one who is thought to be a legitimate judge, It 
caters for all the members of the community within which the 
conditions for common error have been verified: and just as
the error of one is not sufficient to fulfil the requirements 
of common error, so neither does the knowledge of one impede 
the validity of acts.^42  ^ $hat may be regarded as a second 
argument is his criticism of the statement of Sanchez refer­
red to above. Sanchez had admitted that circumstances 
could render it such that a person would be justified in 
approaching a putative judge; Pontius contends that the 
circumstances will always be such as to render such a course 
of action lawful. pbr, he argues, as the impediment of the 
judge is ex hypothesl occult, the manifestation of that 
impediment by the individual concerned may be unlawful,
(42) cf. De Mat. Lib. V, c.XIX, n.17.
or It may be futile (if, for Instance he could not prove 
it in foro externo), or it may even be contrary to the 
public good.^3^
These arguments seem to have influenced later
writers* the former especially appealed greatly to many
(44)theologians. Among others we may mention Lessiua, de 
Castro Paleo,(45) ana Bonacina^^ - who adopted this view 
and sepeated this argument as the basis for it. After this 
time there were no further theories put forward on the 
matter. Indeed, not all moralists touched on the question - 
they were more concerned with the question in so far as it 
had reference to the internal sacramental forum. Of those 
who do mention it, however, the majority^7  ^ favour the 
opinion of Pontius.
(2) Internal Forum*
With regard to this question Sanchez applies the 
same principle as that used by him when dealing with the 
external forum. According to him, the sacramental con­
fession made in the circumstances under consideration is 
valid from the point of view of jurisdiction in the con­
fessor. - for jurisdiction is conferred on him by law by 
virtue of common error. But if the penitent approaches 
this confessor without a justifying cause he commits grave 
sin thereby, and thus renders the sacrament invalid by reason
(43) cf. De Mat. Lib.V. C XIX, n.17.
(44) cf. De Justitia et Jure, Lib. II c.29, Dub.8 , n.66.
(45) cf. Opus Morale, Pars V, Trac. XXVIII, Disp.II, Punct. 
13, 8 10. n.10.
(46) cf. Opera Omnia Mor., Tom.I, De Mat., Q.II, Punct.VIII, 
n.35.
(47) e.g. of. PASSERINUS. De Horn. Stat et Offic., Tom II, 
Q.97, n.3i85 LACR&X, Theol. Mor. Tom,II, Lib.VI,
Pars I, n.114* ROSSIGNOLI. De Mat.I, Praenot,
XXXI, n.ll.
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of lack of due dispositions. m  example of such a
justifying cause would be, for instance, if the pastor cff
a particular penitent is de facto inhabllls. there is no
other confessor to whom the penitent may have recourse,
and it is either necessary or obligatory for the penitent
(49)to receive the Sacrament. ' A justifying cause, therefore, 
renders the Sacrament both valid and lawful* absence of 
this cause renders it not only unlawful, but also invalid.
In this the case differs from that of the external forum 
where the unlawfulness of an act does not necessarily entail 
invalidity.
Pontius, too, makes special mention of this question, 
And in view of the liberal attitude adopted by him when 
treating of the external forum, it is somewhat surprising to 
find him advocating a very restricted and indeed harsh 
discipline in this case. We have seen that for him, as 
far as the external forum is concerned, a justifying cause 
always existed* now he says that with relation to the 
internal such a justifying cause never exists. For, he 
argues, if the penitent is in danger of death then the con­
fessor has jurisdiction from another source (every priest 
having jurisdiction in such circumstances). If the penitent 
is not in danger of death, then he can approach another 
properly constituted confessor* if no other confessor is 
available and it is not a time of precept, then there is no 
necessity to confess* if it is a time of precept and no 
other confessor is available, then he must be regarded as
(48) De Mat. L b. Ill, Disp.XXII, n.46. “Extra hos casus 
peecaret lethaliter fatendo ill! .... et eonsequenter 
tunc confessio esset nulla ratione obicis per 
poenitentem apposlti.“
(49) cf. De Mat. Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n,46.
( 48)
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not having a copia canfessarii, and therefore the precept 
does not oblige.
It is difficult to understand why this outstanding 
theologian should propose such widely divergent norms for 
two cases so closely related. His position can scarcely 
be regarded as consistent, especially as he fails to give 
any satisfactory explanation as to why a justifying cause 
dloould always exist in the former caae, and never in the 
latter. Bie basis of the justification in the former case 
was the inconvenience accruing either to the party concerned 
or to the community in general - surely that same incon­
venience should justify the same act in the latter case*
We admit, of course, that conditions prevailing in each of 
the fora differ, but certainly not to such a drastic extent.
Others too made reference to this question. Reginald
declared that, despite the existence of conmon error, only
those who were in genuine error and gotod faith could be
(51)validly absolved - thus implying that those who may be
(52)in bad faith cannot be validly absolved. So also Manriquez, 
Rodriquez,^3' and Thesaurus-Glraldus. Passerinus seems
to take his stand at the opposite extreme, holding for 
validity in all cases.^53^
Others make a distinction between the case where the 
confessor himself knows of his incapacity and the case where
(50) cf. De Mat. Lib. V, Tit, XIX, n,18.
(51) cf. Theol. Mor., Life.I, n.99.
$52) cf. ipaeetiones Morales et Vic. Pars II, QXLIII, nn.4,7.
(55) Summa Caauum Conscientlae, Pars I, c.LX, n.5.
(54) cf. De Poem, iccles. Pars II, Afesolutio, c.II.
(55) of. PASSERIHHS. De Horn, st&t, at, Qfflc. Tom.I, Q.87, 
n . 3 4 8 . NOTE; It is to fee noted however that in this 
context the author is spealdng in general terms of 
validity in all cases; he might have made exception 
for the case of Sacramental Confession had he adverted 
to it.
the does not. Joannes Sanchez seems to have been the first 
to propose this solution. According to him, the validity 
or invalidity of the absolution depends on the consciousness 
or otherwise of the confessor, with regard to his own 
incapacity. If the confessor is ignorant of his own defect 
of power, all confessions will be valid. fhe only case 
where invalidity results is, when the confessor knows of his 
own defeot, and the penitent knows that the confessor thus 
realizes his true position* in that case the confessor sins 
by imparting absolution, the penitent by seeking it.^56  ^ Bie 
position then is, that the confessor, by deliberately usurp­
ing jurisdiction sins gravely* the penitent by co-operating 
in this sin of the confessor also sins gravely, with the 
result that the confession is invalid. Bie same opinion is 
voiced by Hurtado. He admits, however, that for certain 
grave reasons, the penitent may seek absolution from a 
confessor whom he knows to be conscious of hiE own defect 
of power; such reasons would be the fulfilling of the 
precept of annual confession or the gaining of a jubilee 
indulgence.^57^
That exhausts all the theories proposed by moralists 
with regard to the lawfulness of seeking absolution in bad 
faith (i.e. when aware of the confessor’s defect) from a 
merely putative confessor. Generally speaking it may safely 
be said that the most widely accepted view in subsequent times 
was that the penitent required a just cause in order to 
receive absolution lawfully and validly in such circumstances* 
and a just cause was had if a penitent could not conveniently 
approach another legitimately constituted confessor. Bar- 
gilliat sums up this teaching concisely* "Sed etiam idem
(56) J. SANCHEZ, Selectae Disp., Disp. 44, n.3.
(57) cf. HURTADO. Res. Mor., Pars II, Trac. XII, n,2020.
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privatus qui aclt defectum licit© uti potest ejusdera Spper-
ioris ministerio in casu necessitatis aut utilitatis
specialis seu causae rationabilis, e.g. quando commodo
alium adire nequit .... At si desit aliqua rationabilis
causa abstinendura ab illius Superioris officio; alioquin
peccaret ille privatus, atque in foro poenitentiali, inval-
(5 8 )
ida foret absolutio, defectu dispositionis in poenitenti."
B. Lawful Use of Common Error by Official.
JJie question of the lawful use of common error by 
a putative official who knows of his own defect of power 
does not receive the same attention from moralists and canon­
ists as the preceding. Naturally there was not the same 
difficulty or doubt with regard to the position of such an 
official. If he realized that he possessed no habitual 
jurisdiction or power, he could not easily be justified in 
usurping this power, or at least in forcing the Church to 
sv^ply the deficiency. Hence it is not surprising to find 
the common opinion declaring that such a person acts gravely 
unlawfully in so doing. Many state it a b s o l u t e l y * b u t  
usually it was admitted that if he had a just cause for 
forcing the Church to s^ply jurisdiction in this manner, 
such an official could be regarded as adting lawfully, as 
examples of a just and reasonable cause, Bargilliat mentions 
the following - if confession is necessary in order that a 
penitent may fulfil a precept, and the penitent cannot con- 
venitotly approach another legitimate confessor* if the 
penitent would otherwise be forced to wait a considerable 
time for confession, ete.^50  ^ ®iis latter opinion was the
<58) prael, Juris Can, n.208.
(59) e.g. of. LBSSIUS, De Justitia et Jure, Lib.il, c.29,
Dub.8, n.W. LACROIX* &*©ol. Mor. Lib.VI, Pars I, n.114.
(60) cf. Prael Juris Can., n.208.
aeeepted teaching In pro-Code jurisprudence.^^'
ARTICLE III. - COMMON ERROR AND DELEGATED JURISDICTION.
In. an earlier chapter we have seen/it was generally 
agreed during the 15th and 16th centuries that the princip­
les of coramon error applied equally to officials who were 
reputed to have ordinary power, and those reputed to have 
delegated power. Panormitanua called it the common opinion 
in his time - Sandeus referred to it as the opinion of all 
authors.^2) During the period under consideration here, 
the same attitude was adopted by authors to this question* 
indeed It Is probably true, to say that it has been the 
least controverted of all the questions that have arisen in 
connection with the subject.
For T. Sanchez, this opinion is the more probable - 
"multo probabilior" he calls it. By way of proof he 
merely repeats the arguments used by his predecessors who 
shared this view - arguments from Roman law and the ^eretum 
Gratiani. We have already discussed the merits of these, 
so they need not delay us here. ( 655) Bit one point emphas­
ized by Sanchez is worth noting. It will be recalled that 
Bartolus had stated that the principles of common error would 
not apply if a delegate held office invalidly, by reason of a 
defect in the actual act of commission or appointment - that 
they would apply only to the case of personal defects. Con­
trary to this, Sanchez declares that it is Immaterial whether 
the defect is in the person of the delegate or in the actual 
act of delegation - jurisdiction will be supplied provided th€ 
other conditions for coimnan error are verified In the case.
(61) e,g, cf, D*ANNIBALE. Suramula Theol. Mor., I, n.79, 
footnote 76* LEHMKUHL. Theol., Mor. II, n.504.
(62) of. Above, Sec.II, Ch.II, Par. f.
(63) cf. Above, Sec.II, Ch.II, Par.f.
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If therefore the act by which a legitimate Superior appoints
a delegate be invalid by reason of non-fulfilment of some
essential legal formality, the delegate cannot be a true or
real official - nevertheless jurisdiction will be supplied
to him provided the other requisites for common error are
present. Ihe basis for this opinion is, that there is no
reason why jurisdiction should be supplied in the case of a
(64)
personal defect, and not in the case of defect of commission, 
provided, of course the defect in each case is one which lies 
within the power of the Church to supply, i.e. provided it 
is not an impediment of the divine or natural law.^®5)
Basilius Pontius agrees with Sanchez on this
question of common error and delegated jurisdiction. He
explicitly states that the principles apply to a delegated
( 66)judge - whether he be delegated for one or more cases. 
Lesslus, too, makes explicit mention of this same point, 
emphasizing the fact that the principles apply even in the 
case of a delegatus ad imam tan turn causam. Fagnanus
refers to this as the ootanon opinion in his time. ^ 68 ^ Ahd 
If we judge by the number of ca&ohists who give this same 
answer, there can be no doubting the truth of this statement* 
there is practical unanimity among pre-code authors that 
the principles of common error apply equally to delegated 
and ordinary jurisdiction. ^
(64j T. 8AHCHB2. DeMat,, Lib.Ill, Disp.XXII, n.19.
(85) cf. I, SAHCHBZ. De Mat., Llb.III, Disp. XXEI, n.27.
(66) cf. D®. Mat., Lib,V, c.XIX, n.ll. "Colliges earn doo- 
trinam locum habere non tan turn In judioe ordinarlo, sed 
etiam in delegato, vel ad m a m  vel plures causas fori 
extern!.
(67) cf. De Justltia et Jure, Lib.II, C.29, ffiu,8, n.66.
(88) cf. commentaria, pom.Ill, si c. 2, X,V, 20, n,4.
(69) e.g. cf. DJB LPQO, De Justltia et Jure, Disp.XXXVII, 3 
11.23, PIifc¥6. Jua. Can., II, I, n.36.
RUFFENSTUEL, Jus. Can. Univ. I, III, n.234.
BARGILLIAT. Prael. Juris. Can., n,204.
D^AtjklBALE, Summula Bieol. Mor., I, n.7 9 , footnote 76. 
MARd. jnsT. Mor. Alphons., II, n.1754.
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ARTICLE IV. - COMMON ERROR AS THE SOURCE OP CANONS
On reading Canon 430 5 2 of the Codex Juris Canonic!, the 
relation between it and the subject of common error may not 
be immediately apparent. It reads
"Nihilominua, excepta collatione beneficiorum 
aut officiorum ecclesiasticorum, omnia vim habent quae 
gesta sunt a Vicario Generali, usque dum hie certum de 
obitu Episcopi acceperit, vel ab Episcopo aut Vicario 
Generali usque dum certa de memoratis actibus pontificiis 
notitia ad eosdea pervenerit."
On closer examination, however, it will be noticed 
that even if this canon had never been incorporated in the 
Code, practically all those acts of Vicar General and Bishop 
respectively as considered here, would nevertheless be valid % 
in virtue of jurisdiction supplied to them by reason of common 
error. For, granted that the jurisdiction of a Vicar General 
ceases on the death of the Bishop, or by the translation, 
revocation or resignation of the same, if the Vicar General 
is unaware of any of the above events, then, in normal cir­
cumstances at least, it is most unlikely that the community 
as a whole would be aware of them: and given this general
Ignorance or unawareneas of the community on these matters, 
there is immediately place for the application of the prin­
ciples of common error.
The same remarks hold good with regard to Canon 207 
§ 2, which states MSed potestate pro foro interno ooncessa, 
actus per inadvertentiam positus, elapso tempore vel exhausto 
casuum numero validua est.M In fact the remarks are wven 
more true when applied to this canon, because the occurrence 
of a case such as contemplated above, without the presence 
of genuine common error, will be so rare that the canon
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appears to be practically superfluous. The force of these 
remarks will be better understood after a brief examination 
of the traditional teaching on these two points before the 
promulgation of the present Code.
A. Canon 430 § 2.
The decretal "Relatum" of Gregory IX, makes it 
clear that, on the death of the Superior delegating, the 
jurisdiction of the delegate automatically ceases Msi res 
jam integra sit.” This decretal had led Guilelmus Durantis 
to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the delegate 
expired in all cases on the death of the Superior delegating, 
and that there was no possibility of acts being validly 
performed by such a delegate, even though he was in absolute 
Ignorance of the death of the Superior.(7lV He does not 
aeem to have adverted to the contingency that the whole com­
munity, as well as the delegate, might he invincibly ignorant 
of the death of the Superior, and hence he did not state 
whether this fact would change the aspect of the case. It 
is obvious, of course, that it is one thing to have the 
delegate alone ignorant or unaware of the death of the 
Superior, but quite another thing to have the whole community 
in that state. Panormitanus, we have seen,^5*) noted the 
distinction between the cases, and the possible difference 
between the effects of both in so far as the validity of the 
acts of the delegate were concerned. But to both hypotheses 
he gave a very decisive negative answer. In the former, the 
acts could not be valid, because the ignorance of the dele­
gate could not supply jurisdiction. In the latter case, the 
principles of the Lex Barbarius could not apply because of
the absence of one of the essential factors viz., authoritas 
Superioris. ( 7 3 )
(70) i.e. c. 19, X, 1, 29: cf. also c.20, X, I, 29.
(71) cf. Speculum Juris, Tom.I, Tit. De Jud. Del. § R e s t a t , n . 5
(72) cf. Above Sec.II, Ch.II. Par.g.
(73) cf. PANORMITANUS, Commentaria ad c.20, X,I, 29.
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Various objections could be offered against this 
interpretation and application of the Lex Barbarius, but 
they would scarcely be relevant just now, since our object 
at the moment is not so much to criticize views and opinions, 
but rather to discover the views of the various commentators 
on this point, and especially to note any changes there may 
have been in their teaching.
The first indication of such a change is found in 
the writings of Flaminius Parisius. Speaking of the resigna­
tion of benefices made to, and accepted by, a Vicar having 
a special mandate from the bishop of the place to acdept such 
resignations, Flaminius asserts that even If the bishop had 
died before the acceptance of a particular resignation - the 
vicar being unaware of his death - the resignation must still 
be regarded as valid and effective: the reason assigned
(7U)being - wpropter communem errorem et publicam utilitatem.H
Flaminius quotes as his authority for this opinion a decision
of the Roman Sota<75) but be does not propose any arguments
based on the text of the Lea Barbarius, nor does he attempt
to disprove the arguments put forward by Panormitanus. This
(76)holds also for Henriquez, who claims that many learned
men held this opinion.
Thomas Sanchez also accepted this teaching and set 
out to put it on a sound juridical basis, by showing that 
the case in question fulfilled all conditions required accord­
ing to the proper interpretation of the Lex Barbarius. As 
we have previously so often seen, these conditions were two­
fold - common error and a coloured title, i.e. from a 
Superior having power to confer it. Both of these, he con­
tends, are realized in the present case: ex hypotheai there
(71*) cf. De Reeig. Benefic. Tom.I, Lib. VII, q. 21*, n.33.
(75) Rota Decision - 27th. Jan. 151*6: text not available.
(76) cf. Summa Theol. Mor., Lib.X, 6 . 2 2 ,  n.3, in comment, 
lit. P.
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is common error, because the community is ignorant of the 
death of the Superior who delegated: and there has been a
title conferred by the legitimate Superior - the fact that 
the title no longer exists is secret ?7) _ anaf therefore, 
as Pirhing puts it later, it must still be regarded as a
Prom this time onwards there was absolute unanimity 
on the point: this opinion was accepted by all who mentioned
it. Among others we may mention such names as Filliticinss, 
Candidus, PointusyRossignoli, Potestae, and Reiffenstuel.
In the beginning the question referred to delegated 
jurisdiction in general - viz., whether the acts of a delegate 
are valid if they are performed after the death of the Super­
ior re jam Integra, while the community as such does not 
know of his death. It is very noticeable however, that 
instead of treating this question in general, many authors 
began to discuss a particular application of it, viz., the 
application to the case of a Vicar General. The Vicar 
General eaerclses ordinary, not delegated jurisdiction. Yet 
the fact that his power is dependent for ite existence on the 
continuance in office of the bishop who appoints him, made 
thia question as applying to the Vicar General a very important 
and practical one. As his jurisdiction extends over the 
whole diocese, and includes the capacity to perform important 
administrative functions, it was essential to determine 
exactly the status of the acts performed by the Vicar General
(77) cf. T. SANCHEZ, De Mat. Lib.Ill, Disp. XXII, n.59.
(76) cf. Jus Can. II, I, n.86.
(79) cf. FILIIUCIU3, Quaest. Mor., Tom.I,Trac.VII, Cap.8,n.215.
CAiiDIDUS, PiSQuiaitiones Morales, Disq. Ill, Art.X, n.U.
Pcn m U S T  De Mat., Lib.V, C.XXIV, n.h.
R03SIGN0LI, De Mat., Praenot, XXXI, n.ll.
POTESTAS, Examen Ecclesiasticum, Tom.I, Pars, IV, c.V, n. j2&k*
RKIFFEHSTUEL, Jus.Can. Univ., I, II, n.234.
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in the contingency here visualized. It was a case, too, 
that arose more frequently than that of the cessation of 
delegated jurisdiction properly so called. Hence we find 
authors such as Catididus^0  ^potestae^^ and Rossignoli'1 
treating explicitly of this question as applying to the case 
of the Vicar General - giving the solution we have seen above 
with regard to the general question*
The New Code makes two changes in this accepted 
discipline in relation to the office of Vicar General: it
extended it in one way and restricted it in another. 1$ 
extended it, by establishing the norm that all acts are 
valid, independently of whether the community as a whole is 
in error or not, provided the Vicar General himself is ignor­
ant of the extinction of his power, having as yet, got no 
certain notification of the death, resignation or translation 
of the bishop. The restriction is that the validating 
effect is limited to a certain extent - it does not apply 
to the conferring of benefices and ecclesiastical offices.
It must be noted however that this law applies only 
in the case when a Vicar General is ignorant of the cessation 
of hia jurisdiction. The extinction of delegated juris­
diction properly so-called follhws the rules of Can.20? §1, 
and after its extinction, acts can only be valid by virtue 
Of jurisdiction supplied in common error, in the manner we
have seen it applied above.
11 - —  ------------------- —         ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(80) ef. Disq. Mor., Disq. Ill, Art.X, n.U. "Turn quia quamvia 
mortuo epiacopo potestas Vicarii expiret, et si Vicarius, 
incertus de morte, concedat litteras dimiaaoriaa ad 
Ordines, valerent, quia communi errore habetur ut 
Vicarius legitimus."
(81) cf. Examen. Eccles. , Tom.I, Para. IV, c.V, n.326U -
"Sequltur seoundo quod si mortuo Epiacopo vel revocato 
Vicario Generali, communiter ignoretur mors Episccpi 
vel revocatio Vicarii, valent acta ipsiua ex jurisdiction* 
quam tradit Ecclesia rations communis erroris et tituli
colorati. ”
(82) cf. De Mat., Praenot. XXXI, n.ll.
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B. Pan on- 207 § 2.
The second law referred to as having its origin
closely associated with the doctrine of common error - Canon 
207 § 2 - needs very little explanation. It treats of the 
cessation or extinction of delegated jurisdiction for the 
internal forum: the same principles apply therefore as
obtained in relation to the external forum. The case con­
sidered here is that of a priest who, having been granted 
jurisdiction to hear confessions for a stated length of time 
or for a given number of cases, inadvertently oversteps his 
faculties by hearing confessions after the stated period has 
elapsed, or by exceeding the specified number of cases. In 
these circumstances the canon declares such confessions to 
be valid. We shall briefly review the traditional teaching 
on this point.
Speaking of the ways in which it was customary for
priests to be approved for the hearing of confessions 
(83)Henriquez states that sometimes a bishop approved con­
fessors for a period of one year only (for certain reasons 
then prevailing). He goes on to say that if such a con­
fessor (approved for one year) continued to hear confessions 
after the year had elapsed, those confessions would he invalid, 
because he could no longer be regarded as ldoneus et appro­
bates : in other words because he would have no jurisdiction.
In a footnote, however, Henriquez admits that in such circum­
stances the confessions could be valid by reason of common 
error - "Si tamen vere est doctus, et communi errore vulgi 
censetur adhuc approbatus valeret absolutio.^®^
Sanchez reiterates this statement, declaring it to
be most probable that so long as the fact of privation of
jurisdiction remains occult, with consequential common error,
(S3) ©f. Summa Theol. M0r., Lib.VI. Cap. VI, n.3.
(8U) cf. Summa Theol. Mor., Lib.VI, Cap.VI, n.3, commento 
lit. 1.
I
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tbe acta of the person thus occultly deprived are valid.
The reason given by him is - "quaa est error communis ortua
(35)a Justo tituli initiol” Pontius teaches the same
doctrinej^*5) likewise Candidus who quotes from Sanchez 
almost verbatim. One of the few to oppose this teaching
wes Bonacina. His ground for objecting was, not that the 
principles of common error did not apply to the internal 
forum, but because he did not consider the coloured title 
in this case to be s u f f i c i e n t . ^ T h i s  objection however, 
could scarcely be regarded as carrying much weight in view 
of the argument of Sanchez Just mentioned above, and espec­
ially in view of the fact that so many authors, when treating 
of the parallel case in relation to the external forum, con­
sidered the title to be quite sufficient (i.e. a title which 
I
at one time was valid but now no longer exists - its extinc­
tion however being still occult). Besides, by the many who 
taught that no coloured title was necessary, this objection 
would not even be considered. We can understand, then why 
Potestas refers to the opinion of Henriquez, Sanchez, Pontius 
and the others as the common teaching.
The new legislation as contained in Canon 207 § 2 
of the Codex Juris Canonici differs from the traditional 
teaching in this, that it no longer requires that the commun­
ity as a whole should be ignorant of the cessation of Juris­
diction in the confessor. It is sufficient if the confessor 
himself dees not advert to the fact that his Jurisdiction 
has ceased: the main factor is the inadvertence of the con­
fessor, not the ignorance of the community. As a corrollary
(35) De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.58.
(86) De Mat., Lib. V. Cap.XIX n. 16.
( a ? )  cf. Disp. Mor., Diaq. Ill, Art.X, n.h*
(88) cf. Opera Omnia M0ralia, Tom I, De Mat. Q.II, Punct. 
VIII, n.29.
(89) cf. Examen Eccles. Tom I, para, IV, c.V, n.3269»
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of this canon therefore, if the confessor should continue 
to give absolution with full knowledge and advertence to 
the fact that his jurisdiction had ceased, these absolutions 
should be invalid. But here again, jurisdiction would be 
supplied to him by reason of common error - if the fact of 
cessation of jurisdiction was generally unknown. And, as 
we said in the beginning of this article, this will almost 
invariably be the case: for it ia only on a very rare
occasion that the terminus ad quern of a confessor’s juris­
diction will be common knowledge - hence it will only he 
very rarely that the exact time of cessation of a confessor’s 
jurisdiction will be generally known. It was this consider­
ation which led us to say at the outaet that, in view of 
the jurisdiction supplied by the Church in common error, 
this canon 207 § 2 appears to be practically superfluous. 
However the Church, in such important matters, wishes to 
cater for all possible contingencies - those of rare and 
those of frequent occurrence - and on this ground, at least, 
the inclusion of this Canon 207 2 is justified.
ARTICLE V. - COMMON ERROR AND PROBABLE JURISDICTION.
Canon 209 of the Codex Juris Canonici declares that 
in common error and in positive and probable doubt, the 
Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and 
internal forum. It is not by mere accident that common 
error and probable doubt have been so closely linked together 
by the codifiers of ecclesiastical law: these two notions
have always been associated with each other, not because of 
any marked similarity in the notions themselves, but prin­
cipally by reaeon of the fact that they produce the same 
juridieal effect. And while not wishing to give a detailed 
treatment of the evolution and application of the principle
that in positive and probable doubt the Church supplies
, % ■
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jurisdiction, we shall try to show here, as briefly as 
possible, how the doctrine of common error was, to a large 
extent, responsible for the rise and firm establishment of 
the other.
While the doctrine that jurisdiction is supplied in 
common error may be ssid to be ancient, having had its origin 
in Roman law, the same cannot be said of that of the supply­
ing of jurisdiction in probable doubt. In fact, by compari­
son the latter may well be regarded as of recent origin, for 
it does not seem to have arisen earlier than the 16th century. 
From the commencement of the 17th century, however, both 
theologians and canonists have been very conscious of it, and 
it is noticeable that while they generally take for granted 
that jurisdiction is supplied in common error, they go to 
great trouble in order to prove the same with regard to 
probable doubt. In proving this, many put forward the 
argument that, because the same inconveniences and evil- 
consequences would follow from invalidity of acts by reason 
of actual lack of jurisdiction in the case of probably doubt, 
as would follow in the case of common error if no jurisdiction 
were supplied, jurisdiction should therefore be supplied 
equally in both cases. Others try to show that the case 
of probable doubt is actually the same as that of common 
error - and therefore governed by the same principles.
The Jesuit Theologian Henriquez adopts the first of 
the argumenta just mentioned. Speaking of a dubium juris, 
he says that if the confessor and penitent are led, by the 
opinion of expert theologians, to believe that the former 
enjoys jurisdiction in a particular case, then the Church 
clearly confers jurisdiction (that is, in the contingency 
that the opinion is false and that the confessor did not 
actually enjoy habitual jurisdiction). He bases his view 
on the analogy that jurisdiction is thus conferred in common
error - "ut confert etiam jure antiquo sacerdoti occulte 
excommunicato habenti titulum parochife^ **(90)
The connection between the two is put more strikingly 
by Sanchez. Aa a corrallary of his teaching on common 
error he proposes the following case:^1  ^ If there are two 
opinions as to whether a particular priest is the legitimate 
minister of the Sacrament of Penance or marriage, whether the 
jurisdiction or licence given to him is legitimate, whether 
the bull by which he had received authority la withdrawn, 
or whether it extends to this particular case - how do all 
the acts performed by that priest, in such circumstances, 
stand? His reply is, that even if the opinion which holds 
he is not the legitimate minister be true, or if it be true 
that he really enjoys no habitual jurisdiction, or that the 
bull has actually been revoked, as long as the truth remains 
hidden and as long aa the opposite opinion is considered by 
theologians to be probable, then all the acts of such a 
priest are valid. His reason is that in those circumstances 
all the conditions required for the operation of the princip­
les of common error are verified, viz., common error, a 
coloured title, and the defect of jurisdiction is one which 
can be supplied, by human ecclesiastical authority. Thus
Sanchez reduces the case of probable doubt to terms of common 
error, and decides it on those principles.
It is difficult to criticise the argument. There 
certainly appear to be sufficient grounds for his claiming
(90) cf. ESHRIQOBZ, Summae Theol. Mor., Lib.V, c.XIV, n.3. 
KOTST The author did not mention explicitly a dubiua 
juris - but that is obviously what he implies when he 
says: "Quando ignoratur jus difficile et confessarius
ac poenitens inculpate putant per sapientium opinionem.... 
adesse jurlsdictionem.M
(91) cf. De Mat., Lib. Ill Disp. XXII, n.65.
(fa) 8AKCHEZ, De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.65- - "quia 
esi communis error, titulusque praesumptus, collatus a 
legitimo Superiors et defectum ilium jurisdictions 
ministri, aut licentiae potest jus humanum supplere."
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the presence of a coloured title - at least in the cases 
mentioned "by him, as for instance where there is doubt as to 
whether the bull by which the confessor acquired jurisdiction 
has been revoked. With regard to the common error essential 
there seems to be a difficulty. There can be no doubting 
the real distinction that exists between error and doubt - 
error presupposes a previous Judgment about something, a 
false Judgment it is true, but at least a definite decision 
has been made: whereas doubt entails the withholding of
definite Judgment by reason of the existence of two conflict­
ing yet reasonable alternatives. It is not possible to 
have these two states of mind consistent in the one mind in 
relation to one and the same object. However Sanchez probablj 
means that while the confessor might be in doubt as to whether 
he really had the requisite faculties, the community as such 
might well be in complete ignorance even of his doubt - 
being deceived by the fact that he has a title - and there­
fore in common error with regard to his Jurisdiction. If 
the community knows of the existence of the two conflicting 
opinions, and is itself therefore doubtful, it is scarcely 
possible that it could at the same time be said to be in 
common error. H0wever, this latter contingency will, in 
the normal course of events, be rare, as the ordinary 
community will not usually be well versed in theologically
probable opinions. Viewing it in this light, we may conclude
that, as ft general rule, what Sanchez states is true*
While Suarez gives the moat exhaustive and clearest
exposition of the question to date - which he opens by saying 
that he has scarcely found any treatment of it in earlier
authors - it will be seen that he follows the same lines as
Sanchez in proving his point.^95'
«*» '     •  , „_         ■ -  —....
(93) cf. Be Sacramentis, II, Disp. XXVI, Sect. 6, n.?«
& . . V
- I l l -
Distinguishing between a dubium proprie dictum and dubium 
lmproprie dictum, be says the former is a purely negative 
state in which the intellect ia drawn to neither opinion on 
account of the absence of any positive and probable founda­
tion for either - this type of doubt is not considered here: 
dubium improprle dictum, on the other hand, ia had when the 
intellect is able to make a probable and reasonable Judgment 
in favour of one opinion, which however, does not exclude 
the possibility that the contrary opinion may still be true, 
hence does not exclude the fear of error, Suarez then goes 
to show how, by two distinct argumentations, a confessor who 
is in dublo improprie dlcto as to whether he has Jurisdiction, 
may be certain in practice that absolutions imparted by him 
are valid. The first of these - and the one that interests 
us here - is as follows: Recalling the principles of the
Lex Barbarius, he says that if a person is commonly reputed 
to be pastor while in point of fact he is not, because, for 
instance, he has obtained the benefice by simony, all the 
absolutions administered by such a pastor are valid, "ne 
communis ignorantia populo noceat." ^t is the same in the 
present case because a probable opinion is sufficient to give 
rise to this common estimation or repute mentioned above.
And the same reason is also present, because this ignorance 
or errow which arises as a result of the probable opinion of 
experts is common and public, and can be detrimental to the 
common good and injurious to the ooamunity, if in reality 
the minister lacks Jurisdiction. ^ ^ T h e r e f o r e ,  in this 
case too, the Church supplies Jurisdiction if de facto the 
minister lacks it, because the probable opinion followed was 
incorrect.
(9k) of. Do Sacramentis, II, Disp. XXVI, Sect. 6, n.7»
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Thia argument ia essentially the same as that of
Sanchez. He goes further than Sanchez, however, in one
these circumstances validly receive absolution, but the con­
fessor also lawfully imparts it. For, ex hyipothesi, the 
confessor has a solidly probable opinion in hie favour: 
though he can not solve the speculative doubt* he can solve
follows is not the true one, jurisdiction will still he forth­
coming by virtue of common error. And it ia lawful to follow 
a probable opinion in moral matters, because in so doing one
view, it was only to be expected that his teaching should 
influence that of later theologians. There is abundant 
evidence of this influence. For instance, Ludovicus S Cruce 
gives three arguments to prove that jurisdiction is supplied 
in probable doubt - his second argument is practically a 
verbal repetition of what we have already seen in the writings 
of Suarcx.(96) Incidentally, a Oruce claims himself respon­
sible for the acceptance of this opinion by Suarez in the 
beginning - and says that it was this argument that convinced 
the master-mind that jurisdiction is supplied in
(95) cf. De Sacramentis, II, Disp. XXVI, Sec.6, n.7« - 
"quia tunc non obstante tali dubio, videtur esse licitum 
sacramentum hoc ministrare, quia tale dubium speculativum 
est, et non practicum, cum in moralibus licitum est uti 
opinione probabili: nam qui ex ilia operatur, morsliter
certus est practice non peccare,"
(96) cf. Disputationes Morales in Trea Bullas Apos., Appendix, 
De Opinione Probabili, Dub.II, n.3. "Sic ergo in pro- 
posito, quia probabilitaa opinionia praebet titulum 
coloratura, et causat commumem errore//opinantium illara 
ease veram, Ecclesia tunc supple* defectum, conferens 
confessariis sequentibus illam opinlonem veram juris- 
dictionem, quia in hoc casu eadera proraus ratio militat 
ac in praecedentibue stiprs relatis, cum ignorantia quae 
nascitur a sententia probabili Doctorum ait cofcmunis et 
publics, et cedere possit in grave detrimentum animarum 
si Confessarii absolventes juxta probabilitatem illius 
opinionia carerent sua jurisdictions."
point; Suarez' thesis is that
the practical doub£: he is certain that if the opinion he
is, in practice, certain that one is not committing sin. (95)
With an authority such aa Suarez putting forward thia
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probable doubt. Though a small minority asserted that
this doctrine could be deemed no more than probable - among 
which minority we find Pranciacus de Oviedo^®^ - the over­
whelming majority regarded it as certain that Jurisdiction ia 
supplied by the Church in probable doubt. And though various 
arguments were employed to prove it, a very common one was 
undoubtedly that^/we have bedn discussing here. To mention 
but a few representative names we may list those of Bonacina, 
Oranado, Leander, Passerinus, Salnanticenses, Mazzotta and 
Voit.^ ")
With that, we think, sufficient has been said to 
demonstrate how closely associated these two Juridical notions 
have always been, and how the doctrine of common error exer­
cised such a telling influence on the establishment of the 
teaching that the Church supplies Jurisdiction in probable 
and positive doubt. By way of conclusion we should like to 
make reference to a very interesting point, which may well be 
regarded as a paradox in canonical history. Discussing the 
controversy that existed in pre-Code Jurisprudence as to 
whether a coloured title was an essential requisite in order 
that the supplying principles of common error might operate,
(97)
($7) of. Disp. Mo^. in Tres Bull. Apoat., Appendix, De Opin. 
Prob. Dub. II, n.3 ”... atque haec de hae secunda via,
de qua cum Compluti existerem, eonsului Sapientissimum 
Magiatrum Pransiscum Suarez, qui cum in ea esset opinione 
non licere uti jurisdictions probabili in administrations 
Sacrament! Poenitentiae, certe ob praedietum modum 
dicendi mutavit sententiam et poatea illam typis mandavlt 
U, Tom. de Poen. Disp. XXVI, Sec. 6. n.7.M
(98) of. Tract. Theol. Schol et Morales, Trac.V, Cent. ITT, 
Punct.L» n.33*
(99) cf. BOHACINA Op. Omnia Mor. ,Tom.I, De Mat., Q. II, Pune t. VIII
uRAMDO, Commentaria in Univ* lae 2a* St.Thom. ,
tfonull, Cont.II, Trac.XII, diep.L,§ i*, n.58.
■Ui i i , De Sac. Lib.I, Trac.V, q.l03s 
3?a££^IITU5 , De Horn. Stat. et Off ic.Tom. II, Q.87, 
n . ' 3 5 7 .  / n .  7 5 .
SALMAUTICEK3MS Curs. Theol.Mor.Tom. I, Trac.VI, c.XI,
■ Punct.Y.
MAZZOTTA, Theol. Mor. Trac. VI, Disp. II, Q.I. c.2,§ 3. 
VOIT. Theol. Mor. Tom II, Trac.II, C. IV, n.7^6.
- m -
Gasparri remarks: "Proinde atante hac controversia juris-
dictio videtur suppleri, ex principio saltern reflexo, quod 
nempe Jiccleaia in dubio juris jurisdictions applet.
In the beginning the principle that jurisdiction is supplied 
in probable doubt, flowed from the doctrine of common error: 
here we find a development in the doctrine of common error 
being justified and confirmed by the invocation of that very
<7principle which had, so to aay, emanated froqi itself. L
(ICO) Trac. Can. De Mat., Vol.I, n.913
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COMMON ERROR AND NON-JURISDICTIONAL ACTS.
In a later chapter when treating of poet-Code teaching 
on the supplying principles of common error, a very important 
and practical question of interpretation will arise viz., 
whether Canon 209 (in which the doctrine of common error is 
codified) intends to restrict the application of the principle 
to the supplying of jurisdiction alone. In other words, 
the question will arise as to whether the legislator intends 
to exclude the application of the validating principle in 
the case of acts, which are not performed by virtue of the 
power of jurisdiction - in the case of acts which we may call
non-jurisdictional acts? In order to give a proper and
complete answer to this question later, it will be necessary 
to make a brief study here of the traditional canonical 
doctrine on the point.
Under this category of non-jurisdictional acts we 
find three distinct types discussed by authors in relation 
to common error, viz., (1) acts of assistance at marriage;
(2) acts of a public notary, and (3) acts performed by 
virtue of dominative power. Having examined each of these 
in turn, we may be able to define what was the determining 
factor with regard to the matter to which the supplying
principles of common error applied, according to pre-Code
teaching.
ARTICLE I. - COMMON ERROR AND ASSISTANCE AT MARRIAGE.
A. Assistance by virtue of Ordinary Power.
The Tridentine decree Tametsi^^ conferred on the 
pastors of parishes in which it was published, a position of 
importance with regard to the celebration of marriage which
C H A P T E R  II.
(1) Sees. xXIVk Dec. de Ref. Mat., Cap.l.
they previously never enjoyed, or rather with which they 
were previously never burdened. Henceforth, in those places 
where the decree had been promulgated, every marriage had to 
be celebrated before the parochus proprius of one of the 
parties to the marriage, or before the delegate of that 
pastor or of the Ordinary: the non-compliance with this
rule rendered the marriage invalid. The fadt that his 
assistance was necessary for validity made the question as 
to who was the parochus proprius a vital one: in every case 
it had to be ensured that the priest assisting at the 
marriage was the parochus proprius - or at least his properly 
constituted delegate.
Naturally, the question was soon raised as to the 
validity of a marriage celebrated before a parochus putativus 
i.e. one who is merely reputed to be pastor. Ib such a 
marriage to he regarded as valid? Is the defect of power 
in the putative pastor supplied by reason of common error, 
thus rendering the marriage valid?
The theologians of the early 17th century had already 
realised that the act of assistance at marriage did not 
entail the exercise of true jurisdiction. They saw a differ­
ence between the act by which a pastor assisted at marriage, 
and the act by which he conferred absolution or, indeed, the 
ait by which he administered the other Sacraments. He 
conferred absolution by virtue of the power of orders and the 
power of jurisdiction: he administered the others by virtue
of the power of Orders alone. But assistance at marriage 
was different. This function was performed not by virtue 
of Orders, nor of jurisdiction, but by virtue of the fact 
that he was appointed an authoritative witness to the ceremony 
Henriquez brings this out very clearly when he writew:-
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"Sola enim praesentia illius requiritur qui eat posaessione
parochiae, etiam absque ullo verae jurisdictionis uau, et
ministratione Sacramenti."^ Bonacina has something similar
’’Ratio noatra eat turn quia haec aasiatentia auctoritativa
(3)non eat proprie actua jurisdictionis." Later on Pagnanua
calls the pastor a teatia auctorizabilia with regard to 
assistance at marriage.
But though they realized this, still, these 
theologians had no hesitation in applying the principles of 
common error to acts of assistance at marriage by putative 
pastors, just the same as they applied them to confessions 
heard and abaolutions conferred by these same pastors. In 
other words, they regarded all the official acts of such 
pastors as valid, independently of the source or nature of 
the power by virtue of which each individual act was per­
formed. This had been the traditional interpretation of 
the doctrine before the Council of Trent, when the general 
terms "omnia gesta" or "gesta" were customarily used to 
describe the extent of application of the principle. It 
was merely a matter of form that post-Tridentine theologians 
should add the item of assistance at marriage to the "gesta" 
of the pastor. Prom the very beginning thia was done by all 
who adverted to the question - by Henriquez/*^ T. Sanchez^ 
Lessius,^) P o n t i u s , a n d  Bonacina. (9) That it continued
(2) Sum. Theol. Mor., Lib.XI, c.3* n.L.
(3) Op. Omn. Mor., Tom I. De Mat., ft.II, Punct.VHl, n.21.
(U) cf. Commentatia ad c.l, X, V, 8, n.l39i of. also LESSIUS, 
De Just, et Jure, Lib. II, c.29, n.£t.
(5) Summ. Theol. Mor., Lib.XI, c.3, n.U. "Sat est pro matrimon-
io praesentia illius qui communi errore reputatur parochus
proprius."
(6) De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp.XXII, n.6o. "Breviter ... si absque 
titulo collato a legitimo Superior! intruaua eat, non valet 
matrimomium ... Si autem titulum habuit a legitimo Super- 
iori, invalidum tamen ob vitium occultum, valet matrimonium
(7) cf. Be Juatitia et Jure, Lib.II, c.29, n.6 7.
(8) cf. De Mat., Lib. V, c.XIX, n.19.
(9) Op. Omn. Mor., Tom.I, De Mat., Q.II, Punct. VIII, n.27. 
"Primo colligi potest, validum esse matrimonium cui
(continued end of page 118.)
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so, is evidenced by the testimony of ^ enumerable authors from 
this time to the publication of the Code. To say that it 
was the common opinion in pre-Code teaching would scarcely be 
doing it Justice: it would be a fairer reflection to aay
that we have not found one author, who held that the principle 
did not apply in the case of the assistance at marriage by a 
putative pastor.
It is true, of course, that in many cases authors 
held that the marriage would be invalid if the pastor in 
question did not have a coloured title. But the invalidity 
in that case would follow as a result of the defect of a 
coloured title, which, as we have seen, was regarded by many 
as essential - not from any intrinsic reasons preventing the 
operation of the principles with regard to the act of assist­
ing at marriage.
B. Assistance by Virtue of Delegated Power.
We have seen that the decretalists generally taught 
that the principles of the Lex Barbarius applied to delegated 
as well as ordinary Jurisdiction - a teaching which continued 
unchanged to the promulgation of the Code. We have Just seen 
that commentators and theologians placed the act, by which a 
pastor assisted at marriage, on a par with an act placed by 
virtue of Jurisdiction, at least as far as the principles of 
common error were cohcerned. It was only to be expected then, 
that the application of the Lex Barbarius to delegated assis­
tance at marriage and to delegated Jurisdiction sjiould also 
go hand in hand. That this was so will be evident from the 
following survey of the question.
(9) (continued): asaistit parochus, habens titulum invalidum
Ob vitium allquod occultum, aut habens beneficium incom- 
patibile sibi collatum a legitimo Superiore. Ratio est 
quia adest titulus coloratus cum errore cummuni absque 
impedimento Juris naturalis aut Divini."
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By virtue of the Tametsi decree, the pastor or Ordin­
ary could delegate another priest to assist at a marriage at 
which they themselves had, by reason of office, the right to 
assist. It is to be noted that the decree laid down that 
the Ordinary or pastor could delegate another priest. Thomas 
Sanchez raised an interesting question: Would the marriage
be valid if the pastor delegated a lay person who was commonly 
considered to be a priest? At first glance such a marriage 
would appear to be invalid because a lay person could not 
receive valid delegation to assist, by reason of the decree 
Tametsi which required that the person delegated be a priest. 
Nevertheless, Sanchez declared such a marriage valid, because 
all the conditions required for the application of the Lex 
Barbarius are fulfilled, viz., dommon error, a coloured title 
(delegation by the pastor), and the impediment or incapacity 
arises merely from positive ecclesiastical law: for it is
not required by either the divine positive or natural law
( 10)
that the official witness to a marriage contract be a priest.
This case visualizes an incapacitating defect in the person
delegated, but it is evident from an earlier context, that
Sanchez holds the same view when the defect of authority is
( 11)due to a vitiated act of delegation.
With Sanchez thus setting the lead, as it were, other 
commentators followed his reasonable and logical application. 
Pontius accepted it without hesitation, and explicitly 
applied it to delegation both ad universitatem causarum and 
ad unam causam.^1^  Among others we may mention Bonacina,
(10) T. SANCHEZ, De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.61*.
(!1) T. SANCHEZ, De Mat.., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.19. "Sed 
verius eat etiam quando vitium est circa commissionem 
faetam a legitimo Superiore: dum communlter id vitium
ignoratur, valere gesta per delegatum, nisi jus in 
poenam casset."
(12) Of. De Met., Lib.V, c.XIX, nn. 11, 19.
(13) cf. Op. Omn. Mor., Tom. I, De Mat., Q.II, Punct. VIII, n.3C
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S c h m a l z g r u e b e r P i c h l e r , ^ 15  ^ ana Filllucius.^lo'
Though all authors did not explicitly advert to the question 
it is significant that none denied the application. Indeed 
for many of those who made no explicit reference to the point, 
a safe analogy may be drawn from the fact that they regarded 
the principles of the Lex Barbarius as applying to delegated 
Jurisdiction.
Among the more modern writers who held this same
view, we may note Rosset,^^ Murray - who like Pontius,
( 18 )made explicit mention of delegation ad unam causam 
D*Annibale ,(19) Wernz^20  ^ and Gasparri/21  ^ who declarea 
the marriage to be valid even if the person delegated and 
commonly considered a priest is really a woman.
The testimony of such authoritative oanofeists furnish­
es us with sufficient evidence to claim with safety that the 
application of the principles of the Lex Barbarius to the 
act of assistance at marriage, by virtue of delegated 
authority, was a well-founded and widely accepted teaching 
in pre-Code Jurisprudence.
(1U) cf. Jus Scclea. Univ. IV, III, n.188.
(15) cf. Jus. Can., IV, III, n.22. "Sufficit, etiam si laicus 
vel olericus inferior sacerdoti, substitmatur modo com- 
muni errore habeatur pro sacerdote."
(16) cf. Quaes. Mor., Tom X, P. I, cap. 6 , n.206.
(17) cf. De Sac. Matrimonii, n. 2223.
(18) De Imped. Mat., n.L03>
(19) cf. Summa Theol. Mor., Ill, n.L6l, note 61+.
(20) cf. Jus Dec., IV, n.180, II, note.213. "Quodsi quis 
communi errore habeatur Sacerdos, qui revera laicus est, 
delegatlo eidem facta valorl aasistentiae et matrimonii 
non obstat."
(21) cf. Trac. Can. de Mat. , n. 1129.
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ARTICLE II. - COMMON ERROR AND THE ACTS OP A NOTARY.
We have had occasion to refer many times already to
the application of the principles of common error to the acts
of a putative notary. In Roman law we found explicit legis-
( 2 2 )lation on the point. Innocent IV gave an indication
(23)that the same principle applies in Canon law. Hostiensis
taught the same doctrine, which was re-echoed by many pre- 
Tridentine jurists, both civil and ecclesiastical.^2^  In 
the post-Tridentine period there is no change in outlook: 
a very brief examination of the evidence will suffice.
Sylvester had described the office of notary as a 
public office - public from the point of view both of 
authority and utility, viz., it is an office established 
by the public authority, its purpose being the promotion 
of the public or common utility. (2^  The office was never 
regarded as one which brought with it the power of juris­
diction. Nevertheless, just as in the case of assis­
tance at marriage, canonists and theologians continued to 
apply the principles of common error to the acts of a puta­
tive notary, for the same reasons as applied in the cast of 
defect of jurisdiction. Usually indeed, they made no dis­
tinction between acts performed by virtue of jurisdiction, 
and acts performed by virtue of any other power. The nature 
of the power exercised was never considered, but rather the 
nature of the office: if the office was of its nature a
private one, common error would not apply: if it was public
(22) Nov. XLIV, 1, k: cf. Above Sec.I, Ch. 1. PP. 7, 8.
(23) cf. Apparatus ad c.l, X, II, 22: cf. Above Sect.II, 
ch. 1. Art.III.
(2h) cf. Above, Sec. II, Chs. I, and II.
(25) cf. Summa Sylvestrina, pars I, v. Excommunicatio III, 
n. 2.
(26) e.g. cf. T. SANCHEZ, De Mat. Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, 
n.5U. LESSIUS, De Just, et Jure, Lib. II, c.29. n.67.
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however, then granted common error, the acta of the office­
holder would he valid. We stressed this point when treating 
of the pre-Tridentine authors and noticed that the expression 
"gests rations public! officii valent,” was very frequently
4
used in this connection. We find a typical example of the 
same thing in the writings of Suarez. Replying to the 
question as to the validity or otherwise of documents drawn 
up by a notary who ia excommunicated, he says: "Loquimur
autem per se et ex vi excommunicatlonis quae publics et nota 
sit: nam si sit occulta, ex superioribus jam constat general-
is regula, acta ab excommunicato occulto ratione publicl 
muneris valida esse .... quia ob publicam utllitatem, ipsa 
Reapublica seu Eccleaia supplet ilium defectum juxta 
1. Barbarius ff. de offic. Praet.”^2^
Here we see that Suarez speaks of a public office 
and says that the general rule applies, that acts performed 
by a putative public office-holder are valid: the fact
that in the context he is treating of the acts of a notary 
makes it obvious that he intends the general rule to apply 
non-jurisdictional as well as to jurisdictional acts.
This is explicitly stated by Lessius who makes express 
mention of non-jurisdictional acts - ".... supradicta 
procedere etiam in iis, quae geruntur ex officio publico 
^quamvis non sint actus juriadictionia, ut in instrumenta 
Tabellionis ....”(2®' Passerinus too makes this clear.(29) 
Among many others holding this same view we may note such
(27) Be Censuris, Disp. XVI, Sect.V, in initio.
(28) De Just, et Jure, Lib.II, c.29, n.67.
(29) De Horn. Stat. et Offic., Tom. II, q.87, n.35l. "Nee 
obstat, quod notarius non habeat jurisdictionem, quia 
ratio ob quam geata per eum e x  l e g e  valida eunt, e s t
communis utilitaa, quae milltat etiam ubi quis Be 
intrudlt in officium jurisdictionem non habens.”
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names as Flaminius Parisiusf T. Sanchez, J. Sanchez^
P o n t i u s , a n d  Zoesius.^^ During the 18th century we 
find Relffenstuel,^-^ S c h m a l z g r u e h e r a n d  Mayr O.F.M. 
among those who favoured it.
FPom this imposing weight of evidence we feel justi­
fied in asserting that the traditional teaching has been, 
that the application of the supplying principles of common 
error has not been restricted to the supplying of jurisdiction 
alone, but rather to the supplying of any power or capacity 
required by any putative public official, in order that he 
might validly perform the functions of his office. The fact 
that authors of the 19th century make little or no reference 
to acts of a notary when discussing common error, does not 
weaken the claims the theologians had no practical reason 
for treating of the case of putative notaries: the question
did not retain much interest for canonists either, by reason 
of the rareness of occurrence and its relative unimportance. 
But even if they do not make explicit application of the 
principles to the acts of a notary, it is very significant 
that at no time has this application been denied: their
silence, therefore, maybe justifiably interpreted as 
signifying agreement.
(JOj cf. De Rgsig. Benef. , Tom.I, Lib. Vxl, q»2l+, n»ix6»
(31) cf. De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.5U.
(32) cf. Selectae Disputationes, Disp. kkt n.3.
(33) cf. De. Mat., Lib.V, o.XIX, n.3.
(3k) cf. Gomm. in Jus Cat). Univ., Lib. II, Tit. XXII, n.7»
(35) cf. Jus. Can. Univ., II, XXII, n.268.
(36) cf. Jus. Eccles. Univ., II, XXII, n.10.
(37) Trismegietus Juris Pont. Univ., Lib. II, Tit.XXII,
Punct. X, n.52.
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ARTICLE III. COMMON ERROR AND DOMINATIVE POWER.
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction may be defined as the 
public power of governing, ruling or directing baptized 
persons towards their supernatural end. It is the special 
name given to the authority by which the legitimately 
appointed Superiors in the perfect society of the Church 
rule or govern their subjects. Within this perfect society
- the Church - there have arisen numerous private or imperfect 
societies, such as Religious Orders, Congregations, Confra­
ternities, etc.: the authority by which the Superiors in 
these imperfect societies rule their subjects is called 
dominative power. Membership of these imperfect societies, 
of course, does not entail exemption from subjection to the 
duly constituted Superiors of the perfect society, viz.,
Roman Pontiff and Ordinaries. In effect, membership of
such societies really means that the members come under a 
twofold authority, viz., they become subject to the Superiors 
of the imperfect society by legitimate adscription to it, 
while they still remain subject to the Superiors of the
perfect Society, having already become subject to them by
( 38)the reception of Baptism.
Because of their practically universal extension 
and importance, the Supreme Pontiff, by a special privilege, 
has conferred jurisdiction on the Superiors of certain of 
these imperfect Societies. Superiors in such a privileged 
society therefore enjoy a two-fold power over their subjects
- dominative power in so far as their subjects are members 
of this particular society^ and jurisdiction in so far as 
their subjects are members of the perfect society, the Church. 
In other words, by virtue of this privilege, the subjects,
as members of the Church, are withdrawn from the authority of
(38) Canon 87.
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the usual Superior in the Church - the local Ordinary - 
and are placed instead, under that of their own Religious 
Superior. This is called the privilege of Exemption; 
it is enjoyed by all Religious Orders and by certain Religious 
Congregations. Superiors in non-exempt religious Societies 
however, exercise dominative power only over their subjects - 
the local Ordinary exercises jurisdiction over the members 
of such bodies in so far as they are members of the perfect 
society.
When speaking of dominative power, however, it must 
be kept in mind that its exerfcise is not confined merely to 
Superiors of non^exempt religious: exempt religious Super­
iors also exercise it - in their relations with their subjects
aa members of the particular religious body in question. 
Therefore, superiors of exempt religions exercise the same 
power over their subjects, qua sodalea, as the Superiors of 
non-exempt religions do over theirs. As a corrollary of 
this, it follows that if a Superior in an exempt religion 
is invalidly appointed, his official acts in relation to his 
subjects, qua members of the Church, will fee invalid by 
reason of defect of jurisdiction, while his official acts in 
relation to the same subjects, qua members of the religion, 
will be Invalid by reason of defect of dominative power. 
Consequently when we ask whether dominative power is supplied 
in common error it is important to remember that the question 
refers to the case of a Superior in an exempt religion, just
as well as to that of a Superior in a non-exempt body.
Very few pre-Code authors have given thia question any 
consideration, and those who have referred to it, have done 
so only very summarily and, we may say, confusedly. First 
to raise the question seems to have been Thomas Sanchez;
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at least he treats of it, and ©a he invariably gives many 
references to preceding authors for almost all opinions put 
forward by him, it may be taken that he is breaking new ground 
when he proposes a view without quoting other authorities 
either for or against. Speaking of the annulling of private 
vows and of those having power to do so, Sanchez treats in 
detail of the case where there is doubt as to whether the 
person annulling is the true father, or the legitimate 
guardian or master, or the legitimate religious Superior as 
the case may he. He lays down the rule that if, after 
having used sufficient diligence to ascertain the truth, the 
doubt still continues, (can\^each)annul the vow.
Then he considers the case where a vi>w has been annulled in 
such circumstances, and it is afterwards discovered that the 
person annulling was not really the legitimate Superior - 
in that contingency Sanchez regards the annulment as being 
invalid, and therefore that the obligation of the vow con­
tinues. (39) Though this seems to he a case of probable
doubt rather than common error, still Sanchez regards it as
1the latter, and gives as a reason for the invalidity of 
the annulment in the circumstances, the fact that the prin­
ciples of common error apply to acts of jurisdiction but not 
to "actus dominii" - "Quia quamvis in iis quae jurisdictionis 
sunt, error communis cum titulo satis sit ad valorem juxta
1. Barbarius, ff. de Offic. Praet., at id non efficit ut 
actus dominii valeant, sicut non valeret venditio servi 
existimati tails. Nec etiam hie error efficit ut vota con- 
ditionem imbibitam habeant. Quod est fundamentum potestatis 
irritandi."^0 ^
(39) cf. Opus Morale in Praec. Dec., Tom.I, Lib. IV, c.32,
nn. 15, 16.
(1+0) Opus Mor. in Praec. Dec., Tom.I. Lib. IV, c.32, n.l6.
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It is noteworthy that Sanchez here does not say 
that the principles of common error do not apply to acts 
performed by virtue of dominative power, hut rather that 
they do not apply to "actus dominii." He quotes as an 
example, the act of selling a person who is generally reputed 
to he a slave - hut who, due to some mistake, in realjrty is 
not: common error does not render such a contract valid.
This is quite true. Such a contract is invalid simply 
because one of the conditions for a valid contract of sale 
is absent, viz., the object being sold does not belong to 
the person selling. There could be no question of the 
application of common error in such a case: the purpose
of the doctrine of common error is to supply the defects of 
power in a putative official: it will not supply a defect
of ownership in order to render valid a contract of sale 
entered into by an official. Ve agree, then, with Sanchez 
when he says "error communis non efficit ut actus dominii 
valeant," but this does not prove that common error does not 
apply to acts performed by virtue of dominative power. He 
seems to confuse potestas dominii and potestas dominativa.
He says in effect that common error does not supply domin­
ative power (when speaking of the invalidity of the annulment 
of a vow by a putative Superior), but to illustrate it, he 
gives an example showing that common error does not supply 
potestas dominii.
Bonacina, who follows Sanchez closely, gives the 
same solution to the question of the vow annulled by a 
putative father - "quia error non confert potestatem 
dominativam." He makes explicit mention of the fact
that error does not confer dominative power: as a corrol-
lary of this he condludea:- "Ob id non est valida venditio
(Ul) Summa Theol. Mor., Tom. II, Disp. IV, Q.II, Punct.VII,
§ II, n.23.
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rei alienee, quae proprie putabatur, bee est valida venditio 
boainis liberi, qui servus putabatur." Here he, too, 
obviously confuses dominative power with ownership.
De Castro Paleo adheres closely to the opinion voiced 
by Sanchez and Bonacina whom he quotes. The reason alleged
by him for the non-application of the principles to dominative
( 1+2 )power is because no law makes express mention of thia point. 
Others who defend the same view are Trulleneh^-^ and Leand^i^
but they merely repeat the observations of Sanchez and fall 
into the same confusion on the point.
One author only seems to have put it forward as an 
absolute view that dominative power is supplied in common 
error. This was J. Martinez de Prado. He bases his view 
on the fact that the reasons for which the deficiency is 
supplied in the case of jurisdiction apply equally in the 
case of defect of dominative power,(**5) an opinion which
is regarded aa probable by the Salmanticenses.
CONCLUSION.
Such is the history of the teaching on the question. 
From an historical viewpoint the position is obviously not 
very enlightening. At first glance the weight of opinion 
(such as it is) would certainly seem to be contrary to the 
applying of the common error principles to dominative power.
On closer examination, however, it will be seen that the views
(1+2) cf. Opus Morale, Pars III, Trac. XV, Disp. II, Punct.
IV, n.10.
(1+3) cf. Opus Morale, Ton. I, Lib. II, c.II, Dub. 3k» n.ll. 
"Respondeo negative, quia error non confert potestatem 
dominativam: sic non est valida venditio hominia liberi,
qui servus putabatur."
(1+1+) cf. Quaest. Mor., Tom V, Trac. I, Disp. XVI, Q.95.
(1+5) Theol. Mor. Q u a e s t .  Praec. , Tom.II, Cap. XXXI, Q.13»nJI0. 
".... quia a paritate rationia id quod dicitur de supples 
da jurisdictione videtur militare in supplenda potestate 
dominativa ... ne semper sint anxii illi quorum vota 
sunt irritata a potestate dominativa, an ilia sit solum 
exiatimata et non vera."
(1+6) cf. Curaus. Theol. Mor., Tom.IV, Trac.XVII, c.3, P.VIII, 
n. 71.
-129-
p©t forward by the authors quoted above do not influence the 
question as it exists today: the notion of dominative power
as conceived by 1 7th century theologians differed vastly from 
the notion obtaining in modern canonical jurisprudence: 
therefore the opinions voiced on this question by 17th century 
theologians as applying to their notion, cannot be validly 
applied to the notion of dominative power ae it now exists.
The following brief remarks may help to show the truth of 
our contention.
We have seen above that the typical example of an 
act performed by virtue of dominative power given by Sanchez, 
Bonacina, de Castro-Palao and de Prado is the act of irrita­
tion of a private vow by a father or religious Superior.
Now, a private vow is not an act which brings with it 
juridical effects: it does not engender any rights or
obligations recognised or sanctioned by public authority.
The annullment of such a vow affects only the conscience of 
the individual for whom it is annulled: it ie entirely a
private matter. Obviously, therefore, there is no place 
for the supplying of power, in this case, to enable a puta­
tive father or a putative Superior to validly annul such a 
vow: for, we have seen many times already, that the principles
of common error apply only to acts performed by reason of a 
public office - a condition not realised here. Hence with 
Creusen^?) we may say, that we agree with the solution given 
by these authors to this particular case, but in so doing, do, 
not in any way jeopardise the possibility of having the 
principles of common error apply to dominative power.
(U7) cf. Acta Congresaus Jurid. Int., Vol. IV, "Pouvoir
Dominatif et Brreur Commune" Pp. 191-192.
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It may be asked why Sanchez and the others should take 
this particular case as a typical example of an act of dom­
inative power. Why did they not take, for instance, the 
act by which a religious Superior admita an aspirant to 
novitiate, or a novice to religious profession? Precisely 
because they did not regard these acts as exercise of 
dominative power. It must be remembered that at this time 
all religious Societies existing in the Church enjoyed the
privilege of exemption - for this we have the explicit testi-
(U8)mony of Sanchez - and therefore the major Superiors in 
these bodies all enjoyed the power of jurisdiction. It 
was only natural then that all the official acts of such 
Superiors who enjoyed jurisdiction should be looked upon aa 
acta of jurisdiction. Not until the non-exempt religious 
congregations had begun to flourish later in the 17th century, 
and in the following centuries, were canonists able to 
determine with any degree of precision what functions of 
a religious Superior’s office ihvolved the exercise of juris­
diction, and what functions pertained to the domain of 
dominative power. It was for this reason we said above that 
the notion of dominative power, as it now stands is so 
different from that which prevailed at the time Sanchez and 
the others wrote.
In view of all this we would consider the following 
points as being worthy of special note here. Sanchez,(k9)
Bonacina,^^0) Trullench^^1) and Leander(52) a8 have seen,
(L8) cf. Opus Mor; In praec. Dec. , Lib.V, c.IV, n.7h.
"Nee Episcopus, cum hodie Superior religioaorum non sit 
(omnes enim illi privilegium exeraptionis habent.")
(U9) cf. Opus M0r. in Praec. Dec., Tom.I, Lib.IV,c.32, n.15.
(50) cf. Sum. Theol. Mor., Tom.II, Disp. IV, Q.II, Punct.VII,
I II, n.23.
(51) cf. Opus Morale, Tom.I, Lib. II, Cap. II, Dub.3U» I). 11.
(52) Quaest. Mor., Tom. V, Trac. I, Disp. XVI, Quaest.95.
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give as their example of dominative power the act hy which
a father or religious Superior annuls the private vow of a
child or «ubject. They thxta give, ©a an example, an extreme«
form of dominative power - the most private form possible* 
Obviously however, there is a notable difference - at leapt 
from the point of view of juridical importance - between the 
act by which a religious Superior annuls the private vow of 
a subject, and the act hy which the same Superior admits a 
novice to religious profession. In the case of the former 
the juridical effects are non-existent: in the case of the
latter there follows a host of juridical effects - new 
obligations and new rights, arising as a result of the fact 
that the individual, thus admitted to profession, acquires a 
new status in the perfect society; by that act he passes 
from the lay to the religious state. Consequently it must 
be admitted that this latter act of the religious Superior 
approaches more closely to the notion of a public act than 
doeB the former; hence the function of admitting novices to 
profession approximates more closely to the notion of a public 
function or office, than does the function of annulling private 
vowa.
V
It is on thiB point, we thinks that the solution of 
the question, whether dominative power is supplied in common 
error, ultimately hinges. If it could he established that a 
religious Superior possessing dominative power exercised a 
public office in the execution of any of the functions attached 
to his office, then the principles of common error would apply. 
For it has been made abundantly clear, in the course of this 
treatise - and especially in the course of the present chapter 
that the guiding principle, accepted by all, in regard to this 
matter has been, that, in common error any power of capacity 
that is wanting to a public official is supplied to him: the
fact that he is a public official is the determining factor:
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whether the power attached to the office he holds is that of 
jurisdiction or not, does not matter. Thus, Trullench who,
in one context, denies that dominative power (as he visualizes
(53)it) is supplied in common error, in another context
explicitly affirms that the supplying principles apply to all
acts - both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional - which are
performed by vir|ue of a public office. (54)
It is significant that we find at least one instance
of the problem being solved along these lines in pre-Code
teaching. For Thesaurus-Giraldus explicitly state that the
act, by which a putative religious Superior admits a novice
to profession, is valid, not because this act is an exercise
of jurisdiction, but because it is an act performed by virtue
of a public office. In support of their position they refer
to a decision of the Sacred Congregation of Regulars, which
declares valid the profession of a nun admitted by a merely
(55)putative Abbess. Tbis opinion of Tbesaurus-Giraldus, and
the decision of the Sacred Congregation referred to fthe date
of which is not given), may not have constituted a probable
opinion, and could not be regarded as representing pre-Code 
teaching on the matter; but, at least, it serves as a concrete 
example of the potentialities attached to approaching the 
question from this viewpoint. We shall return to thia point 
in its proper place in a later chapter.
(53) cf. Opus Morale, Tom. I# Lib. II, Cap. II, Dub.34, n.ll.
(5k) Opus M0rale, Tom. II, Lib.VIII, c.l, Dub.10, n.8:
"Procedunt etiam supradicta in iis quae geruntur ex 
officio publico, quamvia non aint actus jurisdictionis.w
(55) THESAURUS-OIRALDUS, De Poenis Neeles., Pars I, cap.VI. 
’'item procedit in potestate conferendi beneficia, vel 
confirraandi, quia dicitur publicum officium potestate et 
utilitate, et generaliter, quod titulus coloratus cum 
communi errore reddat valldos omnea actus, qui ex tali 
officio publico geruntur, licet non sint actus juris­
dictionis formaliter, ut assistentia parochi in matrimonio 
contrahendo .... et idem dicendum de actu admittendi ad 
profesaionem qui non est actus jurisdictionis, sed publlcl 
officii ... et Sacra Congregatio Regularium deciaravit in 
une Adomarien. valldam fuisse profesaionem Monialis 
admissam ab Abbatissa illegitima, vel vidua quam Epis- 
copus deputaverat, qui tamen super tali impedimento non 
poterat dispensare: sed ad eum pertinebat deputare
Abbatiasam."
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THE NOTION OP COMMON ERROR.
Probably the least-discussed of all the questions 
and difficulties which arose in connection with the doctrine 
of common error in the course of its long history, was that 
most obvious of all questions: What is common error? We
do not imply that this question was disregarded entirely.
Some authors explicitly mentioned it - but such references 
were brief; others showed their views on the question by 
their application of the doctrine. But whether they 
expressed their yiews explicitly or only implicitly, it is 
very noticeable that all of them seemed to take the answer 
for granted. It is true there was a slight divergence of 
opinion as to what type of error was envisaged here - but on 
the main question as to how to determine when this error 
could be regarded as common, there was practical unanimity 
till the end of the last century - we may even say till after 
the promulgation of the New Code: To us who associate the
notion of common error with endless controversy at the 
present day, this may seem strange. It is nevertheless true, 
as a glance at traditional teaching will show. For con­
venience and order, we shall discuss the question under two 
heads already suggested;- (a) What type of error is required 
- and suffices? (b) When can this error be said to be 
common. We may put these briefly thus:- (a) Definition 
of Error: (b) Definition of Common Error.
A. Definition of Error.
Error may be defined as a false judgment of the 
intellect resulting from ignorance about a given point. We 
have seen that earlier commentators had used the terms 
ignorance and error indiscriminately when treating of the 
subject of common error; we noted especially the use of the
C H A P T E R  I I I .
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expression ignorantia probabilia as opposed to crass or
(1) ^  supine ignorance. Consequently, when we find Reginald,
Sanchez,^ Bonacina^ and others making this same dis­
tinction with regard to error, and insisting that the prin­
ciples of the Lex Barbarius apply only when the error is 
probabilia, it is obvious that they are repeating the 
teaching of those earlier commentators and merely sub­
stituting the term error for that of ignorantia. The 
intention of both those earlier and the present writers was 
to exclude any error which arose as a result of crass or 
supine ignorance from participating in the benefits of the 
Lex Barbarius. It is a very reasonable and logical restric­
tion - merely an application of the principle, "Nemini fraus
sua patrocinari debet" - a restriction which has been accepted
(5)by all subsequent authors.' '
A point, however, about which there was not this 
same unanimous agreement was, whether jurisdiction was 
supplied equally in the case of error juris as in error facti 
(the error in both cases being ex hypothesi communis). Again 
the terminology may not appear familiar, but the significa­
tion is clear. Error juris is error arising from ignorantia
juris - ignorance of the existence or extension of a law, e.g.
if a person is ignorant of the fact that every priest needs
(<t) cf. Above, Sec. II, Ch. I, Art. Ill, Footnote 25.
(2) cf. Theol. Mor., Lib.I, n.99*
(3) cf. De Mat., Lib.Ill, Disp. XXII, n.8.
(U) Op. Omn. Mor., Tom.I, De. Mat., Q*JI, Punct. VIII, n.25.
(5) e.g. cf. LAYMANN, Theol. Mor., Tom.I, Lib.I, Trac.U, 
c.2 2, n.9 ;
HAUNOLDUS, De Just. Et. Jure, Tom.V, Trac.II, c.l, n.19. 
SCKMAL 7. GRUBBER, Jus Socles. Univ., II, Tit.I, n.20; 
PIRHING, Jus Can., II, I, n.8U.
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jurisdiction in order to hear confessions, and thinks that 
a "simplex aacredos" is capable of doing so: error facti
is error arising from ignorantia facti - ignorance as to 
the fulfilment of conditions required for the application 
of a law in a particular case, e.g. if a person knows that 
a priest requires jurisdiction in order to validly absolve, 
but is ignorant of the fact that this particular priest does 
not possess jurisdiction. The case visualized in the Lex 
Barbarius, which is the basis of all canonical doctrine on
common error, was clearly one of common error of fact
 ^ (6)terror communis facti). The question was raised as to
whether the principle was thereby restricted to the case of 
common error of fact alone, or whether it also applied to
common error of law (error communis juris).
Earlier commentators did not refer to the question - 
and comparatively few authors of the 1 7th century, and 
later, discuss it. It is worthy of note that T. Sanchez,
who gave a very exhaustive treatment of common error, fails
to mention it. He is content with giving the general 
qualification that the error should at least be probable, 
thus giving the impression that if the error can be regarded 
as probable, then it is immaterial whether it is error juris 
or error facti.
A small number of writers however denied the parity 
between the effects of error of fact and error of law, chief 
of whom were Mascardus,^^ G a r c i a , a n d  Joannes Sanchez^-^ 
Neither Mascardus nor Sanchez offer any reasons for their 
opinion. In fact it is not so clear that the latter really
(6) NOTE: These expressions communis error facti, and 
communis error Ju^ia must not be confused with those of 
communis error ae facto and communis error de jure, 
which we shall meet later.
(7) cf. De Probationihuh, Conclusio 6U9» n.100.
(8) cf. De Beneficiis, Tom.I, Pars.V, c.IV, n.30h.
(9) cf. Select. Disp., Disp. Uh> n.10.
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intended to exclude the application to error of law properly
so-called, for it would seem from the context that he had in
mind not so much error juris as dubium Juris. In the context
he is treating explicitly of the problem referred to in a
previous chapter, viz. whether jurisdiction is supplied by
the Church in the case of probable doubt. He appears to
confuse these two notions which are really distinct and
separate.(10) Whatever doubt there may be with regard to
the teaching of Sanchez, however, there can be no doubt that
Garcia denied the application of the Lex Barbarius to the
case of error of law: his reason being that these principles
do not apply "quando jus resistit.M^il; This same reason
is given by Gobat in similar terms: "quia jura detestantur
(12)ignorantiam juris."'
It is true that ignorance of law has never been 
looked upon with favour, as is manifest from Regula 13»
Reg. Jur. in VI, which states: "Ignorantia facti, non juris,
excusat." Laws abhor ignorance of themselves, and do not 
confer benefits and privileges on such as are ignorant of 
them. But another principle must be kept in mind - a 
principle established by use and custom, though not by 
positive ecclesiastical legislation - viz., that a certain 
type of ignorance does enjoy the favour of the law, in so 
far as the Church supplies jurisdiction whenever common error 
is present: common error, that is, arising out of probable
(10) J. SANCHEZ, Selectae Disp., Disp. n.10 - "... adver- 
tunt tunc"errorem conferre jurisdictionem quando est 
circa factum, non quando error versatur circa jus; 
quando aliquia ergo Sacramentum ministrat ex oninlone 
probabili cum periculo irritandi illud, si forte a parte 
rei vera non sit, opinio ex errore juris procedit, non 
facti ...."-------------- ------ --------
(11) De Benef., Tom.I, Pars. V, c.h, n.303.
(12) Op. Mor. Omn. , Tom. I, Pars. I, Trac. VII, n.107.
ignorance. And since common error could arise as a result 
of ignorantia juris - ignorance which is exeusable and incul­
pable in view of the circumstances in which the community 
may be placed - this objection put forward by Garcia and 
Gobat can scarcely be regarded as insuperable.
The Jesuit Theologian, Lyymann, refers to this
question and adopts the view that the Lex Barbarius applies
(13)to all common error whether it be error of law or of fact.
So also Vericelli who contends that even though the Lex 
Barbarius speaks of error of fact, its dispositions must be 
extended to include error of law which is invincible. He 
bases his opinion on analogy - "propter identitatem rationis, 
lex extendenda est in favorabilibus.(^  Perhaps the best 
reason flf all in favour of this view is that given by Lacroix, 
who, adverting to the objection that laws do not favour 
ignorance of themselves, asserts that even if a community 
is in common error by reason of error of law, acts placed in 
favour of this community will be valid: (l) because the
common good demands it; (2) because the laws do not dis­
tinguish between common error of law and common error of fact.
Considerations such as these moat probably led the 
majority of theologians and canonists to take the matter for 
granted. The only qualification made by the majority waa 
that the error should be probable: they did not distinguish
between error of law and error of fact: it is logical to
conclude, then, that their intention was to include all 
common error that could be regarded as probable. A strong 
indication of the truth of this assumption may be found in 
the commentary of Schmalzgrueber.(lo) Declaring to be valid
(13) cf. Opera. Tom.I, Lib.I, Trac. IV, c.22, n.9 .
(1U) Quaestionea Morales et Legales, Trac.II, %.XXV, n.12.
(15) cf. Theol. Mor., Tom.II, Lib. VI, Pars I, n.113.
(16) cf. Jus Sccles. Univ., II, I, n.20.
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all the sentences pronounced by one who is merely reputed 
to be judge by the probable and common error of the people, 
he goes on to give his reason for inserting the word probable 
- "Dixi autem probabili errore, aliud easet si gesta essent 
a judiee exiatimato per crasaum et suninum, aut ex liquidl et 
manifeste Juris ignorantia provenientem errorem ...." Here 
h# says that error cannot be regarded as probable if it 
arises from a patent and manifest ignorance of the law, 
thereby implying that probable error can arise from ignorance 
of law which is not so manifest - or ignorance of law which 
is inculpable. He makes no distinction between error of 
fact and error of law - he includes both under the term 
error probabilis. Whether common error arises therefore, 
from error of law or error of fact, provided this error is 
probable, the principles of the Lex Barbarius apply. And 
we may safely assume that is the attitude of all those authors 
who demand that the error be probable, viz., that they speak 
indiscriminately of both error juris and error facti.^ ^
A couple °* authors^xQj appear to restrict this 
teaching somewhat by admitting common error of law in relation 
to an obscure or doubtful law, and denying that the principles 
would apply if the ignorance concerned a clear and unambiguous 
law. But in practice thia goes back to the principle of 
Schmalzgrueber, viz., that common error of law suffices if it 
is probable: for error of law that is common and probable
could scarcely arise with regard to a law that is clear and 
unambiguous. D*Annibale perhaps, best sums up the teaching 
on the point - "Error autem communis est si eo loco ubi aliquis
(17) e.g. cf. VERNIER, Theol# Praet. , Tom.I, n#92:
BAILLY, Theol. !5og. et Mor., Tom.IV, De Poen. , C.IX,
Art. II, p.336; CRa ISSQn , Manuale Tot. juris Can.,
Tom. I, n#298.
(18) i.e. PS ANGELIS, Prael. Juris Can., IV, I, n.25, and 
I CARD, Prael. Juris Can., Tom. I, n.285*
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juriedictionem exereet .... ea praeditus esse public©
exiatimetur: seu facti error versetur, aeu ijuris ....
dummodo error juris alt probabilia."^^^
B. Definition of Common Error.
Earlier commentators bad adverted to the fact that 
common error could be verified in one place with regard to a 
particular official, while in another place it could be 
publicly known that thia person was really inbabilia - and 
they had agreed that the Lex Barbarius applied, in such 
circumstances, in the place where the incapacity or defect 
was generally u n k n o w n . T h i s  interpretation was 
unanimously accepted by all subsequent writers. Thomas 
Sanchez for instance states it thus - "Sufficit tamen si 
sit communis error in eo loco ubi actus gestus fuit, quia 
ibi impedimentum erat occultum, quamvis in alio notorium 
esset."^2^  Authors also as a rule, advert to the possi­
bility that an impediment which at one time was publicly 
known in a certain place, could, with the passing of years 
slip from the memory of the people, so that common error
could then arise in this same place, because the impediment
( 2 2 )in the official referred to had now become occult.
But when may an error in a given place be regarded as 
common error? Sanchez gives the impression that discussion 
of this question is superfluous, for he simply says the error 
ought to be "common” - the error of one or two does not 
suffice. He seems to imply that the meaning of the term 
"common" is too clear to need definition. This ia probably
(19) Summula Theol. Mor., Tom.I, n.79> Footnote 72.
(20) cf. Above, Sec. II, Ch. II, Par.B.
(21) De. Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.9.
(22) e.g. cf. SANCHEZ, De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.10.
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/ op«\the explanation for the fafit that so many authors during
the 17th and 18th centuries adhered to a stereotyped treatment 
of this particular point» which ran something like this 
"Dixi error communis: non tamen sufficit error unius vel
duorum vel paucorum; debet esse communis.”
Actually the first attempt to determine or define
i
the term was made by Thomas Hurtado. Having raised the 
question as to how many persons would be required, and 
sufficient, in order to render an error common, he prefaces 
his reply by remarking that he has not seen the question 
discussed by any author. In his opinion, error can be 
regarded as common when it is public - and it is public 
when the greater part of the community is in error. (23) This
interpretation is favoured also by VericesLli, who has some­
thing worthy of note to say with regard to the notion of 
"place” in connection with this matter. According to him, 
common error is had if the greater part of the community, for 
which a certain priest is appointed, is in error about that 
priest's jurisdiction. For instance, in a large city which 
has a population of 500,000, it would be practically impos­
sible for a priest to obtain jurisdiction by reason of common 
error, if it were necessary that the whole population should 
be in error - because the greater part of that population 
would never even know, or know of, that priest. Therefore, 
it is sufficient if the greater number of those to whom the
(22a) e.g. cf. REGINALD, Theol. Mor., Lib.I, n.99i
BOKACINA, Op. Omn. Mor., Tom.I, De.Mat. , Q.II, Punct.VIII
n. 25;HAUNOLDOS, De just, et Jure, Com. V, Trac. II, c.l, n.19; 
PA3SERINPS, De Horn. Stat. et Off., Tom.II, Q.87, n.3*+9; 
PIRHINQ, Jus. Can., II, I, n.8U;
QUEERER US, Theol. Mor. D. Aug. , Tom.I, Trac. VII, Disp.IF,
§ XVII, n.537;
SCHMALZGRUEBER. Jus. Eccles. Univ., II, I, n.20.
(23) Res. Mor., Pars II, n.20l6. - "Sed existimo tunc censeri 
errorem communem, quando est publicus: tunc autem est
publicus quando in maiori parte existit et eaeteri 
scientes taceant."
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prieat actually miDlaters be in e r r o r . T h e r e  can be
no doubting the reasonableness and feasability of thia
assertion. It squares with the expression of Pelinus Sandeui
when he said that a person should be reputed to be a real
(25)Judge by womnibus scientibus et cognoscentibus:" we
have seen that this should generally correspond to the people
within the territory under the jurisdiction of the judge in
question. Most probably it was this same idea that Sanchez
and the others had in mind, when they spoke of an official
whose incapacity was publicly known in other places, but
occult in the "place" where he was acting as official.
It is certainly what later authors have in mind, as can be
deducted from statements such as - "Sufficit autem ad errorem
communem, ut vitium ignoretur in eo loco, jbago, Beu oppldo
(26)ubi exercetur jurisdiction" and "Error autem communis 
est si in eo loco ubi aliquis jurlsdictionem (v.g. ubi
(27)parochum agit,) ea praeditue esse publics existimetur."
With regard to the norm given by Hurtado and Vericel-
li to determine when an error may be said to be common, it
amounts to thia that the error must be estimated in a moral
rather than a mathematical manner. Hurtado asked the
question - how many persons must be in error in order that it
be common error? He does not go into mathematical figures
to give a precise and detailed answer. He simply declares
the error to be common if the greater number are in error:
(2i+) VBRICBLLI, Quaest. Mor. et Leg., Trac.*11, Q.XXV, n.15.
- • •. turn quia error communis non dicitur respectu totius
populi, sed respectu ejus multitudinis, quae ea juris­
dictions utiturj alioquin in magna civitate quingen- 
torum millium hominum, fere numquam posset ex errore 
/ communi sacerdos habere jurlsdictionem, quia maior pars 
populi numquam talem sacerdotem novit; q-uare sufficit 
si error sit pro maiori parte illius multitudinis qui 
petit ab eo Sacramenturn."
(25) cf. Above, 3ec. II, Ch.II, Par. B.
(26) LEQUEUX, Sel. Quaes. Jur. Can., Quaes. XIX, n.69.
(27) d*ANNIBALE, Summula Theol. Mor., Tom.I, n.79,
Footnote 72.
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in other words, of the community taken as a moral unit dan 
he said to be in error. This may be regarded as the accepted 
teaching on the point during the 19th century and in pre- 
Code jurisprudence. Different authors stated it in slightly 
different terms, all of which, however, may be regarded as
meaning substantially the same thing. Some few, as for
instance F. Schmier,^2®^  followed the definition of Vericelli 
and said error was common if the greater part of the commun­
ity was in error (major para communitatia). Others stated it 
to be common if the incapacity of the official was unknown to
all or nearly in the community (omnes aut fere ornnes); among
these we may mention Bailly,^^ Seavini,^0  ^Boldin, 
Murray^2  ^ and Marc. Another description of common
error favoured by some was, when the incapacity of an 
official was unknown to all or the greater number (omnibus 
vel saltern plerisque); in this group we find Moullet,^"^ 
Schmitt/^' V o i t / ' ^  and Haine. Santi simply des­
cribes it as common in the following terms, - "quoties quia
(28) Cf. Jus. Can. Univ., Lib.II, Trac. I, c.VII, § k, n.29.
(29) cf. Theol. Dog. et Mor. , Tom. IV, c. IX, Art. II, p. 336.
(30) cf. Theol. Mor. Tom. Ill, Disp. I, C. IV, Art. II. q.6.
(31) cf. Summa Theol. Mor. Ill, n.35h. It ia interesting to 
note Roldin’s application of thia principle to a confes­
sor. He writes: wUt aliquis per communem errorem habe-
atur confessariUB requiritur aliquod factum e.g. exer- 
citium muneris confeasarii per aliquod tempus peractum, 
ex quo loci fideles eum passim pro confessario habent; 
non sufficit ut quis semel more aliorum confessiones exciplat."
(32) cf. De Imped. Mat., n.399: "Error debet esse communis...
Quid vero dicendum si ex parochianis, qui v.g. numero 
duo mlllia sunt, centum aut ducenti bene norint parochi 
titulum vitiosum esse, errore ceteroa occupante? Auc- 
torea non statuunt, et quidem atatueri non potuerunt 
proportionem exactam inter scientes et errantes, qua 
posita error easet vel non esset communis. De casu autem 
dato haec- mihi decenda videntur. 1. Vix fieri potest 
quin tituli invaliditas cito omnibus aut fere omnibus 
parochianis nota fieret; 2. stante proportions ista, 
puto errorem jure communem vocario posse."
(33) cf. Inst. Mor. Alphons. , II, n.l75b-.
(3k) cf. Comp. Theol. Mor., Pars. II, p. 11*8.
(35) cf. Epitome Theol. Mor., Lib. V, 8 82, n. II.
(36) cf. Theol. Mor., Tom. II, n.7U4.
(37) cf. Theol. Mor. Elements, Tom.III, De Poen., Paaa II,
Q. 73, R.I.
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publice et In populo existimatur ease verua et legitimus 
j u d e x , a n d  D'Annibale - "si in eo loco ubi aliquis 
jurisdictionem exercet .... ea praeditus ease publice 
existimetur."(^9) Many, however, were content to follow 
the 17th century tradition by stating that the error must 
be common - emphasizing that the error of one or a few is 
not sufficient. Their attitude to the question seems
to have been that the answer was too obvious to necessitate 
further definition, and may beat be summarised by the sentence 
with which Berardi dismisses the subject - ’’Quid sit error(Ul)communis et quomodo diatinguatur a privato, per se patet.n
Prom convincing evidence such as this, we feel absol­
utely justified in stating that the traditional teaching of 
canonists and theologians demanded a real,/true land actual
error on the part of the whole community, or at least the 
greater part of it (i.e. of the whole community taken as a 
moral unit), in order that it could be said to be common. 
Perhaps the truth of this conclusion may be even more forcibly 
brought home, by an examination of the various applications 
of the doctrine as found in the writings of pre-Code authors - 
in which applications they implicitly, and as it were, uncon­
sciously give their notions as to what common error really is.
It will probably have been noticed, in the course of 
this essay, that the term "official” occurs very frequently.
This has not been without reason. For, if one fact stands
(38) Prael. Juris Can., II, I, n.lU.
(39) Summula Theol. Mor., I, n.79, Footnote 72.
(Uo) e.g. VERNIER, Theol. Prac. , I, n.92;
LEQUEUX, Selectae ^uaes. Jur. Can., Q.XIX, n.69, Par.Ill; 
BOUIX. Trac. de Judiciis, I, Pars I, Sec.IV, c.I, § 3 ,
Prop. II;
CRAI3S0N, Man. Tot. Jur. Can., I, n.297.• 
fcs ANQELIS. Prael. jur, Can., Tom. IV, Pars. I,
Tit. I, n.2U.
I CARD, Prael. Jur. Can., n.28U.
(Ul) Praxis Confess., IV, n. 11+7.
t L
out In history of this matter, it is that all authors 
connected the notion of common error with an official or 
office-holder who exercised a public office. Officials 
most frequently mentioned were Bishop, pastor, confessor, 
judge and notary. And, though there was almost universal 
agreement on the question of the application of the principles 
to the case of delegated officials (even if delegated for one 
case,) there can be no doubt that the primary purpose of the 
doctrine, according to all authorities, was to safeguard the 
community from the evils, grave inconveniences and confusion 
which would follow from a succession of invalid acts, perform­
ed by otfe or other of the officials mentioned above, who 
exercised a quasi-permanent office. In other words, the 
chief purpose of the doctrine was to ensure the validity of 
acts performed by an official who enjoyed habitual power.
This being their attitude to the purpose of the doctrine, 
there will be little difficulty in determining their notion 
of common error itself, To treat of each individual author 
on this point, if it were possible, would certainly not be 
feasible. But we feel justified in taking the teaching of
that outstanding canonist, Schmalzgrueber, as a fair reflec-
( 4 3 )tion of the general consensus of opinion. Schmalzgrueber 
summarises the application of the doctrine in the following 
six points:-
” 1. Valent acta Episcopi, vel alterius praelati, 
cuius electio propter quodeumque juris humani impedimentum
fuit nulla, si ejus nullitas publlce ignoretur ........
2. Valent absolutiones collatae a Sacerdote, et coram eo 
celebrata matrimonia, etsi verus paroehus non sit quia vel 
intrusus, vel ad animarum cura ab Episcopo non approbatua;
modo pro legitimo parocho communlter sit habitus  .....”
(42) NOTE: By this we do not wish to imply that the princip- 
ies of common error do not, or should not, apply to dele­
gated power. What is implied is, that the conditions 
required in order that common error be verified were 
determined to cater primarily for the case of ordinary
or habitual power. But if these conditions are actually 
fulfilled with relation to a case of delegated power,then 
obviously the principles will equally apply.
(43) Jus Eccles. Univ., II, I, n. 22.
- 144 -
-1U5-
’‘3» Eadem acta, sententiae, et absolutiones subsistunt, 
qua^tumvis episcopua, vel alius praelatus excommunicatus, 
auspenaus, vel jurisdictions et ipsa praelatura, et bene- 
ficio, vel officio privatus fuisset, modo communl errore
existimetur adhuc praeditus jurisdictione sufficienti ......
U. Ea ipsa valebunt quantumvis impedimentum unus, vel alter 
sciverit, modo ii a quibus gesta sunt, pro veris judicibus 
communi errore sint habitl: quia leges non privatam, sed
communem aestimationem attendunt  .....  5« Imo valori a
se actorum non oberit mala fides ipsius judicis, parochi aut 
confessarii, scientes se carere jurisdictione, modo communi
errore existimetur hoc praediti .....  6. Denique eadem
acta valent, etsi una, vel utraque pars sciat, judicem coram 
quo contrahunt matrimoniura, legitima potestate instructum 
non esse, modo communiter habeatur pro vero judice, aut vero 
parocho, ob eandem rationem .....  "
That this statement represents the accepted teaching 
is borne out by the fact that later authors refer to it as 
the classical exposition of the doctrine - de Angelis,^^ 
for instance, writing more than a century later, quotes these 
six points verbatim, and proposes them as a practical and 
safe guide in all questions pertaining to common error. 
Analysing the six applications given above, we find that 
each one envisages an official in a given community labouring 
under an incapacitating impediment which renders him incapable 
of validly holding, or of validly performing the functions 
attached to, the office he is thought to hold. The community 
knows that this official in question is exercising the function 
of bishop, pastor or judge as the case may be - but it is not 
aware of the fact that he labours under an impediment. The
members of the community do not pass a formal judgment to the
( W  cf. prael. Jur. Gan., Tom. IV, pars I, Tit. I, n.31.
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effect that they consider this particular person to be a 
real and legitimately constituted bishop, pastor or judge. 
They simply know he exercises the functions pertaining to 
one or other of these offices, and accept him as a real 
official without further question, because, being ignorant 
of the occult impediment, they have no reason to doubt his 
legitimacy. Strictly speaking, perhaps their attitude might 
be defined as that of "common ignorance" rather than "common 
error." Yet their attitude or state is not one of absolute 
ignorance in the sense of a merely negative absence of know­
ledge: there is a 'positive element involved in so far as
their acceptance of the official is based on a positive fact 
or fundament, which leaves no reason for doubting his legiti­
macy as an official, viz., the fact that they all know he has 
been appointed to the office, or know that he actually per­
forms the functions of the office. Whether we refer to 
their state as that of ignorance or error makes little 
difference. The point we wish to emphasise, and the point 
which is made abundantly clear by the extract quoted above, 
is that this state or attitude of the people is an actual 
state - they actually know that a particular person exercises 
a certain office, and are aware of no reason for doubting his 
title to do so legitimately: their error is an actualised
fact.*115*
(U5) NOTE: We have said that many authors could he quoted
to substantiate this contention. Following are a few - 
T. SANCHEZ, De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. X*II, nn. 5 & 6. 
K7T. qui’bua ut occureretur, utrumque jus decrevit omnia 
gesta per eum dum communis error durat valida esse, ac 
si verus judex esset ..... Oportet autem adesse communem 
errorem quo ille verus judex existimetur ;**
PIRHINa, Jus fran. Univ., II, I, nn. 83 & 8U. "Requiri- 
tur autem ad valorem sententiae et actorum per talem 
judicem, imprimis error publicus sive popull, videlicet 
ut ille defectus judicls alt occultus, adeoque ut vulgo 
H v e  communlier habeatur pro vero et legliimo judice 
REIFFENSTTJEL'e Jus Can. Univ. ,~II, I, nn7 197* 1$8." - 
11 Jus utrumque decrevit, stante eommuni errore, gesta 
per putativum judicem esse valida, ac si verus judex
existeret ......  Inter condiciones requisitas ad hoc,
ut actus judicis putativi valeant, ea est praecipua quod 
interveniat error communis: hoc est quod tails communl-
ter existimetur esse legitimus judex}" 
cf. also LEQA, De Jud. Eccles. T r n. w .
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A further point: Though we have seen the purpose
of the doctrine to be the prevention of evils and inconven­
iences arising from the invalidity of a succession of acts 
performed by a putative official, it must be remembered that 
the number of such acts exercises no influence in determining 
whether common error is present or not. Common error consist* 
in the attitude of a community in regarding a particular per­
son as a real and legitimate official: it is not gauged by
the number of people who actually approach this person in his 
official capacity, nor by the number of times: it may be
realised even without the performance of a single act by
the putative official concerned. Baldus de Ubaldis had
(46)pointed this out in his time. Lehmfcuhl too expressly
states it^4^  - "Errorem vero communem ut distinguas ab 
errore paucorum non id considerari debet, utrum multi an 
pauci eum adierint qui legitima potestate destitutus erat: 
sed utrum pauci multive defectum potestatis cognoverint, an 
potius eum potestate legitima praeditum esse putaverint."
This is an important point to keep in mind - for, if one 
were to estimate common error by the number of people who 
actually approach a putative judge, confessor or pastor in 
his official capacity, the way would be immediately open to 
erroneous notions and false conclusions. It may well be 
that the consideration of this false mode of estimating common 
error, played some part in leading the Jesuit theologian, 
Bucceroni, to evolve a new theory as to the notion of common 
error - a theory which he alone of all pre-Code authors 
advocated, and which is really a contradiction of the teaching 
of all other pre-Code authorities.
(46) cf. Above, Sec. II, Ch.I* Art. IV.
(47) Compend. Theol. Mor., n, 843.
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According to Bu c c e r o n i ^ t h e r e  are two categories 
of common error, viz., common error de facto and common error 
de jure. The former is that which we have heen considering 
all along - the case where the community, or at least the 
greater part of it, is actually deceived into thinking that 
a particular priest, for instance, ia a legitimately appointed 
and approved confessor, when in reality he is not. The 
latter - common error de jure - is had whenever conditions 
or circumstances are such that public error, or an error of 
the community, can, and - in the normal course of events - 
should follow as a result of them. Common error de jure 
therefore consists not in the actual1fact of deception of 
the community, but in the placing of a fact which cibuld 
deceive the community if, and when, the community adverts 
to that fact. For Bucceroni, it is sufficient if common 
error in this sense be realised in order that the Church 
supply defect of power, (^9)
The context in which this theory appears is as 
follows: A certain priest Titius, had heard the confessions
of a community of nuns, and those of pupils resident in the 
convent, without proper approbation or jurisdiction - an 
essential condition in the rescript granting him the requis­
ite faculties had not been realised. The question was asked 
whether these absolutions were valid. Bucceroni evidently 
assumes that there could be no question of common error da 
facto in the circumstances - because .the case deals only with 
a small group of people, viz., a community of nuns; never­
theless he declares all the absolutions to be valid because
(1*8) cf. Casus Conacientiae, II, Casus 129, n.6, Pp. 170-172.
(1*9) cf. Casus Conacientiae, II, Cas. 129, n.6, p. 1?2:
"Quare error communis intelligi non potest error de 
facto et in actu aeeundo; sed error communis oejure 
et in actu primo i.e. in tali rerum siaiu seu conditione, 
ut error publice seu communitatis sequi naturaliter 
possit et debeat: si res neape naturalem cursum suum
sequatur.M
of common error de_Jure. Common error de jure ie verified 
because of the presence of a circumstance (status rerum) 
which of its nature, could deweive many into believing him 
to be a legitimate confessor. This circumstance was the 
fact that he had obtained a rescript conferring the due 
faculties - the invalidity of the rescript due to the non- 
fulfilment of an essential condition being occult. The 
author, however, did not require such a forceful circum­
stance as an apparently valid rescript: he regarded it as
confessions publicly, for he says in another context - 
"Huiusmodi rerum status profecto habetur, semper ac confes- 
sarius publice exereeat munus confessarii, ita ut publics 
confessarius existimetur, et ideo multorum possit confessiones
public confessional, and commencing to hear confessions 
(independently it would seem, of how many or how few penitents 
may be present), is something (status rerum, conditio) which 
of its nature could deceive many into believing that he enjoys 
jurisdiction, constitutes, therefore, common error de jure, 
and so renders valid the confessions heard by him - even 
though his action may never actually become known to any save 
the few who were present at the time.
his theory is a merely negative one. He declares that the 
interpretation of common error as signifying common error 
de facto cannot operate properly in practice, because of the 
doubts that must always exist as to when exactly it is 
realised. For, taking the case of a priest who commences 
to hear confessions publicly but without jurisdiction, none
quit® sufficient commenced to hear
audire."^0 ' Thus the very fact of a priest entering a
The chief argument given by Bucceroni in favour of
(5o) Casus Conscientiae, II, Qasus 129» n.5, P. 169
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of his absolutions would be valid until after he had
absolved almost the whole community, thus giving rise to
the situation where the last few penitents (the minor part
of the community) would be validly absolved, and all the
others who had come first (the majority) would be invalidly
absolved. Furthermore the difficulty arises as to where
exactly the dividing line is to he drawn between those who
are validly and those who are invalidly absolved, thus
creating doubts e#en in the minds of those last absolved
(51)about the validity of the absolution received by them.
We do not intend to go into the merits of this 
argument here; we shall meet it again in greater detail in 
a later chapter. But there is one criticism which we should 
wish to make with regard to another argument which Bucceroni 
puts forward in favour of his theory. He at least insinuates 
that certain earlier writers had actually favoured his view - 
chief of these being d*Annibale.( it will be well to 
quote the passage from the work of D’Annibale to which he 
(Bucceroni) refers: ’’Krror communis est si eo loco, ubi
aliquis jurisdictionem exercet, v.g., ubi parochum agit; 
ea praeditus ease publice existimetur ....; seu facti error
versetur seu juris ; dummodo error juris sit probabi^s^,
The implication intended by Bucceroni, by inserting this 
extract in a context treating of common error de jure, is 
that D'Annibale used tbe words error facti and error juris 
to signify the same thing as he himself understood by his 
own terms, error communis de facto and error cumaanla de jure. 
But obviously there is a vast difference in the signification
(51) cf. Casus Conscientiae, II, C r s u s  129, n.6, Pp.171-172.
(52) cf. Casus Conscientiae, II, Cas. 129, n.5> P. 169.
(53) D ’Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., I, n.79, footnote 72. 
KOTS: The words underlined are given in italics
fey Bucceroni.
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of these terms. D'Annibale spoke of error of law and error 
of fact according as the error concerned the existence or 
extension of a law, or referred to the fulfilment of 
conditions required for the application of a law in a 
particular case. And, aa we saw earlier in thia chapter, 
he was merely repeating the generally accepted teaching of 
authors when he said that common error could ariaa as a 
result either of error of fact or error of law, provided the 
error of law was probable. Obviously this has no connection 
with the signification attached by Bucceroni to the terme 
common error de facto and common error de Jure: these
terms do not signify common error arising aa a result of 
error of fact and error of law; they signify, rather, common 
error that is already actualised and common error that is 
to-be-actualised.
It is clear then, that Bucceroni’s appeal to the 
authority of D ’Annibale is absolutely unfounded, and based 
on a misinterpretation of terras. It is clear that neither 
can any other author be quoted by him as advocating his 
opinion. Nor doeB any other pre-Code author writing after 
Bucceroni*a time accept or endorse this new theory. There­
fore we can conclude that the unanimous opinion - if we 
except one lone author - in pre-Code doctrine, demanded that 
the error should be common error de facto, viz., a real 
error into which at least the greater part of the community 
has actually been led. This conclusion shall have a very 
practical hearing on our ultimate definition of the notion 
of common error - which we shall see in the following 
chapter.
SECTION IV.
 .
THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON ERROR 
POST-CODE JURISPRUDENCE.
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THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON ERROR IN POST-CODE 
JURISPRUDENCE.
When the Codex Juris Canonici came into force on 
May 19th 1918, the teaching that the Church supplies juris­
diction in common error attained, for the first time, the 
status of a written ecclesiastical law. True, the doctrine 
had been long recognized, hut aa we have seen, it originated 
not from a written ecclesiastical norm, but from the universal 
acceptance by canonists and theologians - with the approval 
of the Church - of a principle of Roman Law (Dig.I, 1U» 3)* 
Until the promulgation of the Code the doctrine enjoyed the 
status of jus oonsuetudinarium: after the promulgation of
the Code it became a lex acripta. Prom the point of view of 
force or authority there is, of course, no difference between 
these two forms of Jua. The lex scripts, however, has an 
advantage over the former in this that it is more defined: 
the express words of the legislator are had by which his will 
may be ascertained: jus conauetudinarium is of its nature
somewhat more vague, and hence more subject to divergencies 
in its interpretation with consequent controversies.
In canon 209 of the Code the statement of the doctrine 
is contained in a few words - MIn errore communi aut in dubio 
positivo et probabili sive juris sive facti, jurlsdictionem 
supplet Ecclesia pro foro turn externo turn interno." By the 
omission of all reference to the necessity of a coloured 
title, it is clear that the Supreme ecclesiastical legislator 
no longer demands the presence of such a title, in order 
that the acts of a putative official may enjoy the benefit of 
the supplying principles. obviously the legislator knew of 
the existence of the controversy; hiB silence with regard 
to the question, then, can only he interpreted as signifying
SBCTION IV.
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his wish that such a title is no longer essential. Post*4 
Code commentators are unanimously agreed on t h i a . ^  With 
the final settlement of this, the moat controverted question 
with regard to the whole subject in pre-Code jurisprudence, 
one might well expect to find general agreement on the prin­
ciples and their application henceforward. But another 
controversy arose in its place. This time the point at 
issue was to determine when precisely common error is 
realized - or what precisely is the notion of common error.
In the preceding chapter we found this question had met with 
all but unanimous agreement in pre-Code teaching: post-Code
teaching produced varied opinions. In the opening chapter 
of this section we shall examine these various views on the 
matter, criticize them from a juridical viewpoint and propose 
what we consider to he, according to the mind of the legis­
lator, the true notion of common error. In the second 
chapter we shall discuss the various applications of the 
principles.
 0O0-—
(l) e.g. cf. Cappello, De Mat. N. 663» "Parochus putativus, 
scil. ille quern errore communi, etiam sine titulo 
colorato, fidelea pro parooho legitimo habent, valide 
assistit; nam ecclesia supplet...... Olim controversia
erat, num sufficeret error communis sine titulo colorato... 
Hodie certum est, titulum coloratum non requiri" ......
CORONATA, Inst. Jur. Can. I, n.292. Ante Codicem plures 
auctores ad hoc ut Ecclesia suppleret jurisdictlonem 
requirehant, praeter errorem communem, etiam titulum 
coloratum: Codex communiorem sententiara titulum non
requirentem canonizavit.
THE NOTION OF COMMON ERROR.
Ae we have just outlined above, we shall treat this 
question under three headings. The opening article shall he 
devoted to a statement of the theories concerning the notion 
of common error: in the second we shall give a criticism 
of one of these theories, viz., common error de jure: and 
in the final article we shall propose that particular 
definition of common error de facto which we consider most 
justified in view of the principles for interpretation as 
laid down in the Code itself.
ARTICLE I. VARIOUS NOTIONS OF COMMON ERROR.
Speaking generally it may he said there are two maih 
schools of thought with regard to the notion of common error: 
one holding that the error must he de facto common; the 
other, following the lead of Bucceroni, contending that 
error which is de jure common suffices. But the exponents 
of the common error de facto theory do not agree amongst 
themselves in determining when precisely the error may he 
regarded as common. One group follows the traditional 
teaching which gave the word "common" a literal or proper 
interpretation signifying moral unanimity: another section
adopts a more modified view and advocates an interpretation 
which gives the terra an Himproper" signification. Hence 
for convenience we may treat the views under the following 
heads:- (a) Common Error de fadt cum propria significatione:
(b) Common Error de facto cum impropria significatione:
(c) Common error de jure.
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A. Common Error de faotn cum propria algnlficatione.
During the poat-Code period there is a noticeable 
tendency on the part of many canonists and theologians to 
give as wide and as comprehensive a meaning as possible to 
the term common error. Their attitude seems to have been 
to stretch its meaning to the utmost limit. Relatively few, 
therefore, can be quoted as upholding the traditional doctrine 
in demanding that all or most of the community should he in 
error. Among these we may mention prummer who writes:
"Error dieitur communis qui inficit omnea fere incolas 
aliciuis loci,"^ Chelodl/2  ^ too, strongly favours this 
interpretation. Qougnard,^ Ojetti,^ Ferrerea^ and 
C oechi^ also share this view.
B. Common Error de facto cum impropria significatlone.
Writing in the Jus Pontiflclum (Vol. XVI, 1936, p.159) 
F. Claeys-Bouuaert purports to give the considerations or 
reasons which led so many writers before him to the conclusion 
that the term common error must be taken in a less restricted 
and improper sense. These authors, he says, having adverted 
to the fact that the purpose of this law is to provide for 
the general or common good, have interpreted common error
Ias being correlative with common good. But the common good 
is sometimes regarded as the good of many as opposed to the 
good of one or two or relatively few private persons. Hence
(1) Manuale Theol. Mor., Ill, n.Ul3*
(2) cf. Jus Can. de Personis, n.130. "Error dieitur communis
saltern juxta saniorem doetrinam, si eo loco, ubi quis
jurlsdictionem exercet, publice ea praeditus ease exlstime 
tur morallter ah omnibus, licet unus vel alter cognoscat 
re vera deficere."
(3) cf. Trac. de Poen. N. 28.
(U) cf. Comm. In Cod. J.C. Lib* II, P.218.
(5) cf. Compend. Theol. Mor., II, n.651.
(6) cf. Comm, in Cod. J. C. , Lib. II, Pars, I, n. 132.
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they understood common error in the sense of "error of many." 
By imputing such a process of reasoning to them we feel that 
Claeys-Bouuaert is giving the authors in question more credit 
than is due to them. For in reality the majority are content
to state their views without making any attempt to suhstanti-
(7)ate them. Thus Arregui simply states that common error
is "error omnium vel coraplurium alicuius loci fidelium:"
he does not give any reason as to why error complurium should
suffice. Neither do Noldin-Schmitt put forward any proof
for the statement that common error is verified if a large
or notable part of the faithful in a given place thinks that
(o)a particular priest enjoys true jurisdiction. Even
Vermeerach fails to provide a basis for his assertion that
(9)common error 1b error multorum. ' The same is true of
( 10)Merkelbach who follows the interpretation just mentioned.
The only author who made any attempt to justify this 
wide interpretation of the term in its improper signification, 
seems to have been E. Jombart S.J. The reasons advanced by 
him in support of the theory that common error means "error 
of many" are briefly: (1) If moral unanimity or error of
the majority were required, it would he on very rare occasions 
only that the Church would be called upon to supply juris­
diction - which is contrary to the intention of the legis­
lator: (2) Granted that moral unanimity or the error of the
majority is required, how can this unanimity or majority be 
calculated or computed?^11  ^ Arguing, therefore, from the
(7) Summarium Theol. Mor., n.6o2.
(8) cf. Theol. Mor. Ill, n.3U7.
(9) cf. Theol. M0r. Ill, n.U59.
(10) cf. Summa Theol. Mor., Ill, n. 586.
(11) cf. Nouv. Sev. Theol. L. (1923), L*Erreur Commune, P.172.
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relative uselessness of the law, if the term common error 
were to he interpreted strictly, and from the difficulty 
encountered in calculating when precisely there is common 
error present according to the norms of the strict inter­
pretation, Jombart reasons that common error must he taken 
to mean "error of many."
He then asks the question: How many people would be
necessary and sufficient to constitute "multi" in this con­
text? He insists that this is a case for moral estimation 
rather than mathematical calculation; for, he says, just as
it ia impossible to give an exact mathematical answer to
those questions of the ancient Greek Sophists - how many 
grains of corn are required to make a heap?, and how many
hairs must a person have so as not to be regarded as bald? -
so it is likewise impossible to give a precise mathematical 
answer to the question under consideration here. While 
maintaining that the estimation must be a moral one, Jombart 
emphasized the fact that common error is something relative: 
in order to have common error there must be a certain ratio 
or proportion between the number in error and the number in 
the whole community. Thus a considerably greater number
would be required to be in error in a large city parish, than
(12)in a village of two hundred inhabitants.
Vermeersch, as we have already seen, also holds that 
common error means error multorum. But he goes further than 
Jombart in this that, while the latter restricted the notion 
of common error to a certain ratio between the number in error
(12) cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol. L. (1923) L ’erreur Commune, P.172 - 
"La notion d'erreur commune requiert une ceriaine pro­
portionality, un nombre plus considerable dans une 
paroiase de Paris que dans un village de deux centB 
habitants. Hous admettons sans peine avec l’Epitome 
que l'erreur de cent personnes habitant in college 
suffirait. Par contre, l’erreur de cent personnes, 
disseminyes a Montematre dans la foule des grands jours, 
ne semble pas meriter le nom d'erreur commune."
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and the number in the community in each particular case,
Verjneerach propoaea 200 people as an absolute figure. In
other worda, however big a community might be, if 200 members
of that community were in error, then error multorum was
( 13)present - and the notion of common error verified. Tak­
ing multi in the relative sense, as Vermeersch permits - in 
relation or proportion, that is, to the number of people com­
posing the community - the term could be verified by a figure 
much smaller than 200. Indeed the only limit placed by him 
is that the community in question must be composed of at 
least ten persons - to conform to the dictum of Reiffenatuel 
(Lib. V, Tit, I, n. 21+9) that ten persons constitute a populus. 
Hence he considers it sufficient for common error if many
(1U)members of a convent composed of ten nuns be in error.
It may be noted that Jombart, too, was of the opinion that 
a convent of nuns is a community capable of effedting common 
er*or.<15>
Such then are the various notions of common error
as expressed by those authors who require error de facto.
But before passing on to treat of the theory of common error
de jure, it may be well to have a clear idea as to what
exactly authors had in mind when they spoke of common error 
de facto. ft must be emphasized that though these authors 
disagreed among themselves as to what number of people would 
actually constitute an error as common, they were in full
(13) cf. Theol. Mor. Ill, N. i+59. "Error communis est error 
multorum sive absolute multi sint, puta 200, sive sint 
multi relative ad numerum £idellum qui paroeciam vel 
communitatem componant."
(li+) cf. Theol. Mor. Ill, n.i+59. cf. Also WOUTERS, Manuale 
Theol. Mor., I, n.103*
(15) cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol. L. (l923) L*Srreur Commune P.177. 
Footnote I. Jill ne nous semble pas tellement Evident 
que l'erreur des vingt moniales d’un Carmel (milieu trds 
fermd, tr6s isold, complltement sdpard et independent 
de la paroisse ne puisse etre appelde erreur commune, 
si l'on admet la relativltd de cette notion. Salvo 
meliori judicio."
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agreement with regard to the question of the nature of 
common error de facto* For all of them it might he 
described aa an ’’attitude" of a community, or the people of 
a certain place, in thinking or believing an official to 
have true jurisdiction or power, when in reality he has not. 
Moat authors aeem to find it difficult to define this "atti­
tude” precisely: J©mbart gives the beet and most complete
treatment of the point. Briefly his thesis is thia.*1^
Common error is had whenever a cause from which the error 
springs, has actually come to the knowledge of the public.
It is sufficient, therefore, if a fundament has been pieced - 
a fundament which is de facto public in the sense that it is 
actually known to the community - a fundament which of its 
nature deceives that community into thinking that a particular 
confessor, for instance, enjoys true jurisdiction. The 
classical example given by the author (and much quoted by 
later writers) will illustrate the meaning more clearly:
The pastor announces at Sunday Masses that a strange priest 
will hear confessions in the parish church on Friday of the 
coming week. On the day stated a strange priest arrives in 
the Church and proceeds to hear confessions. Actually the 
pastor has forgotten to obtain the requisite faculties for 
the strange priest. What of the case? According to Jombart, 
the fact that the pastor had announced the coming of a strange 
priest to hear confessions was a fundament actually and gener­
ally known, a fundament which was sufficient to lead the 
people to believe that the priest, who was due to come for 
confessions on the Friday following, would have the requisite 
faculties for hearing those confessions. This fundament thus 
generally known constituted common error, so that even if 
only one or two, or a few people approached the strange priest
(16) cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol. L. (1923) L’Erreur Commune, P.173.
for confession on Friday, the ahaolutione conferred on them 
would he valid hy reason of common error. In order to have 
common error, he argues, it is not necessary that many people 
he actually fully conscious of the error, in the sense that 
they should have formed an explicit judgment such as - "I am 
convinced that this priest, whom I see here, has the requisite 
faculties for hearing confessions." It suffices if they 
helieve in a general and indeterminate way, that on ^riday 
next a strange priest endowed with the required jurisdiction 
will come to their Church to hear confessions. It is true 
that in this latter state or attitude the error is in the 
minds of the people only in a hidden and confused manner; 
hut it is ready to assert itself in a formal proposition at 
the first opportunity presented. Even before it has been 
clearly formulated it is nonetheless a real error, at least 
virtually.(17)
Thus, for instance, if any member of the congregation, 
who had heard the pastor’s announcement, should be asked on 
Friday whether this strange priest had the requisite faculties 
for hearing confessions, he would undoubtedly answer in the 
affirmative. If that same member were never asked for his 
opinion as to the legitimacy of this particular confessor, 
his opinion or attitude though remaining unexpressed, would 
nevertheless remain the same. The fact that there ia an 
explicit formulation of it, does not essentially change his 
attitude. perhaps the clearest manner of expressing the 
attitude is to call it an implicit rather than a virtual error. 
Jombart does, in fact, refer to it as such; for, in summing 
up his teaching on the question, he says that it is solidly 
probable that if, as a result of a public fundament being
(17) cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol. L. (1923) L’Hrreur Commune, P.173
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placed, an error exists in the minds of many in an implicit 
and rather indeterminate way, the Church immediately supplies 
jurisdiction.
Vermeerach conveys the same idea in fewer words.
For him, also, common error is realized if the fundament of 
the error he public or actually known to many: it is suffic­
ient if the elements of an erroneous judgment, with regard 
to the jurisdiction of a certain priest, exist in the minds 
of m a n y . T h i s  is really equivalent to the implicit 
error spoken of by Jombart. Noldin-Schmitt follow the same 
line of thought - "Cum error significat aliquod judicium 
mentis, requiritur tamquam fundamentum erroris communis
qliduod factum pluribus notum, ex quo fidelea sine culpa,
/>v
saltern gravi, erro^ee judicent, hunc aacerdotem habere 
jurlsdictionem; utique non opus est Judiclo formal!. Aliud 
autem est mera nescientia sine fundamento. 20/i By assert­
ing that a formal judgment is not necessary, the author seems 
to regard an implicit judgment or error as being sufficient. 
And with the last phrase Noldin-Schmitt bring out very 
forcibly the fact that thia error of the people though 
implicit, is nonetheless very positive. The existence of 
the fundament (which ex hypotheai is publicly known) affords 
a legitimate baais and a positive reason for the attitude of 
the community in regarding a certain prielst aa a properly 
constituted confessor. Hence though error is a false judg­
ment arising out of ignorance, and though common error may, 
in one sense, be said to be common Ignorance (i.e. ignorance
(18) cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol. L. (1923) L'Srreur Commune, P.173* 
- II est done aerieusdment probable, que si par suite 
du fondement public de l’erreur commune, I'erreur regne 
dans lea esprits d'une manidre implicite et assez 
indeterminde, l'Eglise supple le jurisdiction sans 
attendre que beaucoup se trompent d'une facon explicite 
et parfaitement prdcise."
(19) cf. Theol. Mor. Ill, n.^59 - "Arbitramur satis ease 
fundamentum erroris sit publicum seu notum multia i.e. 
ut elements erronei judicii de talis sacerdotis juris- 
dictione sint in multorum mente."
(20) Theol. M0r. Ill, n.3U7.
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of an occult impediment or incapacity in the confessor) it
must be emphasized that common error does not arise entirely
from ignorance, as signifying a mere negative state or
complete lack of knowledge. There must always he present
that fundament - that public fact which gives a positive
reason for believing that the priest in question already
(21)has jurisdiction.
All this is in keeping with the traditional notion 
of the nature of common error. The only difference that 
may be noted is that in pre-Code jurisprudence the public 
fundament, according to many authorities, had to be a titulus 
coloratuBi for others a titulus exiatimatus sufficed. In 
effect the fundament which post-Code authors speak of is 
nothing other than a titulus existlmatus. Needless to 
remark, if there is actually a titulus coloratus present, 
then of course the fundament or reason for believing the 
confessor, pastor, etc. to be real, is all the stronger.
To sum up therefore; In order to have common error 
de facto two conditions must be fulfilled:-
1. There must be a fundament placed - a fact which 
of its nature leads the community (the majority, nearly all 
or rony etc. according to the various views already seen with 
regard to the number required) to believe, through no cul­
pability on its part,-that a particular priest, pastor, etc. 
has true jurisdiction.
2. This fundament must be public - i.e. this fact 
must be actually known to the community (the majority ... etc) 
This second condition is all-important, as we shall see 
presently ih treating of common error de jure. When these
(21) cf. Also 0 ’NEILL: I.E.R. XXII, (1923) The Meaning of
Common Error, p. 299-300. ".... There must blTeome
substantial basis for the misapprehension, aome external 
fact that gives ground for it."
two conditions are fulfilled then common error de facto is
( 2 2 )ia present.' It is immaterial whether authors refer to
it as "implicit” or "virtual” errors they are agreed on
th? notion, the name ia of minor importance.
0. Common Error De Jure.
The theory of common error de jure represents the 
utmost limit to which the interpretation of Cn. 209 could 
be pushed. Originating with the Jesuit Theologian, Buccer- 
oni, towards the end of the 19th century, this theory may be 
said to have been resurrected by another Jesuit author - 
P.M. Cappello - not long aflter the publication of the Codex 
Juris Canonici. Since its re-introduction by Cappello,
quite a large number of authors - both canonists and theolog-
(2k)ians - have adopted it. In view of what we have just
seen of the notion of common error de facto, it will be 
easy to understand the notion as visualized by those who 
propose common error de jure.
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( 2 2 )
(23)
(2U)
cf. S.R. Rotae Decisiones seu S©ntentiae XIX (1927),
P. 1+56. "Enimvero propter errorem communem putativus 
est capellanus railitaris, si talia adsint adjuncta 
publics ut milites secundum communiter contafngentia / ^ 
inducantur in errorem quo eum habeant ut prfeeditum 1 
titulo capellani militaris, dum revera non est quia v.g. 
e suo capellani officio excidit."
e.g. cf. CLAEYS-BOUUAERT, Jus Pont. XVI, (1936), De 
Conceptu Erroris Communis in Cn. 209, P. 163 - Re?erring 
tF“TFe~Theory of Vermeersch (Theol. Mor. Ill, n.i+59) he 
writes: "Quod vocat cl. Auctor fundamentum erroris
publicum in eo consistere videtur, quod multi perspectum 
habeant factum e cuius notitia concludendum ipsis est, 
facili et immediate deductione, adesse jurisdictionem.
De cuius praesentia judicium forsan non est explicitum, 
sed saltern implicitum, utpote immediate in alia notione 
con ten turn.,r
e.g. cf. VERMEERS CH-rOREUSEN, Spit. Jur. Can. I, n.322. 
ROTE: This theory as found in the Epitome must be
attributed to Creusen: a footnote to the text actually
admits that Vermeersch teaches otherwise, ( m  his Theol. 
Mor. Ill, n.1+59). Cf. also WERNZ-VTDAL, Jus Canonicum, 
II, n. 331: ASRTNYS-DAMEN, Theol. Mor. II, n.359;
WOUTERS, Man. Theol. Mor., I, n. 103; DAVIS, Mor. <& 
Past. Theol. Ill, n. 21+9; BESTS, Introductio in Cod. 
p. 221: SABETTT-BARRETT, Comp. Theol. Mor., n. 770,Q.12. CORORATA, Inst. Jur. Can., I, n. 292.
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Bucceroni, as we have seen earlier, had defined
common error as a "state or condition of things” from which
public error, or error of the community could, and should,
(25)naturally, follow. Cappello repeats this definition,
at least in effect, though in slightly different terms. He
says that not only is it probable, btit practically certain,
that in order to have common error it is sufficient if a
fundament of error is placed - a fundament, which in view of
the circumstances, will necessarily lead into error.
Coronata, who uses the term ’’cause” instead of ’’fundament,*’
gives what is probably the best and most complete statement
of the theory. He writes "....  sed sufficit, uti videtur,
ut causa posita sit ex qua multi et fereomnes in errorem
inducantur, vel saltern ex comrauniter contingentihus induci
poseint, licet forte de facto pauci proRaus vel etiam unica
(27}persona erraverit et ilia jurisdictione usa sit.
Wernz-Vidal use the term "public fact,” but obviously with
the same signification as the terms ’’cause” and "fundament
"Ergo potius dicendum est tunc haberi errorem communem in
sensu canonis cum datur factum publicum quod per se natum
est inducere in errorem, non unum vel alterum, sed quoslibet
promiscue ita ut potius per accidens sit, quod unus vel alter
(28)
ob peculiares ipsius circumstantias in errorem non inducatur."
i
(25) Casus Conscientiae, Casus 129, n.6, P. 172.
(26) of. De Sacramentia II, (De Poen), n.3hl - "Et error 
potest dici communis .... quatenus errant virtute, licet 
non actu, quatenus nempe ex qliquo facto externo et 
publico, quod nature sua induoit in^errorem fideles 
necessario, attentis circumstantiis, in errorem inducuntur
(27) Inst. Jur. Can., I, n. 292.
(28) Jus Can., II, n.38l. NOTE. While agreeing with Claeys- 
Bouuaert (Jus Pont. XVI, '(1936), p. 16L) in saying that 
this extract taken in itself could be interpreted as a 
statement of the theory of common error de facto (e.g. if 
the author had in mind a public fact already known to the 
community), there are very strong indications from the 
context that it is common error de jure the author 
intends to uphold: for in the immediately preceding 
sentence he is criticizing the impracticability of the 
common error de facto interpretation.
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Aeeording to this theory, then, common error is had 
whenever any fundament, cause or public fact ia placed, which 
of its nature can and - in ordinary circumstances - should 
lead many into error. Common error is present immediately 
this fundament cause or fact has been placed, even though it* 
existence may be known only to one or a few persona, and even 
though its existence may never actually become known to any­
one save that one or those few persons. For this reason 
Creusen refers to common error de jure as Interpretative 
common error, i.e. error which would be common if the funda­
ment should become generally k n o w n . A s  an example of 
a fundament of its nature sufficient to deceive many o& all, 
C a p p e l l o ^ O )  gives the case of a priest who enters a con­
fessional in a public ehurch. The very fact that it is a 
public Church to which all have free access: the fact that 
the priest is in the confessional and prepared to hear con­
fessions: and the fact that the rector of the church, whose
duty it is to prevent abtises, does not hinder this priest 
from hearing confessions: all these circumstances necessarily
lead one to the conclusion that this priest must be a real 
confessor. Therefore, in these circumstances, common error 
is already verified and renders valid all the confessions 
heard by that priest, whether they be few or many.
(29) cf. Epit. Jur. Can. I, n. 322. NOTE I. F. CLAEYS-
BOUUAERT (Jua. Pont. XVI, (1936TT~De~"Conceptu Erroris 
Communis in Can. 209, P. 159) and A fOSO (Jus Pont. XVIII 
, P. 167) also refer to common error de jure as 
interpretative common error.
NOTE II." Bouuaert-Simenon refer to it as Virtual 
common error - cf. Manuale Jur. Can. I, n.363. "Sufficit
probabiliter error communis virtualiter seu de jure tan­
tum, quamvis non de facto: i.e. sufficit ut illi tantum
de facto versentur in errore, qui per circumstantias 
sunt in occasions judicandi de jurisdictions vel ipsa 
fruendi, dum alii forsan majore numero, ne quidem d£> 
juriadictione cogitant, eed per se caderont in errorcm 
si in occasione essent judicium ferendi."
(30) cf. De Sacramentis II, (De Poen. ) n.3<U2.
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It will be noticed that there is a marked resemblance, 
at least in terminology, between the two theories as outlined 
here. The exponents of both theories speak of a public funda­
ment cause or fact. The essential difference between them 
lies in the fact that they do not both give the same meaning 
to the term public For the common error de facto theory a 
public fundament signifies one already actually known to the 
community (to the majority, many etc.): for the common error
de jure theory it signifies one which is placed in such cir­
cumstances that it can become known to all or many. At first 
glance this may appear to he a very slight difference. On 
closer examination, however, the variance between the two 
becomes more noticeable. It will become more apparent still, 
when we come to Examine the vastly divergent effects consequent 
on the practical application of the respective theories.
By way of justification of this interpretation which 
reduces the notion of common error to that of mere inter­
pretative error, Cappello proposes five main arguments. Many 
subsequent authors adopted Cappello’a opinion; they were 
usually content, too, to accept it on the strength of the 
arguments put forward by him. Invariably these authors 
repeat one or other of his five reasons - or perhaps a 
variation or combination of them. Following are the 
arguments
(1) The very fact that the fundament is external and 
public renders the error itself external and public or common. 
To quote verbatim - "Eo ipso quod fundarnentum erroris seu 
factum inducens natura sua fideles in errorem, est externum 
et publicum, etiam error dici potest, et auidem rationabiliter 
externus et publicus seu communis.”
(31) cf. De Sacramentie II, (De Poen.) n.3Ul.
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(2) Admitting that the opinion requiring common 
error de facto is correct, then an investigatiob must always 
he; made with regard to the number of those who have actually 
erred: ia other words all the parishioners of a certain
pariah, or the inhabitants of a given place must be asked 
whether they consider Titius a real confessor: and thia
procedure would not only be difficult and disturbing but 
practically impossible.
(3) Supposing (though not conceding) that in a 
particular case this interrogation (no. 2) could he made, it 
would still prove nothing in favour of the opinion holding 
for the necessity of common error de facto - (a) because a
law must cater for what universally and commonly happens, 
not for extraordinary and particular cases; (b) because 
certitude about the number of those in error could never he 
had.
(L) Besides, even before commencing this interroga­
tion, it would be necessary to decide just precisely how many 
people would be required to be in error, in order to con­
stitute the error common in each particular case, according 
to the greater or smaller number of inhabitants in the dis­
trict, village, city, etc: it would have to be decided
whether the error of 30, 50, or 100 would suffice. But to 
attempt this would be ridiculous, and certainly could not be 
in keeping with the intention of a wise legislator.
(5) In oanon 209 the Code purposely decided the 
controversies that existed in pre-Code teaching. Hence it 
can be rightly supposed that the legislator wished to define 
the position clearly and finally, in such a way that there 
would be no further room for doubts and anxieties. But if 
the common error„de facto theory is admitted the way is
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necessarily opened to many doubts and anxieties: all of
which is really contrary to the purpose of the law and the
mind of the legislator.
Such are the arguments proposed by Cappello to prove 
this theory of common error de jure. It will be noticed 
that of the five, the first and last are the only positive 
arguments listed - the only ones with a semblance of a 
juridical basis. The others are merely negative, and 
could be more fittingly termed objections to the theory 
of common error de facto. It will be recalled that the same 
remark applied to the arguments of Bucceroni: his justi­
fication for the new interpretation was the unproven asser­
tion that the theory of common error de facto could not work
out smoothly in practice. The objections of Cappello are
(32)merely an elaboration of this idea. In the following
article, we shall endeavour to interpret the canon of the 
Code in question (Cn. 209) in the light of the principles 
laid down by the Code for the proper interpretation of its 
own laws. In doing so we hope to show that the theory of 
common error de jure has no legal foundation. And in doing 
so we also hope to answer the objections of Bucceroni, Cappello 
and the others, by showing that the application of the doctrim 
is both practical and simple when common error is interpreted 
as signifying common error de facto.
(32) NOTE, ye have said above that subsequent authors gener­
ally repeat one or other of Cappello's arguments - usual­
ly an objection against the theory of common error de 
facto. Here are a few examples of such: GOYENECHE,
iluris Can. Summa Princ. Lib. II, p. 219 Footnote 19, - 
Dieitur omnes moraliter sumpti, quod difficile captu est. 
Puto aufficere ut error dieatur communis ut tails causa 
ponatur de se aufficiens ad coramuniter errorem inducendum 
WOUTERS, Man. Theol. Mor., I, n.103. '••• item probabil­
iter, satis est fundamentum erroris communis positum esse 
Ut ai nomen aacerdotis jurisdictions carentia confeasion- 
all affi*um est. Ratio petitur ex eo quod secus aaepe 
difficile determingretur, utrum necne error communis 
adesset."' BESTE, Introd. in Cod.. P . 2 2 1 . "  wE x adverRo. 
admissa contraria opinione, semper foret inquirendum in 
singulis casibus, quot errantes mathematice requirerentur 
spectato numero fidelium in loco, ad constituendum error­
em de facto coraunem, et num pumerus reipsa sufficiens 
fuisset errore deceptus, ut quis beneficio tails erroris 
frueretur."
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ARTICLE II. CRITICISM OF THE COMMON ERROR DE
JURE INTERPRETATION.
The sole and primary object of interpretation of law 
ia to determine what the intention of the legislator was when 
he framed the law - to discover the mind of the legislator. 
Interpretation, therefore, does not consist in attributing to 
a certain combination of words a meaning which could have been 
intended by the legislator, nor a meaning which would have 
been intended if the legislator had adverted to certain cir­
cumstances overlooked by him, nor even a meaning that should 
have been intended by him if he were to make the best possible 
law. Interpretation is the procedure by which is determined 
the meaning actually intended by the legislator at the moment 
he framed the law. The most fundamental and most obvious 
means of arriving at a knowledge of this intention of the 
legislator, is by an examination of the words used by him in 
expressing his intention - by an examination of the words in 
their text and context. To ensure that this means be pro­
perly employed, the Supreme ecclesiastical legislator lays 
down that in the interpretation of the laws of the Code, the
words must be understood according to their proper significa-
♦4 (33)tion.
The proper signification (propria signlficatio) may 
be verified in any of three w a y s . (3*+) it may be the natural 
signification of the word, which arises from the original and 
primeval imposition of names on different things. It may be 
the usual signification, which is the natural signification 
either confirmed or changed by common usage. The usual
(33) of. Canon 18 - "Leges ecclesiasticae intelligendae aunt 
secundum propriam verborum signifcatlonem in textu et 
oontextu consideratam;
(3U) cf. A. VAN HOVE, De Legibus Eccles. n.2f>2.
-170-
signification becomes juridical if it is determined by the 
use of jurists or legal experts, or if it ia defined by law 
itself. Of these three, the usual signification may be 
regarded as being most fully and completely the proper signi­
fication: but the natural and juridical signification also
come within the meaning of the term, and so must he accepted 
if such exist in a particular case.
Interpreting canon 209 (In errore communi ........
jurisdictionem supplet Ecclesia ,...) in the light of this 
principle, giving the words their proper signification, we 
may note the following points:-
(1) Error: The proper signification of the word
"error" or "to be in error" is that a false judgment already
actually exists (i.e. according to both the usual and the 
juridical signification). It is not sufficient that the 
error should exist, as it were, in a fundament not yet known 
to the mind: for, according to all, the word "error" is
applied not to one who is about to err, nor to one who will 
err, or who would or should err, but only to one who here and 
now errs. This is the proper signification of the term, 
and the signification to be assumed here unless the legislator 
expressly states that the term is to be given an improper 
or special signification. But neither from canon 209» nor 
from any other canon, does it appear that the term should be 
given such an improper signification. Moreover in all other 
cases or matters in which the term "error" appears, no author 
(not even those who advocate the common error de jure theory) 
suggests that it should be taken to mean a future or inter­
pretative error.
(2) Common Error: The proper signification of the 
term "Common" may be said to be general or usual. Whatever 
dispute there may be about the exact number required to be in
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error, in order that error may be called common, there can 
be no doubt that this error should exist in fact - and not 
merely in a fundament that can and may become known to this 
required number. For an error which does not yet de facto 
exist, or at least which exists only in the minds of those 
few who are aware of the existence of its fundament, cannot 
he said to be common, since in reality it affects nobody, 
or at most only those few who, ex hypothesi, know of the
(35)existence of the fundament. As Vermeersch rightly remarks: 
"Verum nostra sententia, non sufficit ut pauci sic errent 
propter causam quae alios etiam deciperet. Tunc enlm 
nullus error communis adeat; sed adesset si." To give the 
words "common error" an interpretative signification such 
as Vermeerach here visualizes, would obviously be giving 
the words an improper signification. But this improper 
signification cannot be accepted, unless the legislator 
gives an express indication to this effect. And again 
there ia no indication given in this canon, or elsewhere, 
that such is the intention of the legislator.
(3) But even granting, for the sake of argument, 
that the meaning of the words is not apparent, that there 
exists a real doubt as to whether the term common error ia 
to be interpreted as meaning common error de facto, or is to
(35) Theol. Mor., Ill, n.659.
(36) These two arguments are very concisely summarized by 
V. DALPIAZ - Apoll. VII, (1936), De Conceptu Erroris 
Communis juxta Can. 209, P.690 "Hoc taniummodo negavimus 
et iterum negamus, errorem nempe communem etiam tunc 
baberi si ponatur publice factum, quod multos in errorem 
inducere possit, etiamsi paucos tantum, imo neminem in 
errorem inducat. Et quaesivimus: Si nemo erret, ubinam 
error? Et si pauci tantum errent, ubinam error commun­
is? Num admittendum est Codicem incosiderate seu incon- 
sulte usum fuisse verbo error Communis? Nonne ab ipso 
Codice tamquam norma interpretationia principium statuit- 
ur: 'Leges ecclesiasticae inteliigendae aunt aecundum 
propriam verborum signifcationem in textu et contextu consider a tarn.'
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be understood as signifying common error de jure, there can 
still be no juridical case made for the latter theory.
Canon 6, n.2, states: "Canones qui jus vetus ex integro
referunt, ex veteris juris auctoritate, atque ideo ex receptis 
qpud prohatos auctores interpretationibus, sunt aestimandi;"
It is true that the doctrine off the supplying of jurisdiction 
did not exist in the form of a written ecclesiastical law 
before the promulgation of the Code: nevertheless this
doctrine comes within the scope of Canon 6, n.2, for this 
canon uses the term jus which includes law, both written and 
unwritten. But Canon 209 is a mere repetition of the jus 
vetus in so far as it repeats the doctrine as commonly taught 
and applied in pre-Code jurisprudence. This canon, therefore, 
must be interpreted according to pre-Code teaching, as found 
in the writings of approved pre-Code authors. But we have 
already seen that all pre-Code authors - with the exception 
of Bucceroni - understood common error as meaning, not inter­
pretative or de jure error, hut real, genuine, actual error. 
The term must, therefore, be given the same signification in 
post-Code teaching.
(U) We have said that the purpose of interpretation 
is to discover the mind of the legislator, in so far as his 
mind or intention is expressed in his words. The legislator, 
on his part, is presumed to have used the words best calcul­
ated to express his mind or intention. This is especially 
true of the laws of the Code, for we are assured by Cardinal 
Gasparri that there is nothing in the Code which has not been 
discussed and debated at least four or five times, perhaps 
even eleven or twelve times. The term common error, as
we have seen, had an accepted and determined meaning in pre- 
Code teaching - it had the traditional meaning corresponding
(37) cf. Preface to the New Code, P. XLI.
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to what we now call common error de facto. When drawing up 
the Code of Canon Law, the legislator knew this term, and 
was aware of its traditional and accepted meaning. Is it 
possible that, while the legislator wished to change from 
the traditional notioh of common error to that of common error 
de jure, he still adhered to, and used, a term which had an 
accepted meaning that was opposed to this new interpretation? 
If such wqs the intention of the legislator, could he be 
said to he using words best calculated to express his inten­
tion? If he wished to introduce such a radical change in
the notion of common error, would he not ftave given evidence
of this intention, by expressing the doctrine in new or 
different terms - terms that would be more appropriate and 
more expressive of the new notion? Or, if he wished to 
retain the old term, would he not at least have given some 
indication that he wished the term to be understood in a 
different sense from heretofore? But he has used this same 
term, common error, and he has given no indication that he 
wishes to have it interpreted in any hut the traditional 
fashion. According to the norms for interpretation, there­
fore, we are obliged to interpret the term according to this
traditional signification.
(5) There is another consideration of considerable 
importance which is worthy of note. It treats of the absurd 
consequences resulting from the acceptance of the common error 
de jure interpretation, and from its application in practicd. 
For, granted that common error is verified as soon as a 
public fact or fundament has been placed - a fact which of 
its nature can, and may, lead many into a false judgment - 
it immediately follows that any priest who publicly hears 
confessions, or publicly assists at marriage, in any part of 
the world, even though he may have never been approved, 
performs these functions validly by reason of jurisdiction
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or power supplied by the Church. The very fact that a 
priest (approved or unapproved) - enters the confessional 
in a church, he places a fundament which could deceive the 
community into believing him to be a properly constituted 
confessor, he thereby creates, as it were, common error and 
ensures the validity of all absolutions imparted by him from 
the very outset. Similarly, by assisting at marriage in a 
public Church or in any public place, a priest likewise places 
a fundament calculated to deceive the community, again creates 
common error and so ensures the validity of the marriage. 
Consequently it would be practically impossible to find a 
case of a confession or a marriage that would be invalid by 
reason of defect of jurisdiction or authority in the minister. 
Vermeersch adverts to this when he writes: "Aliter intellectus
error communis permitteret validas absolutiones omni sacerdoti 
ubique terrarum. Satis foret ut ae promptum diceret ad 
audiendam confessionem. Dalpiaz puts it more forcibly:
"Et revera quinara jurisdictionis actus fori sive interni sive 
extern! adhuc invalid! esse possent, si Ecclesia dicenda esset 
jurisdictionem semper suppleri simul ac iidem actus ponantur 
’per factum publicum' quod per se Datum est inducere in error­
em, non unum vel alterum sed quoslibet promiscue? Sxceptis
illis - absque dubio perpaucis - occulto omnino positis,
(39)ceteri omnes habendi essent tamquam validi."
Now the supreme ecclesiastical legislator has taken 
the greatest care to lay down clear and strict norms with 
regard to jurisdiction itself, its acquisition, delegation, 
cessation etc. (Cc. 196 seqq. ); he has gone into minute 
with regard to the jurisdiction required by a priest in order
(38) Theol. Mor. Ill, n.L59.
(39) Apoll. VII, (193U), P.81. cf. also TOSO, Jus Pont. XVIII (1938) PP. 161-162.
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that he may validly hear the confessions of the ordinary 
faithful, of religious men, and of religious women (Cc. 872 
seqq. and Cc. 518-529) : and he has carefudly stated who may
validly assist at the celebration of marriages ex officio, 
and what licences and permissions are required by one who 
has not the right to assist ex officio (Cc. 109U-1096). Are 
we to regard all these canons as mere collections of useless 
and superfluous norms - morms which cannot have any practical 
Implication in the ordinary course of events. Such, in 
effect, is the teaching of the advocates of the common error 
de jure interpretation. For in giving canon 209 the signi­
fication they propose, there is no further need - at least 
as far as validity is concerned - to worry about fulfilling 
the requirements and conditions of the canons just quoted: 
for, given a public fundament, the Church supplies all 
defects of power. The advocates of this theory would imply 
that, by virtue of canon 209* the legislator wished to 
undermine the force, import ind necessity of those canons 
referred to above. They would imply that the legislator 
has framed many laws which in theory seem important, but 
which, in practice, are rendered useless, superfluous and 
impractical. Obviously an interpretation, which has the 
consequence of attributing to a wise and prudent legis- 
lator the establishment of such unreasonable and superfluous 
norms, cannot be regarded as a true reflection of that legis­
lator’s real intention and wish. Hence we cannot accept
the contention of those who interpret common error as mean­
ing common error de jure. ^
(UO) cf. A. TOSO, Jus Pont., XVII (1937) P. 97: cf also Jus Pont.
XVIII (1938) P. 162 - "Etenim si modo descripta Cn. 209 
interpretatio recipi posset, actum esset de cc. 873 seqq. et 
1095 seqq. necnon de compluribus aliis, qui, ad validatem 
actus, jurisdictionem ordinariam aut delegatam requirunt vel, 
ut Cn. 1096 ad valide agendum conditiones quaadam opponunt; 
turn enim, amplificato usque ad absurdum ambitu Cn. 209, num- 
quam adesset jurisdictionis defectus, quin simul ab Ecclesia 
suppleretur; quod uti patet, nemo qui sanae sit mentis 
admittere potest.”
cf. also DALPIAZ, Apoll., VII (193U), P. 81. - ”Fautoribua 
autem contrariae sententiae haec praesertim quaestio poni 
potest. Admisso principio de errore interpretativo tantum,
____________________  (continued end of p.176)
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6. In the light of what we have just seen it may 
he opportune here to criticise the arguments advanced by 
Cappello in attempting to prove his theory of common error 
de jure. While the foregoing five points are obvious 
deductions from the application of the canonical principles 
of interpretation, it is very significant that Canpello, and 
the other exponents of the de jure view, make little or no 
reference to these principles. Indeed, they seem to have 
been very cautious not to appeal to these principles - 
Especially those of Canon 18. Of the five arguments put 
forward by Cappello, it is true that two may be said to 
have the semblance of an appeal to the principles of inter­
pretation: the other three, as we have already noted, are
merely objections against the practicability of the common 
error de facto theory. For the present, we wish to confine 
ourselves to juridical arguments based on official norms 
of interpretation: hence we shall conclude this article
with a refutation of the two arguments which purport to 
place the theory of interpretative common error on a 
juridical basis.
(a) It will be recalled that Cappello1s first argu­
ment ran thus: ?,£o ipso quod fundamentum erroris seu factum
indueens natura sua fideles in errorem, est externum et 
publicum, etiam error dici potest, et quidem rationabiliter 
externus et publicus seu communis.» His line of argument 
seems to be something like the following: "The fundament
of the error is public and external: consequently the error
itself can be said to be public and external. But public 
and external is equivalent to common. Therefore, if the
(i*0) (continued): seu de jure, quid de praeacriptis fiet
tam claris, tam strictis, tarn gravibus quibus Codex 
institutum de jurisdictione eeclesiastica sartum ac 
tectum esse voluit? Nonne legis firmitas in discrimen 
vocatur, ac pernicioso arbitrio via sterneretur, quod 
'nervura ecclesiasticae disEiplinae* penitus disrumperet?'
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fundament of the error ia public and external, the error 
itself must be regarded as common." It is difficult to 
discover a logical trend of reasoning in the statement: 
it is noteworthy, too, that there is a complete absence of 
explanations or proof. Against it we may note the follow­
ing.
Criticising this argument Claeys-Bouuaert emphatical­
ly denies that a fundament of error, i.e. a fact or state 
of things which offers an occasion for error, can be said to
be public unless it is already known to many. From this
alone it derives the characteristic of publicity, viz., from 
the fact that it is de facto and really apprehended by, and
known to, many. For, according to all peoples, he says,
and in all languages, a thing is said to be public only
(Ul)when it is perceived or apprehended by many. We do
not agree with this criticism unreservedly, chiefly because 
the term "public" has been given many different meanings by 
the Code itself. Thus a public crime, according to canon 
2197, is one that has been already divulged or one that has 
occurred, or is now placed, in such circumstances that it 
can be prudently judged that it will sasily be divulged.
A public matrimonial impediment on the other hand, according 
to canon 1037, is one whose existence can be proved in the 
external forujg: if it could be proved by means of an offic­
ial document, therefore, it would be public in the sense of 
the canon, even though nobody was actually aware of its 
existence.
We do not deny that Cappello was correct in referring 
to a fundament as being public, because it was placed in 
such circumstances that it could be prudently judged that 
it could, and should, become generally known - as in the case
(hi) cf. Jus Pont., XVI, (1936), p. 161.
of canon 2197* Besides, the fundamdnt will almost invar­
iably be known to two or three, and hence there will usually 
be sufficient witnesses to prove its existence in the exter­
nal forum - aa in the case of canon 1037* We admit then, 
that Cappello is justified in referring to a fundament as 
being public even before it has actually been perceived or 
apprehended by many. We admit, too, that Cappello may be 
justified in using the term "public" in reference to an 
error that may flow from this public fundament, even before 
many people have actually fallen into that error, i.e. in 
using it with reference to error, in the eame sense as it 
is used as regards crimes or impediments in canons 2197 and 
1037. But we do not admit that, because an error is thus 
termed public, it must necessarily be regarded as common. 
While be may be free to choose any of the recognised mean­
ings of the term "public," and apply it tc error,fce is not
free to say that public error is equivalent to common error,
until he first establishes that the sense in which he uses 
the term "public" corresponds to the accepted signification 
of the term "common." In the present case he cannot “estab­
lish this: for, his notion of public error is one into
which many people can fall, because of a public fundament 
which has been placed: whiibe common error has the accepted
and determined signification (which he is not free to change) 
of one into which many, or the majority of a given community, 
have already been actually drawn.
Briefly, then, we may conclude by agreeing with 
Cappello when he asserts that, if the fundament of error is 
public, the error itself may also be regarded as public: 
and by disagreeing with him when he contends that, if the 
fundament of error is public, the error itself may be 
regarded aa common.
(h2) cf. DALPIAZ, Apoll., VII, (I93h), P. 80. "Sed duo 
haec - factum scilicet publicum et error communis - 
aequiparari semper non possunt, quia ex facto publico 
error communis non semper sequitur."
( (b) The second argument in which we are interested
here is as follows; HIn canon 209 the Code purposely 
decided the controversies that existed sS pre-Code teaching; 
hence it can he rightly supposed that the legislator wished 
to define the position clearly and finally, in such a way 
that there would he no further room for douhta and anxieties. 
But if the common error de facto interpretation is admitted, 
the way is necessarily opened to many doubts and anxieties; 
all of which is contrary to the purpose of the law, and the 
mind of the legislator. Ergo.” Against this the follow­
ing points may he noted;
(1) Granting that the legislator wished to put an 
end to all controversies, doubts and anxieties, it is clear 
that the only controversies he could intend to settle would 
he those already i$ existence at the time he formulated the 
law. He could scarcely he said to have intended to settle 
controversies which had not yet arisen; less still could 
he have intended to settle controversies which he had no 
reason to suspect might arise^4^  - controversies which 
would be due solely, as Claeya-Boxiuaert states it,^4  ^ to 
the subtlety of commentators. fe grant, then, that the 
legislator wished to settle the controversy that existed in 
pre-Code jurisprudence, viz., with regard to the necessity 
of a coloured title. But there was no pre-Code controversy 
with regard to the interpretation of the term common error: 
it enjoyed a traditional signification corresponding to
our common error de facto.
(2) For the purpose of argument, let us concede 
what Cappello contends, viz., that, by interpreting common 
error in the sense of common error de facto, the way is
(U3) cf. MEBKELBACK, Summa Theol. Mor., Ill, n.586. 
(UU) cf. Jus Pont., XVI, (1936) p. 162.
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opened to doubts and anxieties. Then the following points 
could be made:
(a) We can be practically certain that the doubts 
and anxieties which arise at the present time, as a result 
of such an interpretation, are neither more numerous nor 
more serious than those which resulted from the same inter­
pretation in pre-Code times. But being familiar, as he 
was, with the practical application of this doctrine in 
pre-Code times, it can be safely assumed that the legislator 
was aware of both the advantages and disadvantages attaching 
to this interpretation: he knew of any defects there might
be in its application: he knew of the doubts and anxieties
that were wont to arise aa a result of it. If he had con­
sidered these defects of the traditional interpretation 
sufficient to necessitate a change of doctrine, he could 
easily and simply have changed it. But he did not change 
the doctrine. He framed the law in terms which clearly 
indicated a retention of the traditional notion of common 
error.
(b) Moreover, even if we assume that the legislator, 
when framing the law, did not advert to the doubts and 
anxieties which would arise as a result of the practical 
application of this interpretation, the position is not 
altered. For, as we have already said, the purpose of 
interpretation is to discover the actual wish and intention 
of the legislator, as expressed in the words of the law - 
not what his wish or intention would have been, had be 
adverted to certain circumstances or factB actually over­
looked.
These two latter points are based on the assumption 
that Cappello's contention is true, viz., that the inter­
pretation of the term, as meaning common error de facto, 
opens the way to doubts and anxieties. If the contention
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is false, of course, then obviously there can be no 
argument drawn from it. Actually, if the common error 
de facto interpretation is properly understood and applied, 
there is little or no danger of the doubts and anxieties, 
of which Cappello speaks, beihg realized; this we hope to 
show in the article immediately following. Suffice it to 
say, for the present, that whether this statement of Cappello 
be true or false, no argument in favour of the common error 
de jure interpretation can be drawn from it.
By way of summary, therefore, we may safely assert 
that all the rules and norms of interpretation weigh 
against the interpretation of Cappello, and the many others, 
who advocate thd principle of common error de jure. Prom 
the arguments - both positive and negative - listed above, 
we feel justified in concluding that this interpretation 
has no juridical basis, and cannot be regarded as intrin­
sically probable.
ARTICLE III. THE TRUE NOTION OP COMMON ERROR.
Having established that the term common error must 
be interpreted as signifying common error de facto, as 
opposed to interpretative common error, we now come to 
determine when precisely it maybe said that common error 
de facto is realized. We have seen, in the opening 
article of this chapter, that there are divergent views 
on this point. By some, the term is given a strict 
interpretation, and is taken to signify an error that iB 
morally unanimous, with regard to a given community, or at 
least an error in which the greater part of the community 
1b involved. others interpret commoh as signifying a 
notable part of the community. While still others say 
that common error simply means the error of many. Which
-182-
of these views are we to accept? Again, the answer will 
be provided by the application of the principles of inter­
pretation.
Canon 209 must be understood according to the proper
(45)signification of the words, taken in their text and context. 
The proper signification of a word, we have seen, may be 
either the natural, usual or juridical meaning that has been 
attributed to it. Thus, if a particular term has been 
given a particular and technical meaning by the constant 
use of canonists, this technical meaning is called the 
juridical signification. In an earlier c h a p t e r ^ w e  went 
into some detail to show that, in pre-Code jurisprudence, 
the term common error had acquired a certain accepted 
signification, from the constant and consistent use of 
canonists and theologians: it signified an error shared
in by all, or nearly all, the members of a given community, 
or at least by the majority of them. When the legislator 
used the term in canon 209, therefore, it was obviously 
this signification he had in mind; and, by virtue of 
canon 18, this is the signification he has commanded canon­
ists and commentators to attribute to it still.
It is difficult to see any justification for the 
opinion of those who give an interpretation other than this. 
Noldin-Schmitt cannot advance a legal basis for the state­
ment that common error means an error of a notable part of 
the community. More arbitrary still is the opinion of 
Vermeersch, Jombart and Merkelbaoh, holding that the term 
signifies error of many! If the legislator had intended 
that jurisdiction be supplied by reason of the error of many,
(45) cf. Canon 18.
(1*6) cf. Above, 3ec. Ill, Ch. III.
would it not have heen much more simple and reasonable for 
him to state MIn errore multorum .... Ecclesia jurisdictionem 
supplet?” It was not by mere accident that the words ”ln 
errore communi” were used, rather than ”In errore multorum” 
or ”In errore magnae partis capmunitatis, " etc. The legis­
lator had a purpose in using the phrase error comnunist by 
it, he wished to convey a definite notion - a notion that 
this phrase had traditionally been known and understood to 
express, viz., error of at least the majority of the members 
of a given community.
Perhaps the biggest break with tradition is the 
attempt, made by Vermeersch, to establish an absolute standard 
for determining the notion. It might be possible to lay 
down a relative figure that would constitute an error as 
common with regard to a community of a given sizes but the 
statement that the error of 200 people will always constitute 
coronon error - irrespective, that is, of the size of the 
coranunlty in question - must certainly be regarded as unreason­
able. Mathematical formulae are alien to the juridical 
science. Excepting those cases in which the law Itself 
expressly demands mathematical computation, juridical notions 
cannot be defined in terms of figures: usually there are too
many circumstances and contingencies to be taken into consider­
ation to allow of that. We have seen that Jombart condemned 
such an attitude when treating of the question as to how 
many people would be required to constitute multi.
(46a) cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., L. (1923) P. 172 - Ceux qui
reclaimeraient un index nombre chiffrant tous les cas, 
ou une formule algebrique d’une exactitude minutieuse, 
nous rapelleraient les sophistes de la grece antique, 
aux questions captieuses: Comblen faut-11 de grains
de ble pour faire un tas? Combien faut-il avoir garde
de cheveux pour n !btre pas chauve?"
-£83-
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We agree with Jombart in this condemnation. We feel justi­
fied in saying that the vast majority of authors would agree 
with Jombart in this; at least, very few make any attempt 
to reduce the notion of common error to concrete figures. ^
We may safely say, therefore, that the absolute norm of 200, 
as proposed by Vermeersch, must be rejected. We grant that 
the figure might constitute an absolute norm for determining 
the notion of multi; but, for reasons stated above we do 
not admit that the terns 'error of many* and 'common error' 
are synonymous.
Criticism of Jombart'a Arguments; It will be recal­
led that Jombart was the only author who advanced reasons in 
support of his contention that common error signifies error 
of many. It will be opportune to consider these arguments 
at this stage.
A» Tho first argument runs thus; 'if moral unanimity, 
or error of the majority, were required, it would only be on 
very rare occasions that the Church would be called upon to 
supply jurisdiction - which is contrary to the mind of the 
legislator.' Against this we may make the following 
observations:-
(1) Granting it to be true that our interpretation 
would render the cases in which the Church would be called 
upon to supply jurisdiction very rare, it may be asked how 
this state of things can be shown to be contrary to the mind 
of the legislator? We have sufficiently proved, both in 
this article and in the preceding, that the legislator could 
have only one thing in mind, when he used the term 'common 
error' in canon 209. The legislator was at liberty to frame
(47) NOTE. L. WOUTERS (Man. Theol. Mor., I, n. 103) favours 
the opinion of Vermeersch in making 200 an absolute 
standard.
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the law in different words, if he considered the traditional 
signification of this term to he too restrictive, or te»wov 
sufficiently comprehensive, in its application; he could 
have used terms which would admit of the application of the 
supplying principles to more varied and more numerous cases.
But since he has used this term without giving any indication 
that he wished to have its meaning changed, we must presume 
that this restriction of the number of cases to which it 
applies is in accordance with his mind on the matter.
(2) The law of canon 209 - like that of all the 
other canons in the Code - has for its purpose the promotion 
of the common good. But it is for the legislator to deter­
mine what norm or rule is best calculated to prjtaiote this 
common good. If the legislator promulgates a law which, on 
being interpreted according to the proper signification of 
the words, is somewhat limited in its application or scope, 
it must be presumed that he considered the interests of the 
common good to be best served by such a limited application. 
Unless the legislator has given some other indication of a 
contrary Intention, the mere rarity of cases or occasions 
involving the application of a particular law, does not justify 
one in attributing to the words of the law an improper 
slnglfication.
(3) If the occasions in which the Church can be 
called upon to supply jurisdiction are rare, we can safely 
assume that they are not notably more rare now tban before 
the promulgation of the Code. But all authorities seem to 
have been satisfied with the law, in this respect, before 
the promulgation of the Code. There is scarcely any basis 
for believing that conditions have so changed as to demand 
a law of wider scope and application now.
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By this we do not wish to suggest that conditions 
cannot and do not change in the course of times we do not 
contend that a law, which is suitable in one century, must 
necessarily be suitable also in the next. Nor are we 
opposed to the initiative and originality of Canonists in 
developing juridical science. It is only natural that 
conditions should change with the passage of time, necessitat­
ing a consequential change in law. And as canonical history 
proves, many juridical institutes and notions owe their 
origin and development to the initiative of brilliant 
canonists. But irihile necessarily favouring the development 
of juridical science and the clarification of juridical
V ' - fnotions, It must be emphasized that this development and 
clarification should be in accordance with canonical prin­
ciples. Juridical science must emanate from sound prin­
ciples, and must develop along sound juridical lines.
B. The second argument put forward by Jombart is 
as follows: ‘Granted that moral unanimity in error is
required, or the error of the majority, how can this 
unanimity or majority be calculated?’
Jombart himself supplies the answer to this 
objection.^48) Having attempted to prove that the tern 
’common error* cannot mean error of the majority because 
of the difficulty attaching to the calculation of sacs such 
an error, he asserts that common error must mean ‘error 
multorum.’ He proceeds to state that the term "multi” cannot 
be mathematically defined, but must be estimated in a moral 
sense. But from the point of view of facility of calculation, 
the term 'error multorum’ holds no advantage over that of 
’error of the majority.’ For it would be no more difficult 
to make a moral estimation of the notion of ’majority,’ than 
it would be to morally estimate the notion of 'multi.*
(48) cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., L. (1923) P. 172.
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Common Error to be Morally Estimated; Prom the
viewpoint of facility in computation therefore, there seems
no reason for taking the term common error in any hut its
proper signification. In practically every case that will
arise a certain conclusion can he reached as to the presence
or absence of common error, when this moral estimation is
used. Ihere will he no necessity to have recourse to those
detailed mathematical calculations, which the opponents of
the common error de facto interpretation appear to connect
inseparably with its application in practice. Generally
speaking, from the facts and circumstances of the case, the
solution will be clear, either from the fact that the greater
part of the comnunity is manifestly in error, or from the
fact that obviously only a few are deceived. As in so many
other canonical matters, a reasonable and prddent judgment
on the point always suffices. And if, in a particular case,
there is doubt as to whether the error can be termed comon,
then canon 209 itself solves the doubt. a positive and
probable doubt as to the existence of common error (i.e. as
to the sufficiency of numbers in order to constitute the
error an error of the majority) involves a positive and
probable doubt as to whether jurisdiction is had by a certain
(49)official, in liiich case the Church supplies the defieiency.
It will usually be a simple matter to make this 
estimation. For, keeping in mind what we have already seen 
in a previous article, that in order to have common error de 
facto it suffices if a fundament or cause, capable of
(49) Canon 209 - "In errore coranuni aut in dubio positlvo 
et probablli sive juris sive factl, jurlsdictionem 
supplet Ecclesia pro foro turn exjyemo turn intemo."
Cf. CLABYS-BOWAERT, Jus Pent. XVI (1936) P. 162.
"QuodsI in allquo casu reman eat dubitationl locus, 
ipse canon 209, ne loquaraur de purl Probabilismi 
applications, suppeditat solutionem. Dicit nempe, in 
dubio probablli sive juris sive facti, supplere Ecclesiam. 
Quod dubium probabilir versari sane etiam potest circa 
sufficientem errantium numerum, in ordine ad errorem 
vere conmunem constituendum. Via igitur ilia indirecte 
moraliter certa affulgebit conclusio."
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deceiving, is already known to the community as a whole 
or to the majority of its members, it can be seen that It 
will not be difficult to #ake an estimate of those la error. 
For example, if the fundament has consisted in an announce­
ment made at Sunday masses, it will be easy to determine 
whether the greater part of the community was present at 
those Masses. If the fundament took the form of a notice 
in the local newspapers, again, a moral estimation can easily 
be made; judgnent can prudently be passed according to the 
number who are wont to read the local newspapers. On the 
other hand, if the public fundament consisted in an announce­
ment made to a small congregation at Mass on a #id-week morn­
ing, it could not be prudently judged that common error was 
immediately present. Not until some indications or proofs 
could be had that the congregation had spread the announcement 
generally - and so made the fundament known to the community 
as a moral unit - could it be asserted that common error 
was realized.
Criticism of Cappello*s Objections; We referred 
in the preceding article to objections, put forward by 
Cappello, against the feasibility of the interpretation 
of common error as signifying common error de facto. Strictly 
speaking, Cappello had intended these as arguments in favour 
of his common error de jure interpretation, and as such we 
should have treated of them when refuting that interpretation 
in the preceding article. However, as these arguments or 
objections are answered chiefly by the fact that the term 
common error Is to be estimated in a moral sense, we thought 
it more appropriate to postpone their treatment till the 
present context. We shall now examine them briefly;
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(1) In the first of these objections, Cappello
claims that if the opinion requiring common error de facto
is admitted, then an investigation must always be made with
regard to the number of those who have actually err-en'j this
investigation would entail the interrogation of each member
of the canmunity in question, with some such formula as -
•Do you consider Titius a real confessor, a real pastor,
etc.?* Such a procedure would be both disturbing, and
(50)practically impossible.
This argument migjnt carry some wei$it if, by common 
error de facto, were understood an explicit and expressed 
fonnal erroneous judgment by the majority of a given community 
But such is not the case. It suffices if there is placed a 
public cause or fundament (of its nature calculated to deceive) 
which is known to the community as a whole. As Vermeerseh 
states, it is sufficient that the elements of an erroneous 
judgment exist in the minds of those concerned: in other
words an implicit error suffices. And in order to discover 
whether such elements of an erroneous judgment - or an 
Implicit error - exist in the minds of the majority, It will 
not be necessary to interrogate individual members of the 
community on the matter. It will be sufficient if it can 
be prudently judged, that the existence of the fundament has 
come to the knowledge of the greater number. Ifce extent to 
which the existence of the fundament will be known will 
depend, as we have already suggested, on the circumstances 
of each individual case. It will be seen that the above 
objection arises chiefly from a misunderstanding of what Is 
really meant by the term caramon error de facto.
(50) cf. De Sac. II (De Poen.) n.341, 2°.
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(2) The second argument is merely a corrollary of 
that just discussed, is dependent on it and presupposes
it to he time. But as the argument outlined above cannot 
be accepted, there is no need to consider this second in 
details It, too, can be regarded as the result of not having 
properly understood the true notion of common error d® facto.
(3) The third objection may be termed the standard 
objection against the theory of common error de facto, viz., 
’Granting that common error de facto is required, It will be 
necessary to decide hew many people must be in error, in order 
to constitute the error common - whether the error of 30, 50, 
or 100 will suffice. But any attempt to so determine it 
would be ridiculous, and contrary to the mind of the legis- 
Xator..'52*
In answer to this w® should like to emphasize again 
that in computing common error we are not concerned with the 
number of people, for instance, who actually approach a 
putative confessor to obtain absolution* we a?e concerned 
only with the number of those who think this confessor real 
and legitimate, irrespective of how many or how few may 
actually seek absolution from him.^5®^  it may b© stated that 
in the vast majority of cases in which common error is veri­
fied, it exists even before the illegitimate confessor com­
mences to hear confessions. In these cases, all confessions 
are valid from the beginning - however few in number the
(51) cf. De Sac., II (De Poen.) n. 341, 3: This argument
reads* Dato et non concesso quod huiusmodi Interrogatio 
in aliquo casu particular! fieri possit, exinde tamen 
nihil sequeretur in favorem alterius opinionia* turn 
quia lex, ex Ipsa sua natura, non respicit casus extra- 
ordinarios et particulares, sed ea quae communiter et 
universaliter accidere solentj turn quia certitude circa 
numerum errantlum in casu, numquam haberl posset.”
(52) cf. De Sac. II (De Poen.) n. 341, 4.
(53) cf. CAPPELLO. De Sac. II (De Poen.) n. 340.
penitents may be. It is an injustice to the common error 
de facto interpretation, to state absolutely for instance, 
that if 200 people went to confession to a strange confessor, 
the confessions of the first 99 people would be invalid 
because there was no common errors after the confession 
of the 100th person, however, common error was verified and 
the confessions of all those who followed would be valid.
It is unjust to make this absolute statement, because in 
the generality of cases such as this, common error will be 
verified from the beginning - if, for instance, the whole 200 
regarded the confessor as real from the beginning, and pro­
vided, in the circumstances, this number could be taken as 
morally representative of the community in question - and 
therefore all confessions will be valid from the beginning.
In rare cases, however, it may happen that contnon 
error is not verified from the beginning, but arises merely 
as a result of the fact that many people actually approach a 
certain putative official. Ihis ia the case that Cappello 
seems to have ohiefly in mind here: it is the case, too, on
which Bucceroni based his chief argument in favour of, his 
common error de jure interpretation. Bae exanple usually
given is the following: A strange priest - unapproved and
unannounced - enters the confessional in a public church, to 
hear confessions. As he enters it, there are only a few 
penitents present. While hearing the confessions of those 
present, a few more penitents arrive: and in this way more
penitents continue to come in groups of one, two or three, 
so that the priest remains in the confessional absolving for 
a couple of hours. VKhen precisely is common error realized 
in this case?
(54) cf. Casus Conscientiae, Casus 129, n.6. Pp. 171-172,
At the outset, we must admit that common error was 
not verified from the beginning in this case. We have pre­
supposed that the strange priest’s coming was unexpected and 
unannounced! and the fundament of error (the act of enter­
ing a public confessional) was, ex hypothesi, actually known 
to only a few people. Yet the principle stated above still 
applies to this cases common error will be verified when 
the number of those, #10 have approached the priest for con­
fession, is sufficient to enable one to prudently judge that 
the greater number in the community know of the existence of 
this fundament. From the moment that this prudent judgment 
dan be made all the confessions will be valid.
We admit that it is not easy to determine the precise 
moment when common error is verified in this cases we admit 
too that, as a result of this teaching, those who have gone 
first to confession have been invalidly absolved, and those 
who came later received valid absolution. But these apparent 
difficulties in the practical application of common error de 
facto, in this particular case, do not change the position In 
the least. The chief reason for this, is that the particular 
case visualized here must be regarded as being of relatively 
rare occurrence - presupposing as it usually does, a deliberate 
usurpation of jurisdiction by a priest - and therefore does 
not pertain to the cases which the legislator primarily had in 
mind when establishing the law. Secondly, though Cappello 
holds the contrary, it can easily be shown that the common 
good does not necessarily demand that the confessions of the 
first should be valid in this case, just the same as the 
confessions of the latter. as we have pointed out earlier,
It is for the legislator to determine what norms will best
(55) of. De Sac. II (De poen). n.340. Footnote 4.
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premote the Interests of the common good. if the 
application of a law, when interpreted aecordlng to canonical 
rules, leads In a particular case to a situation such as that 
considered here, we must conclude that the legislator con­
siders even this position to be conducive to the common good.
Actually the position is both reasonable and intelli­
gible. If the legislator considered that it would be always 
contrary to the common good to have any confession invalid 
by reascn of defect of jurisdiction, he could have decreed 
that the Church would supply jurisdiction even in the case 
of private error. But he has not laid down that the Church 
s^plies jurisdiction in the case of private error. Juris­
diction Is supplied only in comon error - and this means 
common error as we have explained it. Obviously therefore, 
the legislator must have considered the common good to be 
best promoted, in certain cases, by the invalidity of con­
fession arising from the defect of jurisdiction in the 
minister, e.g. in cases of private error with regard to the 
power of the minister. ffiiere is no reason why he should not 
also consider it to be in the best Interests of the common 
good, that the confessions of some should be invalid in the 
case under discussion, while the confessions of others should 
be valid. Moreover canonists are not justified in reading 
the term * com a on error* to mean the equivalent of *private 
error,* just because the proper signification of the former 
term involves an effect whifch they consider contrary to the 
common good.
Examples of Oases in which Common error is Realized*
It will probably be asserted by many that this teaching, which 
interprets common error as slgiifying common error de facto, 
is too strict. Many will probably object, as Jombart did, 
that if common error Is to be interpreted thus, then it will
-194-
be only very rarely that jurisdiction* will be supplied by 
the Church in common error. The fact that Cappello*a 
teaching has become fairly widespread and constitutes an 
extrinsically probable opinion, has given rise to a general 
belief that the validating effects of canon 209 are all- 
embracing. In practice it amounts to this that common error 
is being invoked as providing jurisdiction in practically 
all cases where confessions have been heard by any unapproved 
priest. In view of this general attitude, the common error 
de facto interpretation Is somewhat strict. Nevertheless 
the cases in which it will apply are by nqrfieans rare, as the 
following examples will show.
(1) Titius, a priest, has been duly appointed pastor 
of a certain parish; he has been notified of the fact by 
the Episcopal Curia, and the parishioners are aware of the 
appointment through an announcement made at the Sunday Masses 
or in the local newspapers. Through ignorance of the law or 
inadvertence to it, Titius arrives in the parish assigned to 
h:!m and proceeds to perform the duties of pastor (hears con­
fessions, assists at marriages etc.) without having gone 
through the legal formality of • canonical instutitlm* (Cc. 
1443-44), ?$iat of all the official functions performed by 
this pastor?
Tie announcement at Sunday Masses, or in the news­
papers, of the appointment of a new pastor, Is a fundament 
sufficient to justify the parishioners in regarding the priest 
In question as a real pastor, on his arrival In ths parish.
’Hfeen this fundament becomes generally known - when It can be 
prudently judged that the majority of the parishioners know 
of that announcement - the requisites for commen error are 
fulfilled, and despite the defect of canonical institution, all 
the acts of that putative psustor will be valid by reason of
-19 5 -
power supplied in common error. This rule holds also, for 
the appointment of all other public ecclesiastical officials, 
e.g. bishop, vicar general, vicar capitular, official, judge, 
etc.: thus a typical case of common error would be had, if
a vicar capitular were appointed as a result of an election 
that was occultly invalid. (Cc. U31, §1, & 1U8 §1.)
(2) Titius, a priest, has been appointed pastor in 
a certain parish, has validly taken possession of his parish 
and has performed his duties as such for some time. After 
a lapse of a few years however, he is deprived of his office, 
e.g. by reason of a sentence of excommunication which has been 
passed on him, or by reason of a decree of removal by the
Tlocal Ordinary. Refusing to relinquish his office, he con­
tinues to exercise its duties. The parishioners remain in 
ignorance of the fact that he has been deprived of his office.
Here there are numerous circumstances present which
lead the parishioners to believe that he is a true pastor,
as, for example, his appointment to the parish, his exercise
of the functions of pastor over a period of time: these
circumstances are known to all; and ex hypothesi, the
community has no reason for believing that he is not still
a real pastor. Hence in this case also, common error de
facto is verified. This rule applies also to all other
officials mentioned above, who have lost or have been deprived
of their office occultly, and who continue to exercise it,
eithernin good faith or bad. But it applies only as long
as the community remains in ignorance of the privation or
loss. (56)________________ ______________________________________
(56) KPT'S. It is of interest to note that the Sacred Roman 
Rota" has based a decision of *non constat de nullitate 
matrimonii * on an application of the principles of common 
error in circumstances similar to those contemplated 
here - cf. S. Romanae Rotae Decisiones seu Sententlae 
XIX (1927) p. U53.
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(3) Similar to the above is the case of a priest who 
has been appointed to an office for a given period of time or 
a determined number of cases, and who advertently or inadver­
tently performs functions pertaining to that office after the 
time appointed has elapsed, or after the specified number of 
cases has been exhausted.
The public will not usually see the letters of appoint­
ment, and hence, as a rule, will not know the limits of a 
priest’s office either as regards time or number. When the 
priest in question performs actions in excess of his mandate, 
the community will still have every reason for regarding him 
as acting lawfully, because a fundament known to all, exists. 
Common error continues therefore, until such time as the fact 
of lapse of the appointed time or completion of the stated 
number of eases becomes generally known.
These three examples were the typical examples of 
common error as contemplated in pre-code jurisprudence. The 
fact that until the 17th century a coloured title was held 
as essential, necessarily exercised a restricting influence on 
the number of cases to which the doctrine would apply. From 
the 17th century onwards, with the growth of the probability 
of the opinion that a coloured title was not really essential, 
the application became less restricted: intruders into
offices were considered as coming under fche benefits of the 
law, provided the fact of their intrusion was occult. More 
recently canonists and theologians began to discuss the 
question of a priest who, on his own authority and without 
approbation, sets himself up as a confessor, or who is invited
by the pastor to hear confessions in a particular church, 
while the pastor forgets to procure for him the requisite 
faculties. The following are examples of the application 
of the common error principles to such cases:
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(i*) The pastor announces at Sunday mass that two
priests from another diocese will hear confessions in the
parish church on the Friday following. The pastor forgets
to obtain faculties for the priests, who duly arrive and
(57)hear confessions in the Church.' '
Here again there is common error present according 
to our interpretation, if it can be prudently judged that the 
majority of the parishioners know of the announcement made 
by the pastor. If it can be prudently judged that such is 
the case then all confessions are valid from the outset, 
even if only one or two people actually approach these 
priests for absolution.
(5) The application might be pressed still further. 
Titius, a strange priest - unannounced and unapproved - 
enters a confessional in full view of a crowded Church, and 
commences to hear confessions.
The fact that he was seen by all entering the confes­
sional, is sufficient fundament to have all believe that 
Titius is properly qualified to hear confessions. The 
absolutions imparted by him will be valid from the beginning, 
provided it can be prudently judged that the congregation 
present represents the greater number of the people of the 
place.
(6) Lastly we have the case referred to above:
A strange priest - unapproved and unannounced - enters the
confessional in a public ehucch. As he enters it, there are
only a few penitents present. While hearing the confessions
of those present, a few more penitents arrive: and in this
way more penitents continue to come in small groups, so that
the priest remains in the confessional absolving for a couple 
of hours.
(57} Cf. VERMEERSCH, Theol. Mor., Ill, n.L59; cf. also 
LYDON, Ready Answers in Canon Law, p. 235.
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As we noted above, common error ia not verified from 
the beginning in this case. But it will be verified when, 
from the number of those who have approached the priest for 
confession, it can be pruddntly judged that the greater number 
in the community know that thia strange priest is hearing con­
fessions: and from that moment all the absolutions imparted
by him will be valid.
These six examples just outlined cover fairly com­
pletely the application that common error de facto may have 
in practice. They show, too, that the scope allowed by 
this interpretation is not so {Limited or restricted as might 
at first be expected. One further point now remains to be 
treated. We have referred many times in these pages to the 
error of a community, and to the error of the majority of 
the members of the community, when attempting to define 
the notion of common error de facto. It may be well to 
determine what constitutes a community in this regard - what 
community is capable, so to speak, of effecting common error.
Community Capable of Effecting Common Error: Explicit
references to thia point in pre-Code teaching were very few. 
Implicit references however were abundant. For, from the 
examples of the officials with regard to whom common error 
might arise, officials such as pastor, vicar general, bishop, 
judge, etc., we could conclude that the community in question 
in each case would be the members of the parish or diocese 
respectively. D'Annibale^58) makes explicit mention of 
parish,' and it will be recalled that Lequeux^considered 
it sufficient for common error, if the people of a 'district* 
or 'town' were deceived. More often, authors simply spoke of 
a 'place.1
(58) cf. Summula Theol. Mor., I, n. 79, Footnote 72.
(59) cf. Sel» Quaes. Jurl Can., Quaes. XIX, n.69, Par. III.
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On the strength of this, there can he no doubt that 
the members of a particular parish constitute a commuhity 
capable of effedting common error. Further, it can scarcely 
be regarded aa doing violence to the word ’place’ if we inter­
pret it with Lequeux as signifying ’district:* under this 
heading would come the district served by an auxiliary 
parochial church: hence common error could be effected by
the community which constitutes the congregation of an 
auxiliary ehurch or ’’Church of ease."
Some modern commentators would be much more lenient.
The only limit that Vermeersch,(^0) inB^aT}ce> places with
regard to the size of the community, is that it must consist
(6i:of at least ten people. In this he is followed by Wouters* 
Aertnys-Damen,^2  ^ though not mentioning figures, assert 
that error of a small community suffices. Uombart^"^ 
suggests that a community of twenty enclosed nuns should be 
capable of effecting common error: he makes the suggestion
rather hesitantly howevef, and leaves himself open to 
correction ("Salvo meliori jjudicio.")
By way of criticism of these views, we would suggest 
that the question will be solved according to the nature of 
the community, rather than by the number of members. The 
doctrine of common error has traditionally been applied to 
the supplying of power to a public official. If it can be 
established that an official in a given community exercises a 
public office, then that community is capable of effecting 
common error. In the course of the next chapter we hope to 
establish that a religious society as such, ar an individual 
province of such a society, is a community capable of effecting
(60) cf. Theol. Mor., Ill, n.U59.
(61) cf. Man. Theol. Mor., I, n.103.
(62) cf. Theol. Mor., II, n.359.
(63) cf. Nouvl Bev. Theol., L (1923) P. 177, Note 1.
-20C-
common error. With regard to individual houses of a 
religious Society or province (prescinding from the case of 
religious houses which are sui juris), we are of opinion, 
that they are not, of their nature, sufficiently public to 
enable the Superior in them to be regarded as a public 
official - and hence the community in such a house would not 
be capable of effecting common error. We shall meet this
question more in detail in the following chapter.♦
Summary: Such then is the true notion of common
error, and the outlines of its application in practice. To 
sum it up very briefly, there are three main guiding points 
to be remembered:-
1. There must be present some fundament, cause or 
fact which of its nature is calculated to deceive people into 
thinking, that a certain official has been legitimately con­
stituted, and enjoys the requisite power for the fulfilment 
of official functions.
2. This fundament, cause or fact must be actually 
known to at least the majority of the members of the community
3. A moral estimation with regard to the number in 
error is sufficient. Hence common error is verified if, 
from the circumstances, it can be prudently judged that the 
majority in the community actually know thia fundament, cause 
or fact has been placed.
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APPLICATION J5F THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMON ERROR.
When we apeak of the application of the principles of 
common error in the present context, we refer not to the 
individual oases to which the doctrine may apply, hut rather 
to the different categories or classes of juridical power 
which may he supplied by the Church in virtue of common error. 
Post-Code canonists have not been in agreement in their teach­
ing with regard to the exact extent to which the defect of 
power is supplied by virtue of common error. Thus, there 
has been a certain amount of controversy as to whether the 
supplying principles apply to delegated jurisdiction - 
especially to the case of special delegation. Again, though 
it is the practically unanimous opinion that ordinary ’power' 
to assist at marriage is supplied, it has "been disputed as 
to whether the principles apply in the case of a priest who 
has obtained a general or special licence to assist at 
marriage. A third question raised by a few authors, is 
whether the principles supply the defect in the case of a 
person who exercises dominative power. Lastly it could be 
asked whether they supply the defect of 'power* in a parish 
priest, in order that he may validly confer the Sacrament of 
Confirmation as extraordinary minister according to the 
decree Splritua Sancti Munera^'' in cases in which the con­
ditions laid down in this Decree are not fulfilled, though 
they are commonly reputed to be. In the present chapter 
we shall treat of these four questions in turn.
C H A P T E R  I I .
(1) A.A.S. Vol. XXVIII, 3. Oct. 1946, Num. 11, 
Pp. 349-358.
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AKTICLB I. - COMMON ERROR AND DELEGATED JURISDICTION.
So far in our treatment of the notion of common error • 
which in reality amounts to the interpretation of canon 209 
according to canonical norma - we have been content to make 
reference to jurisdiction in a general way. It may be well 
to examine the term 'jurisdiction' in this canon, to ascertain 
precisely what its extension i3, viz., to determine whether 
it includes both ordinary and delegated power, or whether it 
applies to ordinary power of jurisdiction alone.
There can, of course, be no question of the principles 
not applying to ordinary jurisdiction. it is important to 
note however, that the term jurisdiction must be taken in 
its proper signification, as including legislative, executive 
and judicial power: so that the Church supplies all or any
of these branches of jurisdiction, according as the occasion 
arises and the requisite conditions for common error are ful­
filled. Hence besides supplying jurisdiction for the valid­
ity of sacramental absolutions (which is the most usual form, 
perhaps, in which the supplying principles of canon 209 
operate), jurisdiction is also supplied to conatit&te valid 
laws (e.g. to a putative ordinary), to grant valid rescripts 
and dispensations, and to pass valid judicial sentences in 
the external forum. All this is certain when there is 
question of ordinary power of jurisdiction. Do the same 
principles apply with regard to delegated jurisdiction?
We must distinguish here between jurisdictional power 
that is universally delegated and that which is specially 
delegated. Universal delegation is had when a superior 
commits to another all the power attached to his office, or at 
least all that pertains to one branch of his office. Special 
delegation is that which is given for a particular case, or a
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determinate number of cases.v ' Obviously these two forms 
of delegation entail different juridical consequences - hence 
we shall examine the relation between the principles of canon 
209 and each of these in turn.
A. Universal Delegation.
The discussion of this question is practically super­
fluous, for it is clear that canon 209 includes jurisdictional 
power that is universally delegated within its scope. A 
few considerations will put this beyond doubt
1. Canote 209 uses the word Jurlsdictio, without 
distinguishing between ordinary power and delegated. And 
where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
2. Furthermore, pre-Code authorities, from the 16th 
century onwards, unanimously taught that the principles of 
common error applied equally to ordinary and delegated juris­
diction. By virtue of canon 6 n.2, the term jurisdiction
in canon 209 must be interpreted in the light of this tra­
ditional teaching. Hence we conclude that the principles
of canon 209 must apply to universally delegated jurisdiction.
3* A l l  post-Code commentators agree in interpreting 
canon 209 as applying to such universal delegation. This 
is evidenced by the fact that modern commentaries and dis­
cussions on common error seem to concentrate on the case of 
a priest who hears confessions and absolves, while he does 
not possess the requisite faculties to do so; and almost 
invariably, the case considered is not fehat of a pastor 
invalidly holding office, but of a simple priest or confessor 
who has omitted to obtain the required delegation, or whose 
delegation has for some reason been invalid.
(2)
(2) cf. CORONAT A , Inst. Jur. Can., I, n.287.
(3) cf. Above. Sec. Ill, Ch.I, Art. III.
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Even Toao, who advocates the view that the Church 
does not supply jurisdiction, unless the defect is due to an 
invalid title to an office in the strict sense, admits that 
It does supply in cases of delegation ad unlversltatem 
causarum. W  His reason for admitting this is, because 
power delegated ad universitatem causarum provides, as it 
were, a foundation for the constitution of an ecclesiastical 
office. His opinion however, with regard to the necessity 
of an office, as a condition for the operation of the prin­
ciples of common error, can scarcely be regarded as tenable. 
We admit that pre-Code canonists very often, or even usually, 
spoke of an ecclesiastical office in this connection: but
that they did not intend to confine the application of the 
principles exclusively to the case of offices, is clear from 
the abundant examples of cases, in which they apply them also 
to delegated jurisdiction. It is much more reasonable to 
hold that the principles apply to universal delegqtioh, 
because the common good and public utility would be injured 
by the invalidity of acts resulting from an invalid general 
delegation, just as gravely as if the invalidity of acts 
followed from an invalid title to an office.
B. Special Delegation.
This question may be solved along the same lines as 
above. The following considerations would seem to indicate 
that the principles apply even to the case of delegation 
for one case only:
1. According to canon 209 the Church supplies juris­
diction in common error. As we noted above, the law does 
not distinguish between ordinary and delegated jurisdiction.
(4) cf. Jus Pont. XVII, (1937) P. 102.
(5) cf. BADII, Inst. Jur. Can., I, n.149.
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We may reasonably conclude therefore, that the legislator 
wishes the canon to apply to all three classes of juris­
diction - specially delegated jurisdiction included.
2. following the norm of canon 6 a.2, and inter­
preting the term * jurisdictio' according to the accepted
teaching of pre-Code authors, we come to the same conclusion.
( 6 )For if we except Innocent IV and a few more early authors 
mentioned by Sanchez, (7) all are in agreement that the 
principles of the Lex Barbarius apply to delegated juris­
diction. True, they do not all say explicitly that they 
apply to the case of special delegation. A certain number 
however, do explicitly state the point, as for instance, 
Sanches, Pontius and Lessius:^®^ and the fact that the 
remainder are aware of this, yet do not question or contra­
dict it, adds force to the presiimption that their failure to 
distinguish, signifies their assent to the view that no 
distinction is to be made between general and special dele­
gation.
(9)A noted opponent of this view however is Toso.
Arguing from the traditional notion of common error - and 
especially from the purpose of the doctrine - he contends 
that the principles of canon 209 do not apply to delegated 
jurisdiction for one case only. The primary purpose, he 
says, and raison d'etre of this doctrine, according to the 
unanimous teaching of authors, was to anticipate and fore­
stall the grave inconveniences and injurious consequences 
accruing to a particular community, as a result of a series 
of invalid acts placed by one who was considered a real 
official, but de facto was not. But such a position could
(6) cf. Apparatus ad c. 22, X, 1, 3.
(7) cf. De Mat. Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.
(8) e.g. cf. T. SANCmEZ, De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.l6; 
PONTIUS, De Mat., Lib. V, C. XIX, n.llj LESSIUS, De Just. 
Et Jure, Lib. II, c.29, Uab. 8, n.66.
(9) cf. Jus Pont., XVII, (1937) P. 103.
1
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only arise in the case of an office holder exercising 
ordinary power, or at most in the case of one who was 
exercising generally delegated -jurisdiction. The incon­
veniences and evil effects visualized here, could not arise 
in the case of delegation for one case only - the private 
good of the parties concerned would he at issue in that 
case, but not the common good. Therefore, the traditional 
doctrine did not include delegation for one case under the 
benefits of the Lex Barharius.
Against this, however, it should he pointed out that 
the ratio seu finis legis is not always the safest norm of
interpretation. While we admit that the reason for the 
Lex Barbarius was primarily to forestall the evil conseq­
uences referred to by Toso - a fact which we have had occasion 
to emphasize during the course of this study - it does not 
necessarily follow that all circumstances, which would not 
offer an occasion for the realization of these evil conseq­
uences, were excluded from the ambit of the application of 
this law. The law was made for the purpose of avoiding 
certain grave evils; certain conditions were laid down 
governing the application of this law. There is no reason 
to believe that the law would not apply to all cases which 
measured up to the required conditions, even though in 
particular cases, the grave evils which originally motivated 
the law were not imminent. To put this in another form: 
Because a particular case would not, in itself, constitute 
a reason sufficient to motivate the legislator to establish 
a law, it does not follow that a law which is established 
from other motives, but which also covers this particular 
case, should be regarded as not applying to this particular 
case. To our mind, it would aeem sufficient, if, in the
U v - -particular case in question, all the conditions laid down for 
the application of the law were verified. Thus in the case
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of canon 209, if common error, as determined in the preceding 
chapter, ia present, then the conditions of the law are ful­
filled, and it would seem to be immaterial whether the putativ< 
official is reputed to be authorized to perform the juridical 
act or acts by reason of an office he is thought to hold, or 
by reason of general or special delegation he is considered 
to have obtained.
As a further argument in favour of his view, Toso 
tries to 3how that in practice there will never be any need 
for the supplying of jurisdiction in the case under con­
sideration. But despite the fact that he makes some 
questionable assumptions,^10  ^ he merely proves that, in 
practice, it will rarely occur that common error will be 
verified with regard to the authority of a person who has 
been delegated for a particular case. This we readily 
admit. ^ lx- But rarity of occurrence of a particular case 
should not militate against its benefitting by the principles 
of canon 209» provided it fulfils the conditions required 
by that canon, viz., provided common error is actually 
present. For the particular cases in which these conditions 
are fulfilled therefore, we prefer to apply the solution 
stated at the outset.
(10) e.g. cf. Jus Pont., XVII (1937) P. 10b - "Quod 
attinet ad incapacitatem delegati, scilicet propter 
excommunicationem, suspensionem, etc,, paucle res 
expeditur: aut enim censura per sententiam inflicta
est, vel declarata, aut minus; si primum, error 
communis amplius extari non potest, ac proinde 
Ecclesia jurisdictionis defectum non supplet ...."
Is he not assuming too much in saying that common 
error oould not exist with regard to the authority 
of a priest who has been suspended by a sentence?
The general public may never even hear of such a 
sentence. Besides, the fact could be publicly known 
in one place, and absolutely occult in another.
(11) NOTE, Cappello adverts to this rarity of cases - cf.
De Sac. Ill (De Mat.) n.671 - "Error communis ubi agitur 
de hoc aut illo sacerdote perculiariter delegato seu de 
licentia in casu particular! concessa, vix haberi potest.’
ARTICLS II - COMMON ERROR Aim ASSISTANCE AT MARRIAGE.
We have seen in a previous chapter^^ that the act
of assisting at marriage by a priest, was never regarded by
pre-Code authors as an exercise either of the power of Oteders
or of jurisdiction. It was always regarded simply as an
act of official witnessing. The same is true of post-Code
jurisprudence. It is accepted by all, that a priest assists
at marriage merely in the capacity of a qualified or a legally
authorized witness - testis auctorizabllis he is usually 
(13}called.' ' Despite this however, it is certain that the 
prescriptions of canon 209 apply to this act of assistance, 
just the same as to acts of jurisdiction. Treating in turn 
of the act of assistance at marriage by virtue of ordinary 
power and by virtue of licence or delegation, the following 
considerations should prove this assertion.
1. Assistance by Virtue of Ordinary Power.
1. At first glance canon 209 would appear to restrict 
its validating effects to jurisdictional acts alone: a
strict interpretation of the term * jurisdictio' would obvious­
ly engender this impression. But we have seen earlier that 
as this canon is merely a repetition of a well-established and, 
to a large extent, well-defined pre-Code doctrine, it must be 
interpreted according to the norm of canon 6, n.2. In order 
to understand the full import and significance of this canon, 
recourse must be had to the teaching of approved prefcode 
authors. In our study of the traditional teaching we found 
that the doctrine applied generally to the supplying of 
juridical power to a public official, independently of the 
nature of the power in question in a particular case. With . 
regard to the act of assistance at marriage therefore, we
1
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(12) cf. Above Sec. Ill, Ch.I, Art.l.
(13) cf. GASPARRI, De Mat., II, n.932.
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found pre-Code authors unanimously agreed that the principles 
of the Lex Barbarius applied to this act. Though the prin­
ciples of the Lex Barbarius were usually referred to, by 
these authors, in terms of the Church supplying jurisdiction, 
they nevertheless made it very explicit that they intended 
them to apply also to assistance at marriage: so that, in
this matter at least, they placed the act of assistance at 
marriage on a par with a jurisdictional act. Hence when 
the ecclesiastical legislator summarised and codified the 
doctrine on common error - "In errore communi ... jurisdiction' 
em supplet Ecclesia ...." - it must be assumed that he used 
the phrase in the traditional sense attributed to it in this 
context, viz., as applying not only to jurisdiction strictly 
speaking but also to that which was accepted aa being on a 
par with jurisdiction - the act of assisting at marriage.
2. Canon 20 of the Code states: "Si certa de re
dealt expres8um praescriptum legis sive generalis sive 
particularis, norma sumenda est, nisi agatur de poenis 
applicandia, a legibus latis in similibus ...." Thus the 
legislator permits the words of a law to he extended, in 
certain circumstances, in order to apply to a matter which 
does not come under the proper signification of the words of 
this law, and which is not explicitly regulated by another 
prescription of law. This process is called analogy. The 
basis of analogical extension as visualized here is a similar­
ity of case and parity of reason; these two considerations 
demand that matters for which express positive laws are 
lacking, should be governed by the same rule as is laid down 
for similar c a s e s . A n  accidental similarity does not 
suffice; there must be a fundamental juridical similarity,
(1L) cf. BESTE, introd. In Cod., p. 81+.
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i.e. an analogy may only be drawn from a law which is made 
to achieve, in another matter, the same object as it ia 
deaired to achieve in the case for which there is no express 
norm. The question under discussion seems a perfedt example. 
The Church supplies jurisdiction in common error: the pur­
pose is the common good, viz., to anticipate and prevent the 
inconveniences and evils, resulting from the invalidity of 
acts performed by one who is merely a putative official.
This is precisely the object it is desired to achieve, and 
for which an express norm is lacking, in regard to acts of 
assisting at marriage in common error - to prevent the evils 
consequent on the invalidity of marriages resulting from the 
defect of capacity to assist. There is therefore, a complete 
parity of reason between the two cases. There is also an 
obvious similarity of case; for both the act of jurisdiction 
and the act of assisting at marriage are performed by virtue 
of power attached to the holding of a public office. With 
such a similarity of case and complete parity of object, 
there can be little doubting the analogy that exists between 
the performance of acts of jurisdiction by a putative pastor, 
and the acts of assistance at marriage by the same putative 
pastor. By virtue of canon 209 the Church supplies juris­
diction in the first case; by virtue of canons 209 and 20
She supplies the authority to authoritatively assist in the 
(15)second.
3. If there is lacking an express premcription of 
law with regard to a particular matter, canon 20 states that 
a norm must be taken from laws "latae in similibus." It also
(15) cf. CAPPELLO, De Sac., Ill (De Mat.I n.670. "Nihilominus 
huiusmodi assistentia maximam habet analogiam cum juris­
dictione; idcirco quae dicuntur de jurisdictione, dlcen- 
da quoque sunt aliqua ratione de assistentia, ita ut 
praescriptum can. 209 applicandum sit etiam assistentiae 
matrimonio ....”
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dec lares that in the same circumstances the deficiency may 
be supplied by a norm taken from the "praxis Curiae Romanae." 
The pradtice of the Roman Curia, therefore, can constitute 
an official canonical norm: for instance, if a particular
interpretation of a certain canon, as contained in a aeries 
of decisions of the Roman Rota, would constitute a suitable 
norm for a matter in which an express ruling is lacking, 
this interpretation can and must be regarded as an official 
bindihg norm. At least one decision of the Sacred Roman 
Rota has given an interpretation of canon 209 which con­
stitutes a suitable norm for the case under consideration: 
in this decision, canon 209 is interpreted as supplying 
authority to a putative chaplain in order that he may validly 
assist at marriage.
While we do not wish to suggest that one decision 
of the Rota would constitute a practice of the Roman Curia, 
it is nevertheless significant that no other decision implies
a contradiction of the attitude adopted in this case: and
besides, the definitive and confident terms, by which the 
prescription of canon 209 is applied to the case, are 
noteworthy.
i+. Another element which may attain the Btatus of 
a recognized canonical norm, in the case where an express 
pre-scription of law is lacking, is, according to canon 20, 
the common and constant teaching of recognised authorities. 
There can be no doubt that the common and constant teaching 
of authorities has been, that the prescriptions of canon 209
(l6) cf. S.R. Rotae Dec. seu Sent. XiX (1927), Pp. 1+53 aqq* 
This decision of "non constat de nullitate" is based on
the fact that common error existed with regard to the
putative chaplain's authority to assist. In the law 
of the case (p. 1+56) we read: "Valide asslstit matrimon-
iis, qua parochus, is qui est parochus putativus, nam 
"In errore communi aut in dubio positivo et probablli 
sive juris sive facti, jurlsdictionem supplet Ecclesia 
pro foro turn externo turn interno."
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( M )apply also to assistance at marriage.v ' This common 
opinion of authorities therefore constitutes a norm which 
must be accepted and followed, since there is lacking, in 
the case of assistance at marriage by a putative official, 
an express prescription of law.
Prom these arguments, drawn from the principles of 
interpretation laid down by the Code, we may justifiably 
conclude that, besides supplying jurisdiction in common 
error, the Church also supplies authority to a putative 
pastor to validly assist at marriage.
II. Assistance by Virtue of Delegated power.
We have established that the principles of canon 209 
apply also to the act of assistance at marriage, but primarily 
with reference to ordinary power. It may be asked if the 
same principles apply to the acts of assistance by one who has 
obtained a general or special licence to assist. We shall 
treat of the cases of general and special licence separately,
(a) General Licence to Assist.
By virtue of canon 1096, §1, this question will have 
reference exclusively to the acts of assistance by Vicarii 
cooperatores or curates, to whom alone the Ordinary or pastor 
is permitted to give general licence to assist at marriages. 
With regard to the question itself, it is important to note 
the striking equivalence placed between jurisdiction and 
assistance at marriage, both by the Code and by the Pontifical 
Commission for the Interpretation of the Code, especially 
with reference to delegation of these powers. Thus the Coda,
(17) We give examples of a few who teach this: GASPARRI,
De Mat., II, n.936; CAPPELLO, De Sac. Ill (De Mat), 
n.670J CLAEYS-BOUUASRT-SIMENON, Man. Jur. Can., I,
363; MERKBLBACH, Summa Theol. Mor., Ill, n.81+6;
MAROTO, Inst. Jur. Can., I, n.69U; VERMEERSCH-CREUSEN 
Epit. Jur. Can., II, n.392; FERRERES, Comp. Theol. Mor.,
II, n.1075; ARREGUI, Summ. Theol. Mor., n.793;
PRUMMER, Man. Theol. Mor., Ill, n.762.
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speaking of those who may assist at marriage, declares in 
canon 1091+ that only the Ordinary of the place or the pastor, 
or a priest delegated by either of these can validly do so. 
Similarly, in canon 1096 § 1, it lays down that only vicarii 
co-operatores can be given general delegation to assist. And 
by its replies of 28th Dec. 1927» the Pontifical Commission 
sanctioned the use of the terms delegation and subdelegation 
with regard to the concessioto of licence to assist at marria|l.
Having established an authoritative juridical basis, 
such as this, for the equivalence between the granting of 
licence or power to assist at marriage, and the delegation 
of jurisdiction, we may justifiably conclude that the princip­
les governing the general delegation of jurisdiction apply 
equally to the general delegation of power to assist at 
marriage. But we have seen, in the preceding article, 
that the prescriptions of canon 209 apply to acts performed 
by one who is reputed to possess delegated jurisdiction 
ad universitatem causarum. The prescriptions of canon 209 
therefore, must also apply to the acts of assistance at 
marriage by a vicarius cooperator who ia reputed to have 
general delegation.
Furthermore, not only do commentators regard the act 
of assisting at marriage as being on a pariwith jurisdictional 
acts, but they also regard the granting of licence to assist
at marriages as being equivalent to delegation of jurisdiction.
(19)Thus Gasparri writes, M  licet enim assistentia
matrimonio non sit actus jurlsdictionis, tamen in favorabilibus 
juxta loquendi usum, actui jurisdictionis aequiparatur; unde 
verba: delegatus, delegatio ad assistendum, quae verba propria
(18) A.A.S., Vol. XX (1928) Pp. 61-62.
(19) cf. De Mat., II, n.936.
-21U-
sunt potestatia jurisdictionis.” And Cappello - "Kihilom-
inub huiusmodi assistentia maximam habet analogiam cum
jurisdictione; idclrco quae dicuntur de jurisdictione,
dieenda quoque aunt aliqua ratione de assistentia."^20  ^ And
aa their teaching ia in conformity with traditional doctrine,
aa is evidenced by the number of pre-Code authorities who
(21)taught this same doctrine, we have no hesitation in
declaring that, by virtue of canon 6, n.2, the teaching of 
these post-Code authors is correct.
Very few canonists or theologians would question 
thia teaching. Practically all who discuss the question 
agree in giving the same answer. One exception however 
would appear to be Toso. Though this writer explicitly 
states in one context, that the principles of common error 
apply to jurisdiction that is universally delegated/22  ^
he nevertheless seems to imply, in another context, that they 
do not apply with regard to general delegation to assist at 
marriage. It may be well to quote his words verbatim:
Deinde nunquam Ecclesia supplet defectum mandati 
Ordinarii vel parochi, in clerico qui matrimonio adsistatj 
non enim in adsistendo jurlsdictionem aliquam exercet, sed 
tantum Ordinarii vel parochi uti testes qualificati, personam 
gerit. Proinde sine legitimo mandato nihil agit (Cn.1095,2) 
et nihil est quod Ecclesia suppleat ad normam canon 209. Si 
autem supplet quando agitur de loci Ordinario vel parocho,
(20) De Sacramentis, III (De Mat.) n.670; cf. also DE SMET, 
De Spons. et Mat., n. 118 - ”De caetero applicanda sunt 
hie principia generalia in materia delegationis juris­
dictionis. Ita locus esse potest suppletioni Ecclesiae 
quatenus valida sit assistentia praestita a Sacerdote, 
qui errore communi reputatur delegatus ...." CLAEYS- 
BOUUAERT, Jus. Pont XVI (1936) p. 160. M. FALLON, Ir.
Ecc Rec. LII (1938) PP. k3&-k39. JOMBARtf, Nouv. Rev.
Theol. L (1923) P. 172. "
(31) cf Above, Sec. Ill, Ch. II, Art I.
(22) cf. Jus Pont., XVII (1937) P. 102.
(23) Jus. Pont., XVII (1937) P. 105.
non eat defectus mandatl qui suppletur, sed titulus Ordinaril 
vel paroehi, quo occult© carent: ita ut quoties utilitas
publica huiusmodi titulum requlrat ad aetorum nullitatem 
vitandam tituli defectum Ecclesia supplest in omnibus.
Sed hoc in officiis ecelesiastlcis contingit, non autem in 
mera aubetitutione testis.”
¥e do not agree that Toso is correct in contending 
that when the Church supplies in the case of the Ordinary 
or the pastor, that it is the title of the Ordinary or pastor 
that is supplied. It is more correct to say that the Church 
supplies, per modum actua, the requisite authority or capacity 
enabling the Ordinary or the pastor to validly assist at 
marriage. We state this on an analogy with the words of 
canon 209, which declares that the Church supplies juris­
diction. It does not say the Church supplies a defect of 
title: it does not say the Church supplies what is lacking
in order to validate the possession of a certain office by 
a particular cleric, in order that he may validly perform 
the functions of that office; it merely says that the 
jurisdiction itself ia supplied. The necessary power is 
supplied therefore while the title continues to be invalid. 
There seems no reason why the same rule should not apply to 
assistance at marriage. Surely the Church can supply the 
authority required for validly assisting at marriage, 
without it being necessary to supply the defect of title in 
the cleric who assists.
Furthermore, if, as Toso suggests, the Church 
supplies the defect of title, then the cleric in question, 
is, for the time being at lea3t, a real official, and 
performs the aots validly by reason of hia office. But the 
traditional notion has always been that common error never 
effects any change in the status of the cleric concerned.
Jurisdiction was always regarded as being supplied directly 
to him at the moment required, without necessitating any 
indirect or mediate process of concession, involving a change 
in the real status of the cleric in order to make him, as it 
were, capable of receiving it and of validly exercising it.
Similarly in the case of invalidly delegated juris­
diction. Here the title will be the act of delegating or 
commissioning. In common error the Church does not supply 
the defect of title, i.e. so that the act of delegating is, 
as it were, validated for the time being; it merely supplies 
the defect of jurisdiction resulting from the defect of proper 
delegation.
Consequently, we cannot agree with Toso when he says 
that, without a legitimate mandate a cleric can never validly 
assist at a marriage - not even by virtue of canon 209.
His reason for this assertion - that the Church does not 
supply a mandate, but only a defect of title - is hot valid.
We shall consider a concrete example. We take the case of 
a curate (Vic. cooperator) who haa been given general dele­
gation by the Ordinary, by virtue of a rescript, to assist at 
all marriages in the parish to which he is assigned: we
suppose that the rescript is de facto invalid because of 
obreption - but thia fact is not known to the parishioners. 
According to Toso, even though the parishioners may be in 
common error with regard to the authority of the curate to 
assist at marriages, none of the marriages at which he may 
happen to assist will be valid - bedause he has not a legit­
imate mandate foom the Ordinary. In other words, the Church 
does not supply authority when the defect is due to an 
invalid commission or delegation. But this does not coincide 
with accepted teaching - that in common error the power or 
authority required to validly perform certain actions is 
supplied to the cleric who lacks it, independently of the
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cauae of hia lacking it, viz., whether it he a personal 
incapacitating defect, or a defect in the person delegating, 
or a defect in the act of delegation itself. All that is 
required ia, that common error he verified, and that it he 
within the power of the Church to supply the deficiency of 
power in the particular case.
There is no reason to believe therefore, that the 
Church does not supply authority or power that is defective 
hy reason of defect of mandate, any more that that She does 
not supply the same power that is defective hy reason of an 
invalid title to an office. Hence even if Toso does insist 
that a delegated cleric, in assisting at a marriage, merely 
acts as a substitute for the Ordinary or pastor ("gerit 
personam parochi"), there is no reason why the Church cannot 
give this cleric the capacity to validly act as substitute 
in common error. Certainly it is within the scope of the 
Church's power to supply capacity to a cleric, in order that 
he may validly act as substitute for the Ordinary or pastor.
(B) Special Licence to Assist.
Having already established that the principles 
governing Jurisdiction, and its delegation, apply equally 
to assistance at marriage and the delegation of authority 
to assist, it is only logical to conclude that, what has been
(2k)said above, with reference to the application of canon 209 
to Jurisdiction delegated for one case, should also apply to 
delegation to assist at one marriage. The fact that a 
few authors deny the application of the principles to the 
case of delegation for one marriage, ^ d o e w  not alter the
(2U) of. Above Art.I.
(25) e.g. cf. TOSO, Jus P0nt., XVIII (1938), P.165: 
OLABYS-BOUUAERT Jus Pont., XVI (1936), P.l6l;
JOMBART, Nouv. Rev. Theol. L (1923) Pp. 363-36U,
position, because the reasons which led us to assert that 
common error applied even to specially delegated jurisdiction 
apply equally here.
It ia true that the case will seldom arise in 
practice? but circumstances can be visualized in which it 
could arise. For instance, if it were announced at public 
masses on Sunday that a certain priest would assist at a 
particular marriage on the following Wednesday, there would 
be sufficient foundation for the people to believe that the 
priest mentioned, would be legitimately authorized to assist. 
Hence if the priest in question actually assisted at the 
marriage, but due to some oversight or misunderstanding had 
failed to obtain the necessary delegation, there would be 
common error present with regard to his authority to assist. 
And in such a contingency, with the conditions for the 
application of canon 209 thus realized, it would be rather 
sever* and scarcely reasonable, to adopt the opinion holding 
for the non-application of this canon to the case - and for 
the consequent invalidity of the marriage.
ARTICLE III - COMMON ERROR AND DOMINATIVE POWER.
Having established that the prescriptions of canon 
209 apply to acts of assistance at marriage, we can equival­
ently state that the application of the supplying principles 
is not exclusively confined to jurisdictional acts. Is it 
possible that Canon 209 applies to other non-jurisdictional 
acts, besides that of assistance at marriage - to acts 
performed, for instance, by virtue of putative dominative 
power? In other words, could it be established, on a solid 
juridical basis, that the Church supplies dominative power in 
common error? The following considerations may provide a 
solution to the question.
- 2 1 9 -
1. To begin with, we admit that no argument can 
be drawn from the context, in which canon 209 Is found, in 
favour of the view that this canon intends to include 
dominative power as well aa jurisdiction. Though the 
heading of the Title,^2^  which reads "De Potestate Ordinaria 
et Delegate," could be interpreted aa referring to both the 
power of jurisdiction and dominative power, an examination
of the canons in this title would seem to show that the 
legislator had not got dominative power in mind. As
Cruesen points out, of the fifteen canons included in
this title, one (can. 210) deals with the power of Orders - 
the remaining fourteen either explicitly or implicitly treat 
of jurisdiction: indeed but for the inclusion of canon 210
the title might well read: "De Potestate Jurisdictionis.2^
2. But while canon 209 cannot be said to refer 
directly to dominative power, it may be contended that an
analogy exists between this canon, decreeing that the Church
supplies jurisdiction in common error, and the matter under 
consideration here, for which an express norm is lacking.
For, let us take the example of a person who has been elected 
major superior of a non-exempt religious Congregation or
(28)Society, hut invalidly so, because of illegitimacy of birth 
- the fact of illegitimacy not being known to the members of 
the religion. In the course of six years of office, this 
superior performs many official functions and duties: he
receives aspirants into the novitiate; he admits many novices 
to first profession, and many temporarily professed to 
perpetual profession: he enters into mahy contracts on behalf
of the Religion, etc. The evil consequences and inconvenien­
ces accruing to the religion as a whole and to its individual
(26) i.e. Cod. Jur. Can., Lib. II, pars I, Tit.V,
(27) cf. CREUSEN, Acta Cong. Jur. Int. 193U, IV, p.185.
(28) cf. canon 50U.
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members, as a result of the invalidity of so many important 
juridical acts, are apparent. It is possible that quite a 
number would pass tbeir whole life, living in a community 
to which they did not in reality belong; they would not be 
bound before God by the promises and vows they had publicly 
made; they would have no real title to share in the spiritual 
and temporal privileges attaching to membership of that part­
icular religion. The religion as such, would be gravely 
affected by the nullity of contracts entered into by the 
putative superior.
To prevent and forestall such injurious consequences, 
there is no express law stating that, in common error, the 
Church supplies dominative power to such a Superior. But the 
parity of reason or object between this case, and that visual­
ized by the law of canon 209, would seem to demand that the 
norm of canon 209 should be extended to include the case of 
dominative power also. There are other points too, common 
to both cases, which denote a definite juridical similarity: 
in both cases, there is question of the performance of 
juridical acta: in both cases, the nullity of the act results
from the absence of a condition or circumstance, required by 
reason of positive ecclesiastical legislation: in both
cases, it is within the power of the Church to supply the 
capacity required to effect the validity of the acts. With 
such similarity of case and obvious parity of reason, it 
would seem certain that there is verified an analogy of law 
according to the requisites of canon 20: hence it would seem
that, by virtue of canons 209 and 20, the Church supplies 
dominative power in common error.
Such.> in outline, is the chief argument put forward
(29)by Creusen to prove his contention, that the supplying““   1         —■■ ■ ■— »—   -
(29) cf. Acta Cong. Jur. Int., IV, P. 185.
principles apply to dominative power. Creusen ia the
foremost advocate of thia view. Very few authors advert
to thia question, hut those who do, all aeem to favour the
opinion just stated. M a r o t o ( 3 0 )  favours the application of
all the canons of this Title (i.e. Lih. II, Para I, Tit.V)
to the case of dominative power, hut bases his teaching
chiefly on a false deduction from the rubric of the Title -
(31)"De Potestate Ordinaria et Delegate." Coronata holds
for the analogical application, as also do Vermeersch- 
Creusen.
3. Apart altogether from analogy however, it may be 
quite possible to establish that canon 209 is intended to 
apply directly to dominative power.
(33)As we pointed out in an earlier chapter, when we
apeak of the supplying of dominative power, we have two types 
of officials in mind - (a) Major Superiors of exempt Relig­
ions, and (b) Major Superiors of non-exempt Religions. For, 
it will be remembered, that though major superiors of exempt 
religions exercise jurisdiction over their subjects, as 
members of the Church, this does not alter the fact that 
these superiors exercise only dominative power over these 
same subjects, as members of the religion. Therefore, the 
question vitally affects both exempt and non-exempt religions.
Toso would make a distinction between exempt and non­
exempt religions with regard to the application of these
principles to dominative power, and would restrict the appli­
cation to those acts performed by a putative exempt religious
(30) cf. In0t. Jur. Can., I, n. 69h.
(31) cf. Inst. Jur. Can., I. n. 275.
(32) Epit. Jur. Can. I, n.311. "Quia si certa de re desit 
expressum praeacriptum legis ... norma eumenda eat ...
a legibus latis tb aimilibus, a generalibus juris prin- 
cipiis' ut can. 20 explicite aaserit, principia hoc 
titulo expressa poteatati dominativae in communitatem 
ex analogia juris applicari posse censemus."
(33) cf. Above Sec. Ill, Ch. II, Art. III.
superior. The basis for this opinion is his contention, 
that the doctrine of common error had the traditional signi­
fication, that the Church supplied not only jurisdiction, 
hut also any other power required by a putative official, in 
order that he might validly perform all the functions of 
his office - provided that office entailed the exercise of 
jurisdiction. Thus a major exempt religious Superior exer­
cises the power of jurisdiction: dominative power is acces­
sory to this power of jurisdiction. If he were merely a 
putative Superior, then jurisdiction would be supplied to him 
by reason of common error, and, according to the interpre­
tation just given, so also would dominative power, by virtue
(3U)of its being accessory to jurisdiction.
It could scarcely be held in the case of a major
exempt religious Superior however, that dominative power is
accessory to his power of jurisdiction. The power which
primarily and most fundamentally attaches to his office is 
dominative: indeed, it is the power of jurisdiction which
is added on, which is, as it were, accidental to his office: 
hence in reality we may say that jurisdiction is the accesQ 
sory in this case. The conclusion drawn by Toso on the 
basis of dominative power being accessory to jurisdiction 
therefore, can by no means he regarded as unqiestionable.
We suggest the following approach to the question as 
being more in keeping with traditional teaching. Traditional 
doctrine did not confine the application of the supplying
(3U) cf. Jus. Pont., XVII (1937) P. 102. "In primis certum 
est, Ecclesiam in errore communi defectum potestatis 
supplere quod attinet ad omnia et singula acta, sive 
jurlsdictionalia aive non, quando agltur de officio 
eccleaiastico, cui competat jurisdictionis potestas 
ordinaria vel ad univeraitatem causarum delegata 
saltern in foro interno: nempe ex gr. quoties agitur
de Episcopo, aut Vicario generali, aut Officiali, aut 
Moderatore Generali vel provincial! religionis exemptae.. 
in officium intrusis vel potestati destitutis propter 
invaliditatem aut ceaBationem tituli;" cf. Also P. 100 
of same article.
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principles to officials who exercised jurisdiction, but
rather applied them to the supplying of the juridical
capacity, required for the valid performance of official
acts, to all putative public officials. As we have noted
many times already, the important factor always was that the
official should be a public official - independently of
whether he possessed the power of jurisdiction or not. Thus
we saw in Roman l a w , ^ ^  that not only was jurisdiction
supplied in common error, but also the capacity to act
validly as a notary. So also in Canon law, common error
was regarded as supplying the capacity to act validly as a
(36)
notary, and the authority to assist validly at marriages - 
neither of which functions entail the exercise of juris­
diction, or are necessarily connected with an office to 
which ia attached the power of jurisdiction. Authority to 
assist at marriage, it is true, is generally associated with 
the exercise of an office in the strict sense, i.e. as a 
participation in the power of orders or juiisdiction, but 
the office of notary has never been regarded as suchl it 
has never been closely associated with jurisdiction, nor 
with a jurisdictional office.
Yet the office of notary has always been looked upon 
as a public office. To recall but a few who regarded it as 
such, and who applied the principles of common error to it, 
we may mention T. Sanchez^^ S u a r e z , L e s s i u s , ^ ^  
Passerinus Schmalzgrueber^1  ^ and Reiffenstuel^2  ^ -
(35) cf. Above S§c. I, Ch.I.
(36) cf. Above Sec. Ill, Ch. II, Arts., I-III.
(37) De Mat., Lib. Ill, Disp. XXII, n.5k-
(38) De Censuris, XVI, Sec. V, in prin.
(39) De J u s t ,  et Jure, Lib. I I ,  c.29, Dub. VIII, n.6 7.
(UO) De Horn. Stat et Offic. Tom. II, q. 87, n.351.
(hi) Jus Eccles. Univ., II, XXII, n.lo.
(U2) Jus Can. Univ., II, XXII, n.268.
 1
certainly sufficient weight of authority to prove that the 
teaching was well-founded and widely accepted. As we have 
said already therefore, it can certainly he claimed that in 
pre-Code jurisprudence power waa supplied to all putative 
public officials in common error, whatever the nature of the 
required power might have been.
Was it the intention of the legislator, in drawing up
canon 209, to change the traditional teadbing on this point?
At first glance, the phrasing of this canon would seem to 
indicate that such was his intention. It must be remembered
however, that this canon is but a repetition of pre-Code
doctrine, and as such must be interpreted according to the 
teaching of approved pre-Code authors: on the basis of
canon 6, n.2 therefore, it would seem that the pre-Code 
applications, noted above, still apply. It may be objected 
that the exclusive mention of jurisdiction in canon 209 is to 
be interpreted as signifying the legislator’s intention, 
that the principles should no longer have effect with regard 
to non-jurisdictional acts. But we can reply that pre-Code 
authors generally spoke of the Church as supplying juris­
diction, when summarizing this doctrine - yet they had no 
hesitation in applying the principles to provide for the 
validity of non-jurisdictional acts in certain circumstances.
In view of this positive indication to the contrary, it 
cannot be claimed as certain, that the exclusive mention 
of jurisdictional power in this canon, signifies the legis­
lator’s intention of excluding non-jurisdictional power from 
the scope of its validating principles. It is at least 
gravely doubtful if such were his intention. Hence in 
accordance with the norm of Canon 6, n.U, - "In dubio num 
aliquod canonum praescriptum cum veteri jure discrepet, 
a veteri jure non eBt recedendum" - the accepted pre-Code 
teaching must be retained. It seems certain therefore, that
the principles of canon 209 must be interpreted as supplying
1
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to any putative public official, the power or capacity 
required by him for the valid fulfilment of his office - 
always presupposing, of course, that the defect of power can 
be supplied by the Church, i.e. provided the defect is not 
due to the absence of a condition required hy the natural 
or divine positive law.
The point now to he decided is, whether a major 
Superior of any religion can he regarded as a public official, 
in the sense in which public is used with reference to the 
doctrine of common error. It will he recalled that in pre- 
Co&d doctrine, there was no recognised opinion hy which the 
principles of common error were expressly applied to the 
supplying of dominative power as such. The reason for thia 
was, as we have s e e n / ^  that the 17th and 18th century 
juriatB did not regard the Superior of a non-exempt religion 
as holding a public office - chiefly because the juridical 
status of non-exempt congregations was not defined at that 
period.
In recent times canonists have given some considerat­
ion to the question of the precise character of religious
< U U ) vSocieties. Worthy of special note is Larraona who 
divides dominative power into two classes, viz., public and 
private. Arguing from the character of non-exempt religious 
Societies - especially those of Pontifical Right - a char­
acter which is, to a very large extent, public and universal, 
he contends that the power of governing such Societies must 
he regarded as public, and in no way to he compared with the 
authority exercised hy the heads of mere private Societies, 
such as confraternities and pious unions etc. Contending
(U3) cf. Above 8§c. IIIT, Ch. Ill, Art. III.
(U4) cf. Acta Cong. Jur. Int. Vol. IV, "De Potestate
Dominative Publics in Jure CanonlciT* Pp. 1U7-180.
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that the religious state is a recognised public state in 
the Church, and that a religious Society is in many ways 
placed on an equal footing with a diocese, he concludes that 
the power of governing such a society must also be looked upon 
as public power. If therefore, as Larraona contends,
the power of ruling in religious societies ©a such ia a 
public power, then the major Superiors of such societies must 
be regarded as public officials - and are therefore officials 
whose official acta would benefit by the supplying principles 
of canon 209*
This contention of Larraona, however, is not accepted 
by all. In an article treating of Dominative P0wer in the 
Bphemerldee Theologioae Lovanlensia» G. Kindt, while not 
rejecting the above distinction, asserts that it has not 
been proved. He notes too, that Larraona has not given a 
definition of what precisely he means by public power, and 
at least implies that the term public power can only be 
applied to jurisdiction.(47) jt is not our intention to 
criticise the respective merits of these views here, because 
even admitting that Larraona*a distinction between public 
and private dominative power is not proven, and admitting 
the power of jurisdiction to be the only power of ruling which 
can strictly speaking be called public, the particular point 
at issue here ia not affected. We do not wish to establish 
that dominative power, as exercised by major Superiors of 
religious societies, is a public power according to all
(45) Larraona sums up his thesis briefly thus: "Ex dictis
hoc criterium generale enuntiare possumus: quae de
potestate publics in Codice et generatim in jure post 
Codicem dicuntur, nisi ex nature rei vel a textu legis 
supremo gradui potestatis publicae, i.e. verae juris- 
dictionie reserventur, intra propriam provinciam et 
verae jurisdictionis reserventur, intra propriam 
provinciam et pro gradu characteris public! aliis 
inferioribua publicis potestatibus, directe vel analogice 
8ervati8 analogiae normis, applicare debemus." (cf.
Acta Cong. Jur. Int. Vol. IV, P. 178.)
(46) cf. Ephem. Theol. Lov. 1942, Fascia 3-4» (July-Dee.) Pp.
(47) of. Ephem. Theol. Lov. 1942, Fasclc 3-4, Pp. 260, 26l.
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etandards, but it would seem tbat it can be established, 
that this power is public in the sense required in the 
present context. This can be shown by a comparison of 
the public character of a notary’s power, with the character 
of the power possessed by a major religious Superior.
The office of notary was described by Sylvester as 
a public office, by reason of the fact that it is established 
by public authority for the purpose of the public or general 
u t i l i t y . A n a l y s i n g  the nature of the office it is easy 
to see the correctness of this description. A notary ie 
appointed by the Ordinary - who participates in the power of 
ruling in the perfect society, the Church. He is appointed 
by the ordinary to perform certain duties pertaining to the 
Ordinary’s office - duties which the Ordinary cannot attend 
to personally, yet which are necessary for the proper function­
ing of his office, and therefore necessary for the general 
good - since that is the primary purpose of the Ordinary’s 
office. Therefore, though there is no jurisdiction attached 
to his office, a notary nevertheless exercises a public 
officd in so far as he participates to a certain degree 
(as an authorised representative of the Ordinary), in the 
function of ruling in the perfect society, and thereby of 
directing the faithful towards their supernatural end.
Comparing the office of a major religious Superior 
with the foregoing, we can claim that he is constituted by 
public authority. For, he belongs to a body which has been 
publicly approved by the Church, and has been constituted in 
his office in accordance with norms laid down by the public 
ecclesiastical authority, in the general law of the Code, and 
in the Society’s Constitutions. And there can be no doub$
(U8) cf. Summa Sylvestrina, Pars I, v. iix communi cat io III, 
n.2* cf. also Above, See. II, Ch. II, P.
that the office is established for the public utility. It 
is the major Superior of a religious body who admits Devices 
to profession, thereby involving a transfer of those persons 
from one recognised ecclesiastical state to another, viz. , 
from the lay to the religious state. A Superior who has 
power to effect such a radical change in the state of individ­
ual members of the Church - a change which involves the 
assumption of so many new obligations, and the acquisition 
of so many new rights and privileges - must be regarded as 
one constituted for the purpose of the public utility. Such 
a Superior is certainly participating to no small degree, in 
the general mission of the Church, which is the sanctification 
of souls, and is sharing with the Supreme Pontiff in the res­
ponsibility for the fulfilment of that mission. Consequently 
just as a notary exercises a public office - though not 
possessing jurisdiction - by participating in the functions 
of the Ordinary, so also a major religious Superior, while 
not possessing power of jurisdiction, must also be regarded 
aa a public official, by reason of the fact that he has been 
commissioned by public ecclesiastical authority to perform 
functions, which exercise such a proximate and important 
influence on the fulfilment of the general mission of the 
perfect Society.
Whatever views may be held as to the nature of 
dominative power in religious bodies, therefore, it would 
seem certain that the Church steps in to supply the defect 
of this power to major Superiors. It seems very hard to 
deny that the notion of public utility - and this lies at the 
root of common error doctrine - is decidedly in question here 
also. By way of illustration we can cite a few instances to 
support this contention: In clerical bodies we have the
admission of aspirants by the major Superior, their reception 
into the institute, their promotion to Orders (e.g. Titulo
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Missionie)» their later attainment of active and passive 
suffrage; we have also all the juridical acts placed by 
the major Superior in the realm of administration - entering 
into contracts, etc. It not the public utility gravely 
injured, if all these acts are invalid by reason of the fact 
that the major Superior invalidly holdB office as a result 
of an occultly invalid election?
To summarise this argument very briefly: Canon 209
must be interpreted according to accepted traditional teaching. 
Traditional teaching has applied the principles of common 
error to the supplying of power to all public officials - 
independently of the nature of their power - the exercise of 
whose office involved the public utility. The office of 
major Superior of a religious institute is public in the 
sense envisaged here, and its exercise certainly involves 
the public utility. Therefore Canon 209 must be interpreted 
as supplying dominative power to a major religious Superior, 
who has been invalidly constituted, but who nevertheless is 
considered hy all to be a real Superior.
1±. To conclude then, we may review the foregoing 
thus: The argument drawn from analogy, by Creuaen, may
perhaps be questioned hy some. If Larraona’s distinction
d
between publi/ and private dominative power were definitely 
and firmly established, then the argument drawn from the 
fundamental basis of the doctrine of common error, would be 
placed beyond all doubt. But even prescinding from Larraona' 
distinction, the evidence seems sufficiently convincing to 
justify the assertion that, arguing from the fundamental 
basis of the doctrine, dominative power is certainly supplied 
in common error.
ARTICLE IV. - COMMON 5RROR AND THE CONFERRING
Off COHPirmation  by  ths pastors
By virtue of the recent decree Spiritus Sancti Munera 
issued by the Congregation of the Sacraments, ll+th Sept. 
19U6,^^ parish priests or their equivalent^0 ' have the 
power of validly and lawfully conferring Confirmation under 
certain conditions. Briefly the conditions required are:- 
(1) that the persons to be confirmed must be in real danger 
of death from sickness: (2) that these persons must be
actually dwelling within the parish or territory: (3 ) that
the ordinary minister of Confirmation cannot be conveniently 
obtained. It is not our purpose to treat of the juridical 
points that might arise with regard to the interpretation 
of this decree: our sole interest is to determine whether
the Church supplies the requisite power to a putative parish 
priest, to enable him to validly confer Confirmation in the 
circumstances envisaged here.
To give an example: Canon 157 lays down that the
ordinary who accepts the resignation of a certain office­
holder, cannot validly confer the same office on any person 
who ia related to the resigner, in either the first or second 
degree of consanguinity or affinity. Nnw, A. resigns from 
his parish, which resignation ia duly accepted by the 
Ordinary. The Ordinary appoints B. to the vacant parish,
Tarut is unaware of the fadt that B. is a first cousin of A.
(we are suppoging that the existence of this relationship 
between A and B is occult). Consequently the appointment of
(1+9) cf. A.A.S. Vol. XXXVIII, n.ll, 3 rd. Oct. 191+6, pp. 31+9- 
358.
(50) cf. Decree Spiritus Sancti Munera I, n.l, where those 
enjoying this power are specified:- (a) Parish prieata 
having their own territory: (b) Vicarii as described in
canon 1+71 and Vicarii Oeconomi (canon 1+72): (c) Priests
to whom the full care of souls with all the rights and 
duties of parish priests are exclusively and permanently 
assigned in a definite territory having its own church.
,   ■■ —
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B to the vacant pariah is de jure invalid. Are we to regard 
all those Confirmations conferred by this parish priest B, 
in accordance with the ahove-mentioned decree, as invalid?
*
To begin with, ex hypothesi, there is common error 
present. It is obvious therefore, that all sacramental 
absolutions imparted by thia pastor, and all marriages at 
which he assists by virtue of his office, are valid. 
Furthermore, we have already seen the purpose of common error 
doctrine to he, to supply, nbt only the power of jurisdiction, 
but also any other power required hy a public official in 
order that he may validly perform the functions of his office. 
It would seem logical and reasonable to conclude therefore, 
that in the case of B, the Church supplies the necessary 
'power* required hy him in order that he may validly confer 
Confirmation.
The only reservation made, with regard to the supply­
ing of defect of power, is that made hy all who discuss the 
question of common error, viz. , that the defect of power is 
not due to the absence oJ? non-fulfilment of a condition 
required hy the divine or natural law. The Church has no 
power to dispense from such conditions, neither can She supply 
the defect caused hy their absence. Thus the Church could 
not supply the power to validly absolve, to one who has been 
invalidly ordained: neither could She supply the power to
validly ordain, to one whose episcopal consecration has been 
invalid. In the case of a putative parish priest however, 
his lack of power to validly confirm is not due to the non- ^  
fulfilment of any condition required hy divine law. While 
admitting that the ordinary minister of Confirmation has 
always been a bishop, and granting that the non-episcopal 
ministers, having the faculty de jure of confirming, have 
always been of some ecclesiastical dignity, there is no reason
!♦ . ■
regard to the conferring of confirmation, is due to the 
afesence of some condition required hy divine law. This 
is apparent from the fact that ecclesiastical authority does 
actually delegate to ordinary priests the power to confirm.
If an impediment of the divine law existed, whereby an 
ordinary priest could flot validly confirm, then the Church 
could not. remove that impediment, nor dispense from it.
That She does, in point of fact, permit ordinary priests to 
confirm, excludes the possibility of such an impediment.
And from the fact that no such impediment exiBts, and that *
the Church does grant this power to parish priests, it 
necessarily follows that She can also supply this power in 
cases of deficiency.
The case might be favourably compared with that of 
sacramental absolution. In order that he may validly absolve, 
a priest requires the power of Orders and the power of juris­
diction - or authorisation. The first is obtained through 
valid priestly ordination, the second through commission by 
ecclesiastical authority: and thia latter is supplied by the
Church in common error. Likewise in order that a parish 
priest may validly confirm, he must have the power of orders 
and authorisation. Again, the first is obtained through valid 
priestly ordination, the second through commission by eccles­
iastical authority; this latter too, can be, and is, supplied 
by the Church in common error.
When a putative parish priest confers Confirmation 
therefor®, in accordance with the prescriptions of the decree 
Spiritus Sancti Munera, ail the conditions required for the 
application of canon 209 are fulfilled. There is:- (a) common 
error - (b) with regard to the power of a public official - 
(c) and this power can be supplied by the Church. It would 
be unreasonable and illogical, then, to hold anything other 
than that the Church does supply this power.
 0O0----
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The treatment of the question of the licit use of 
common error has come to be confined almost exclusively to 
the case of sacramental absolution. The reason for this, 
is because the case of sacramental absolution is the most 
practical - being that which arises most frequently in 
practice - and also the most important from the viewpoint 
of the spiritual welfare of the faithful. We shall confine 
our brief treatment here to this case also, but it is to be 
understood that the principles enunciated will apply also 
to other matters in regard to which common error may be 
realised. As we have seen in an earlier chapter (l) the 
question refers both to the confessor who knows of his own 
defect of power, and to the relatively few members of the 
faithful who may be aware of this defect.
In post-Code jurisprudence the teaching of pre-Code
authors is commonly retained. There is abundant evidence
to show that a grave cause or grave necessity, is commonly
regarded as being necessary to justify a confessor in using
jurisdiction supplied by the Church by reason of common error.
Thus Coronata,^2' Cocchi,^'’ Merkelback,^) and Vermeersch-
Creusen^) all speak of grave necessity. Wouters,^ and 
(7)Aertnys-DamenN apeak of the necessity of a grave cause, 
while Maroto(®'! and Bouuaert-Simenon^) require a reasonable
(1) cf. Above, Sec. Ill, Ch. I, Art. II.
(2} ci. Ir>st. Jur. Can. , I. , n.293»
(3) cf. Comm. In Cod. Jur. Can., Lib. II, Pars I, n,13U.
(U) cf. Summa Theol. Mor., Ill, n.586.
(5) cf. Epit. Jur. Can., I, n.322: II, n. 157.
(6) of. Manuals Theol. Mor., I, n.103.
(7) cf. Theol. Mor., II, n.360.
(8) cf. lnat. Jur. Can., I, n.731, 5.
(9) cf. Manuale Jur. Can., I, n.363.
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cause. The reason for this general demand for a grave or 
reasonable cause is to justify the confessor in usurping
jurisdiction, or at least in forcing the Church to supply it.
As examples of such justifying causes Badii^0  ^ recalls those
mentioned earlier by Bargilliat, viz., if confession is
necessary in order that a penitent may fulfil a precept, and 
the penitent cannot conveniently approach another legitimate 
confessor: if the penitent wishes to gain a special indul­
gence: if the penitent would otherwise be forced to wait a
considerable time for confession. Aertnys-Damen^^  justify 
the use of supplied jurisdiction in cases where grave incon­
venience would be caused to the faithful by the confessor’s 
refusal to hear their confessions, or if many of the faithful 
could not otherwise obtain confession on the occasion of a 
feast. All these may be regarded as cases in which the use 
of supplied jurisdiction will, in practice, be lawful.
With regard to the use of supplied jurisdiction, by 
those of the faithful who may know of the defect of juris­
diction in the minister, the general principle may be laid 
down that, while a justifying cause is needed, thie cause
need not be as grave as that required by the minister in the
.(liOsame circumstances. Hence authors require a just cause 
on the part of the faithful: this just cause is present when 
it would be really difficult or gravely inconvenient to appro­
ach a priest who is a legitimately constituted confessor. It 
is to he noted that a person Who, without a just cause, appro­
aches a priest, whom he knows to be incompetent, sins gravely 
and hence invalidly received absolution, by reason of lack of 
due dispositions.
(10) cf. Inst. Jur. Can. I, n.1U9.
(11) cf. Above, sec. Ill, Ch.I, Art. P. 97
(12) cf. Theol. Mpr., II, n.360.
(13) e.g, cf, COR OK AT A , Inst. Jur. Can. I, n. 293 - wAd licite
utendum jurisdictions quara aupplet Ecclesia in errore com- 
muni commdniter auctores gravem neeessitatem requirunt. 
Leviorem causam admittunt communiter auctores aufficere 
pro fidelihus potentibus quam pro sacerdote utente.”
(11+) e.g. cf. WERKS-VIBAL, Jps. Can. II, n.382: JORIO, Theol.
Mor. Ill, n.512: BOUUABRT-SIMBNON.Manuals Jur.Can.I,n.363
(15) Cf. BOUUAERT-SIMKNON, Manuals Jur.Can.I, n.3 6 3, Footnote k :"In Sacramento Poenitentiae defectus justae causae ohstare pos­
set valori absolutionis, non auidem..ob defectum jurisdictionis I sedob^lrK  lonem d o c ________________________________________ J
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PENALTY ATTACHED TO THE II LICIT USE OF COMMON ERROR.
Canon 2366 reads "Sacerdos qui sine necessaria juris­
dictione praesumpserit sacramentales confessiones audire, 
est ipso facto suspensus a divinis; qui vero a peccatis 
reservatis absolvere, ipso facto suspensus est ab audiendis 
confessionibus.” The question of interest here is, whether 
a priest who unlawfully hears confessions in common error 
(according to the principles laid down in Appendix I.) incurs 
"k*1® gnspensio a divinis mentioned in this canon.
Various views are held by canonists on this question. 
For those who hold that a priest commits no sin, or at most 
a venial sin, by knowingly hearing confessions in common 
error without a justifying cause,''there can of course be 
no question of incurrence of this suspension: for in the
absence of grave sin all the conditions required for incurring 
a censure are not fulfilled, other authors favour the view 
that a priest who absolves in the circumstances considered 
here, does incur the censure laid down in canon 2366, by 
reason of the fact that he commits a grave delict in so doing. 
Among these we may mention Wernz-Vidal/2  ^ Wouters,^ and 
Chelodi. Many authorities, however, while admitting that
such a priest sins gravely, nevertheless contend that he does 
not incur the censure. The principal basis for tbis conten­
tion is that a priest who knowingly absolves in common error,
(1) cf. CAPPSLLO , De Sacramentis II (De Poen.) n.3^3,3: In
this context Cappello describes as probable, the opinion 
holding that it is only venially sinful for a priest to
absolve in common error without a justifying cause.
(2) cf. Jus. Can., VII, n.501.
(3) cf. Manual© Theol. Mor., I, n.l03»
(U) cf. Jus. Poenale, N. 89» 3»
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even without a just cause, does not absolve alne jurisdictione,
for by virtue of common error the Church supplies jurisdiction
enabling him to validly absolve: since he does not absolve
sine jurisdictione therefore he cannot incur the penalty
(5) (6)mentioned in canon 2366. Among others, Coronata,' ' Cerato, 
J o r i o ^  and Woywood^ favour this view.
This latter view is a very reasonable interpretation 
of the words of the canon in question and certainly enjoys 
intrinsic probability. And by virtue of canon 2219 § 1 - 
"In poenis benignior eat interpretatio facienda" - it would 
seem to be certain in practice.
(5) cf. Just. Jur. Can. , IV, n.2077*
(6) cf. Censurae Vigentes, n.113.
(7) cf. Theol. Mor., Ill, n. 520, R. 28.
(8) cf. Horn. 4 Past. Rev. XXXVIII (1938) "Unauthorized 
Administration of the Sacraments." P. 8U9«
-237-
COMMON ERROR AND ABSOLUTION FROM RESERVED_SINS.
In discussing the question as to whether a priest can 
validly absolve from reserved sins, by virtue of jurisdiction 
supplied in common error, two important points must be kept in 
mind. We have had occasion to mention them often in the 
course of thia study, but their implication are brought out 
more forcibly in the present context. They are:- (l) Common 
error must not be confused with the state of mere negative 
ignorance.^ (2) Common error which arises as a result of
vincible or culpable ignorance of the law, does not benefit 
by the principles of canon 209.^  Taking these two points 
in conjunction we shall be able to arrive at a satisfactory 
solution of the question proposed here.
In order that an unapproved priest may validly impart 
absolution (with regard to unreserved sins), it is necessary 
that the people eommobly regard him as a legitimate confessor, 
by virtue of the fact that some public fundament or cause has 
been placed which, of its nature, leads them to the con­
clusion that he possesses the requisite power to do so.
It is not sufficient if the error, with regard to the priest’s 
power to absolve, arises as a result of absolute ignorance of 
the law requiring priests to have obtained authorisation, in 
addition to the power of Orders, before commencing to hear
confessions. If the ignorance were inculpable - or probable,
(3)as earlier canonists called it' ' - then common error arising 
from it would benefit by the supplying principles, But ig­
norance of the law under consideration here, could scarcely 
be regarded as inculpable or probable; for with De Angelia 
and Icard,^ we may assert that such ignorance could not be
(X) (S>) cf. Above, Sec. Ill, Ch. III. p. '*7 - '*t
(l) cf. Above, Sec. IV, Ch.I, Art. I, P. /a-^x
(3) cf. Above, Sec. Ill, Ch.Ill, Pp. /n - m
(U) Cf. Above, Sec. Ill, Ch. Ill, P. H2
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probable , unless there was question of an obscure or doubtful 
law: in the present case the law is clear and unambiguous.
The same is true of absolution from reserved sins in 
common error. Mere ignorance of the law, that an ordinary 
confessor requires special power to absolve from certain 
sins, is not sufficient basis for common error as envisaged 
in canon 209. On the other hand however, if, by reason of 
some fundament or cause which has been placed, the people 
justifiably conclude that a particular confessor does enjoy 
this special power, then common error with regard to this 
particular power is present, and the imparting of absolutions 
from reserved sins by this confessor will be valid. Thus, 
for example, the absolutions from reserved sins imparted by 
a priest, who had been invalidly - but occultly so - appointed 
to the office of Canon Penitentiary, are all valid. In 
order that the principles of canon 209 may apply, therefore, 
common error must be realised with regard to the precise 
power, required by a particular official for the valid exercist 
of his office.
-— — oOo-----
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